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An evaluation of the impact of financial support provided to business under the 
RSA Scheme (£462.5 million offered to 784 businesses) in the period 2000-2004, 
and it replacement SFIE Scheme since April 2004 (£100.1 million offered to 526 
businesses), was undertaken using a range of evaluation methodologies. The 
specific research objectives set out by BERR were to:
Test the validity of the key assumptions underlying the rationale for the old ●●
RSA Scheme and, more specifically, the new SFIE Scheme;
Assess the outcomes of funded projects against objectives with the key ●●
measure being productivity, skilled jobs and spillovers; in the case of the RSA 
Scheme the principle objective in the period 2000-04 was to increase jobs.
The evaluation of the RSA and SFIE Schemes was built around a methodology 
which included a variety of components ranging from econometric modelling to 
face-to-face interviews with SFIE Scheme beneficiaries, as well as surveys of the 
RDA Case Officers and those businesses who were offered financial assistance 
under both the RSA and SFIE Schemes but who subsequently declined it. The 
scale of this empirical work can be summarised as follows:
Beneficiary (RSA and SFIE) and Non-assisted Telephone Survey (n=319, 162 ●●
and 405 respectively)
Face-to-face interviews with SFIE Beneficiaries (n=10)●●
Telephone survey of non-take-up cases (n=15)●●
RDA Scheme Case Officer Survey (n=25)●●
Analytical Approach
The core of the evaluation methodology is the application of econometric 
modelling techniques which seek to ascertain the net effects of RSA assistance 
after controlling for the effects of ‘selection bias’ by incorporating a non-assisted 
group of firms and plants to embed a counterfactual in the analysis. It is this 
econometric approach which allows us to generate estimates of the contribution 
of the RSA Scheme to growth (especially job creation) in the assisted firms and 
plants.
Given the relatively recent introduction of the SFIE Scheme it is not possible 
to apply these econometric techniques to the evaluation of this scheme. 
Nevertheless, in order to be able to make some sort of assessment of the net 
effect of the new SFIE Scheme on beneficiary firms and plants we are obliged 
to obtain self-reported data from assisted firms on the scale of additionality 
associated with the assistance that they received. While this was primarily 
designed for the evaluation of the SFIE Scheme we do also collect it from RSA 
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beneficiaries for general comparative purposes. This is the only mechanism 
available to us which allows us to make comparative assessments between the 
two schemes. 
Who got assistance from the RSA and SFIE Schemes?
RSA SChEME
Our findings lead us to conclude that RSA assistance has been targeted on larger 
firms which might be expected to have many of the characteristics highlighted 
below. Further, it would appear that RSA assistance has been targeted at firms 
that are more likely to benefit from that assistance. This means that the issue of 
selection is of crucial importance to the evaluation and as a result reinforces the 
choice of methodology for this study. In summary:
RSA beneficiaries grew faster than non-beneficiaries both before and after ●●
receiving assistance.
Over the period 2004 and 2006 growth in GVA of the RSA beneficiaries is ●●
more rapid than that of non-beneficiaries. However, with respect to GVA per 
head growth the difference in mean growth rate is not statistically significant 
due to the larger size of RSA beneficiaries in terms of employment.
RSA beneficiaries tended to be younger (average 24.4 years) than non-RSA ●●
beneficiaries (34.4 years).
RSA beneficiaries also tended to be larger than non-beneficiaries both in ●●
terms of employment in the assisted site but also in terms of employment in 
the whole company.
RSA beneficiaries are more export oriented and less focused on local markets ●●
than the general population of firms and operate in more price elastic markets. 
They are also less likely to be selling to the public sector and individual 
consumers than firms in the general population.
Finally, RSA beneficiaries are more likely to be undertaking R&D and product ●●
and process innovation than non-beneficiaries.
hAS ThE SFIE SChEME ChANgEd ThE PROFILE OF ASSISTEd FIRMS?
Comparing RSA and SFIE beneficiaries in the survey is complicated by the fact 
that the replacement scheme was designed to include assistance to firms which 
would normally have been supported under the Enterprise Grant Scheme. For 
that reason the comparison of the two Schemes is limited. However, we do 
endeavour to control for this by presenting data on those SFIE assisted business 
who had received £100,000 or more in grant support (n=47). The results of this 
comparison reveal that SFIE beneficiaries are more likely to:
be smaller firms (i.e., less than 50 employees)●●
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have younger owner-managers (i.e., less than 45 years)●●
have a business plan although this is clearly connected to the application ●●
process and the use of consultants (see Chapter 6)
be less likely to report ‘maintaining sales for current products and services’ ●●
as a business objective
be less export oriented and more locally focused in terms of sales●●
be operating in markets which were less price sensitive●●
have local suppliers and had higher levels of local purchasing●●
Impact of RSA and SFIE Scheme Assistance
EFFECTS ON BuSINESS BEhAvIOuR (RSA ANd SFIE SChEMES)
Generally, the majority of respondents (more than two-thirds in most areas of 
impact) from the two samples of SFIE and RSA beneficiaries reported benefits 
for their businesses. The most common effects were on productivity and sales 
growth with developments in management practice and innovation management 
some of the least often cited impacts. Two statistically significant differences 
were evident between the effects cited by RSA and SFIE respondents relating 
to improved staff knowledge or skills and improved technical understanding 
and capability. In both cases a positive effect was more often cited from SFIE 
beneficiaries than from RSA beneficiaries. 
The conclusion from the 10 SFIE case studies is that the large scale investment 
that these grants support is something that makes an appreciable difference to 
the individual businesses concerned. In many cases, whilst the grant did not 
on its own tempt the firms into making these decisions it acted to increase the 
size of the investment and to emphasize the growth element of the business 
decision. 
SELF-REPORTEd AddITIONALITy (RSA ANd SFIE SChEMES)
Levels of deadweight from both RSA and SFIE appear low with the majority of 
firms citing some form of partial additionality in terms of either achieving business 
outcomes more quickly or to a greater extent. Complete additionality occurred 
in around 21 per cent of cases. Interestingly, there was no statistical difference 
between the pattern of responses between the RSA and SFIE beneficiaries. The 
important point to emerge from the survey of SFIE beneficiaries is that a large 
proportion of the benefits associated with the assisted investment project have 
yet to accrue which underlines yet again the difficulty in undertaking evaluations 
too soon after the introduction of a Scheme. Essentially the results for the SFIE 
Scheme should be interpreted as illustrative at this stage of its life-cycle.
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The most important point to emerge from a comparison with previous RSA 
evaluations is that the extent of wholly non-additionality (i.e., complete 
deadweight) associated with RSA financial assistance has fallen dramatically 
in the current evaluation period (2000-04). One obvious inference to make from 
these figures would be that the selection process for assisted cases has become 
much more refined in the last 10 years which has led to lower levels of wholly 
non-additional cases being supported. This further underlines the importance 
of adopting appropriate econometric techniques that are able to control for this 
‘selection bias’.
SFIE SChEME IMPACT – INITIAL ASSESSMENT
(a) Employment
Using the information on new and safeguarded jobs from all the in-scope 
SFIE beneficiaries it is possible to gross up this result to produce an overall 
employment effect for the programme in mid-2006. With respect to safeguarded 
jobs the assisted businesses had received financial assistance to protect 10,130 
jobs and we can now estimate that 8,884 of these jobs had actually been secured 
at the time of the survey. Of the 9,660 ‘promised’ new jobs we can estimate that 
4,289 jobs have been created at the time of the survey. 
How many of these ‘actual’ number of assisted jobs can be considered as 
‘additional’? We can use the self-reported estimates of additionality from the 
survey respondents to arrive at an estimate of the number of net additional jobs 
associated with the SFIE Scheme in the period 2004-06. In summary, we can 
conclude that 1,875 safeguarded jobs were secured and that 905 net new jobs 
were created as a result of the financial assistance received. 
(b) Operational Issues
One of the most important issues that emerged from the interviews with the 
owner-managers and/or financial director of the business was that the process 
of applying for SFIE assistance was complicated and has resulted in many of the 
interviewed firms employing consultants to submit the application at an average 
cost of around £20,000. 
The RDA case officers’ survey also highlighted the increased complexity of 
the SFIE Scheme for applicants and the difficulty of assessing both need and 
viability, critical components of the overall decision to grant support under the 
scheme. 
MOdELLINg ThE IMPACT (RSA SChEME ONLy)
The findings of the econometric investigation, which control for ‘selection bias’, 
are broadly supportive of a positive RSA intervention (2000-04) in terms of 
employment growth in the 2004-06 period. There are clearly two separate groups 
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of firms within these data. While there is little evidence that the recipients of RSA 
are those that will generate the highest employment growth, it does stimulate 
employment in domestic firms, and is largely associated with firms with an 
international and national, rather than local focus. R&D, however, seems largely 
unrelated to RSA. RSA paid to MNEs, however, seems largely associated with 
encouraging firms to stay in the Assisted Areas, rather than grow, and grant size 
is more important than the simple existence of the RSA Scheme in generating 
employment.
It could be argued that the employment model may under-estimate the effects 
of RSA financial support due to the benefits not being fully realised and a small 
proportion of the safeguarded jobs not being fully captured in the employment 
growth model. Sensitivity analysis would suggest, however, that these are not 
significant issues affecting the validity of the conclusions.
Overall Assessment
The evaluation of the RSA Scheme (2000-04) and its successor SFIE Scheme 
(2004-06) has produced a range of quantitative and qualitative evidence that 
allows us to conclude that:
RSA SChEME (2000-04)
The findings of the econometric investigation are broadly supportive of a ●●
positive RSA intervention (2000-04) on employment growth in the 2004-06 
period. This was particularly the case for UK-owned single plant businesses.
By evaluating the effects of RSA financial assistance in this way has resulted ●●
in a set of results which, when examined in detail and with different 
econometric approaches, all point in the same direction. Indeed, no previous 
evaluation of the RSA Scheme has opened this ‘black box’ of control 
variables which we know have an influence on firm/plant performance. Put 
simply, the RSA Scheme is positively and significantly associated with the 
creation of employment in the recipient plants after controlling for a large 
number of these control variables as well as controlling for selection bias and 
endogeneity.
SFIE SChEME (2004-06)
Evidence would suggest that the beneficiaries under this Scheme are ●●
achieving real business benefits in terms of productivity and that this was 
also associated with increasing skills and technical capability.
There is a high level of full additionality associated with the Scheme (21.1%) ●●
and this has led us to make an interim assessment of net additional job 
creation of 4,289 jobs with a further 87.7 per cent of safeguarded jobs realised 
– that is, 8,884.
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There are some concerns about the application and appraisal process which ●●
have been expressed by owner-managers/senior management of assisted 
businesses as well as RDA Case Officers.
Our overall conclusion is that both the RSA and SFIE Schemes are delivering 
benefits to the UK economy through net additional employment, higher value-
added and a set of wider benefits that demonstrate linkage into other regional 
priorities such as regeneration, skill enhancement, supplier networks and broader 
environmental agenda. We are much more certain of our conclusion with respect 
to the RSA Scheme which has been evaluated using innovative econometric 
techniques and where the majority of the effects of the financial assistance have 
had time to materialise to be captured in our post-assistance impact period 
of 2004-06. Nevertheless, our analysis of the beneficiaries of financial support 
under the new SFIE Scheme has provided a positive assessment across a range 
of business effects.
1Chapter 1: Evaluation 
Overview 
1.1 Aims and Objectives
The overall aim of this evaluation is to assess the impact of the RSA and 
SFIE Schemes1 in light of their objectives. In particular, a critical aspect of the 
evaluation is to assess whether changing the scheme in 2004, from RSA to SFIE, 
has increased the impact of the scheme. The specific research objectives set out 
by BERR were to:
Test the validity of the key assumptions underlying the rationale for the old ●●
RSA Scheme and, more specifically, the new SFIE Scheme;
Assess the outcomes of funded projects against objectives with the key ●●
measure being productivity, skilled jobs and spillovers; in the case of the RSA 
Scheme the principle objective in the period 2000-04 was to increase jobs.
Although the intention was to undertake a parallel evaluation of both the RSA 
and SFIE Schemes it must be acknowledged that it was not possible to apply 
identical evaluation methodologies due to the relatively short period of time 
since the start of the SFIE Scheme (i.e., April 2004). In particular, fully comparative 
estimates of the effects of intervention derived from the econometric analysis 
cannot be generated for both Schemes. However, some attempt is made to 
inform policy discussions with an analysis and commentary on the comparative 
nature of RSA and SFIE beneficiaries and their perceived effects of the financial 
support provided.
It is important to state at the outset that the approach to the evaluation of the 
RSA Scheme is different from those previously undertaken (see, for example, 
King, 1990; PACEC, 1993) which have relied upon a subjective assessment of 
additionality (by both the respondent and interviewer). Whilst we do include 
these questions in the survey of RSA beneficiaries we only do so to provide 
a comparison with the current SFIE Scheme. To be clear, the emphasis in this 
evaluation is on the econometric analysis of the net effect of the RSA Scheme 
which seeks to control for selection and assistance effects by incorporating a 
non-user sample to act as the counterfactual.
An evaluation of RSA Scotland, RSA Wales and of a broadly similar scheme in 
Northern Ireland (Selective Financial Assistance – SFA) was also undertaken by 
the research team using an identical methodology. Although separate projects 
they will provide a UK database of assisted and non-assisted firms for further 
comparative analysis.
1 A detailed discussion of the nature and scope of both these schemes as well as their history is presented in 
Chapter 2. 
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1.2 Components of the Evaluation
The research specification for the evaluation of both the RSA and SFIE Schemes 
included the following components:
Statistical analysis of the administrative database on RSA and SFIE Scheme ●●
Beneficiaries and awards. In particular, the basic characteristics of plants/
firms who have received grants over this period are examined and include 
the following:
Type and value of award (investment aid/employment creation);●■
Geographic location;●■
Size band of firm/plant;●■
Ownership of firm/plant;●■
Sectoral composition of firms/plants ( production/services);●■
Take-up or claim rate for grants (completion).●■
Effectiveness of the RSA and SFIE Schemes. ●● The evaluation will consider 
the effectiveness of the support provided by both Schemes and in particular 
consider: 
Value of grants and gross jobs secured;●■
Comparative analysis with previous evaluations of ‘state aid to business’ ●■
schemes as well as other area-based initiatives related to an economic 
development agenda (e.g., regeneration schemes).
Additionality●● . The evaluation will look at whether the firm/plant would have 
undertaken the resulting project without intervention. This will include an 
attempt to capture whether the project was brought forward, or made larger, 
or significantly improved as a result of the intervention. The extent to which 
the intervention secured a project which could have been lost to alternative 
regional or country locations is assessed. 
Contribution of the Schemes to regional development in the Assisted Areas ●●
(Wider Benefits). In particular, we seek to investigate the added value of the 
Schemes in terms of:
assisting employment and productivity in the Assisted Areas. In ●■
particular, we assess the extent to which the scheme has supported net 
employment and value added growth.
an assessment of the continued importance of an instrument of regional ●■
aid/development given the increasing importance and targeting of aid 
towards innovation and improvements in regional productivity.
the wider ‘spillover benefits’ from assisted firms?●■
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Operational Issues.●●  An assessment (quantitative and qualitative) of the views 
of firms/plants in receipt of Scheme assistance to ascertain the value of the 
assistance they received and how they felt the Scheme operated. This is 
particularly important for the operation of the current SFIE Scheme.
1.3 Evaluation Methodology
In order to address each of these components of the evaluation the research team 
adopted a broad methodology which encompassed a variety of methodological 
approaches ranging from econometric modelling to face-to-face interviews with 
SFIE Scheme beneficiaries, as well as surveys of the RDA Case Officers and 
those businesses who were offered financial assistance under both the RSA and 
SFIE Schemes but who subsequently declined it. 
However, the core of the evaluation methodology is the application of econometric 
modelling techniques which seek to ascertain the net effects of RSA2 assistance 
after controlling for the effects of ‘selection bias’ by incorporating a non-assisted 
group of firms and plants to embed a counterfactual in the analysis. The 
econometric analysis is based on a bespoke survey of around 700 RSA assisted 
and non-assisted businesses in England. It is this econometric approach which 
allows us to generate estimates of the contribution of the RSA Scheme to growth 
(especially job creation) in the assisted firms and plants.
These econometric evaluation techniques are applied to the evaluation of the 
RSA Scheme for the first time and represent considerable methodological 
improvement upon previous evaluations of the RSA Scheme which have 
relied upon a self-assessment method of ascertaining project additionality. In 
other words we argue that the estimates presented here are conceptually and 
methodologically more robust than in previous evaluations of the RSA Scheme 
with the obvious implication that it will be problematic in determining whether 
the Scheme was operating more or less efficiently in the period 2000-04 than in 
the 1980s and 1990s. 
Nevertheless, in order to be able to make some sort of assessment of the net 
effect of the new SFIE Scheme on beneficiary firms and plants we are obliged to 
follow previous evaluation methods and obtain data from assisted firms on the 
scale of additionality associated with the assistance that they received. While this 
was primarily designed for the evaluation of the SFIE Scheme we do also collect 
it from RSA beneficiaries for general comparative purposes. This is the only 
mechanism available to us which allows us to make comparative assessments 
between the two schemes. It is not our preferred method but it is the only one 
possible at the time of this evaluation. 
In summary, there are four key data inputs which feed into the evaluation 
methodology. They are used to provide both a quantitative and qualitative 
2 Given the relatively recent introduction of the SFIE Scheme it is not possible to apply these econometric techniques 
to the evaluation of this scheme.
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‘response’ to the questions raised by the various components of the 
evaluation:
Beneficiary (RSA and SFIE) and Non-assisted Telephone Survey  (n=319, 162 ●●
and 405 respectively)
Face-to-face interviews with SFIE Beneficiaries (n=10)●●
Telephone survey of non-take-up cases (n=15)●●
RDA Scheme Case Officer Survey (n=25)●●
We discuss each data source in turn to demonstrate what they will provide in 
terms of evaluation evidence.
1.3.1 BENEFICIARy ANd NON-uSER TELEPhONE SuRvEy
Evaluation of the impact of government assistance to business must be 
couched in the wider conceptual framework of the determinants of growth 
and performance. Accordingly, we proposed that the survey of assisted and 
non-assisted firms would seek to collect data on firm level factors likely to 
influence performance and growth. We would argue that without the additional 
in-company information it is not possible to accurately isolate the effects of 
‘selection’ and ‘assistance’ on those assisted businesses that had grown faster 
than non-assisted businesses. 
Recent evaluation work on the RSA Scheme has not adopted such an approach 
and as a result, despite the obvious strengths of large sample sizes and 
comprehensive administrative data on performance, may be unable to fully 
isolate the effects of assistance (see, for example, Harris and Robinson (2005) 
and the current work being undertaken for BERR using longitudinal micro data 
to evaluate BERR Business Support Programmes (Criscuolo et al., (2006)). 
Nevertheless, taken together, these evaluations should provide a strong 
complementary evidence base on the effects of RSA and SFIE financial assistance 
on the performance of firms and plants in the Assisted Areas of the UK.
The telephone survey is the main source of evidence for the evaluation of 
Scheme impact on assisted firms and plants. The survey was designed with two 
broad objectives in mind. First, to provide a set of control variables which would 
allow us to model the performance of assisted firms and plants more effectively. 
That is, to be more consistent with economic theory. As noted above, this is an 
important development in the evaluation and moves beyond the reliance upon 
econometric modelling of administrative data which typically only contain data 
on size, sector, ownership and location. Both approaches should, of course, 
be seen as complementary. Second, the telephone survey will provide a set of 
variables on Scheme impact (self-assessed) which can be analysed in a variety 
of ways to provide a range of evidence on impact.
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Data was collected via a survey of RSA/SFIE assisted-firms and non-assisted 
controls on firm characteristics (e.g., size, age, location and sector), market 
position (e.g., number of customers, suppliers, competitors, orientation and sales 
concentration), strategic development (e.g., priorities, strength of management 
team), owner-manager characteristics (e.g., education, attitudes to external 
equity) and external support. Econometric treatment models which control for 
these factors will be more able to isolate the effects of support provided through 
the RSA projects (See Chapter 5).
Profile and Performance
The initial step in the analysis of the telephone survey was to provide an in-depth 
statistical analysis of the differences between assisted and non-assisted groups 
of firms/plants. We are able to do this for both RSA and SFIE Schemes although 
the sample of the non-assisted group was compiled in line with the RSA profile 
in order to assist with the econometric modelling approach which was the core 
of this evaluation methodology. With the inclusion of the wider range of control 
variables this approach can go beyond the usual reliance on size, sector, age 
and ownership variables as covariates. We can, therefore, formally test whether 
the ‘assisted’ group of firms/plants is statistically different from the non-assisted 
group. This is obviously crucial for the econometric modelling work.
Building on this we can use the performance data to provide headline analysis of 
the differences (if any) between the assisted and non-assisted firms/plants over 
the relevant timescales (we have performance data from 2000 to 2006 to provide 
a pre- and post-assistance period). Analysis of value-added is also presented 
based on a ‘proxy’ question which obtained information on the proportion of 
turnover made up of ‘purchased inputs’. We generate estimates of value-added 
per employee based on these responses.
Scheme Impact
The direct questions on Scheme impact provides evidence on the following 
aspects for both RSA and SFIE beneficiaries:
Route to Scheme assistance – e.g., how firms found out about the Scheme.●●
Levels of previous assistance under the Scheme●●
Motivations for seeking assistance from the Scheme●●
Anticipated and achieved outcomes in terms of created and safeguarded jobs ●●
and sales/exports (SFIE clients only)
Impact of assistance on various aspects of the business – e.g., innovation, ●●
product quality and productivity, technical capacity, managerial skills, internal 
efficiency
Additionality – including timing, scale and location dimension ●●
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Timescale for benefits of Scheme assistance – all realised at time of survey ●●
or not?
Alternative sources of finance explored and appraisal protocols used (i.e., ●●
incorporating Scheme assistance – proxy for additionality)
Scheme assistance in context – other financial sources used for the assisted ●●
project and their ‘relationships’ – e.g., levered assistance as a result of 
Scheme assistance
Other public sector assistance●●
Displacement – this can be difficult to capture but we include various ●●
dimensions which enable us to consider the displacement effects associated 
with Scheme assistance. For example, – information on the proportions of 
sales in local markets and the nature of competition will provide evidence 
on the potential displacement effects of assisted firms/plants. We use the 
percentage of survey firm’s sales which are sold within the ‘region’ together 
with the percentage of sales by firms which compete mainly with other firms 
within the ‘region’ to arrive at some assessment of the degree of displacement 
within the ‘region’. 
Multipliers – questions on linkages and supply chains allow us to develop an ●●
analysis of the potential multiplier effects associated with assistance.3 This, 
for example, will help identify if assisted firms/plants are more or less likely 
to be connected into local supply chains and the extent to which purchases 
are made locally.
All of the above are cross-tabulated with the wide range of firm/plant 
characteristics obtained form the pool of control variables. In summary, a variety 
of ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ measures of Scheme impact, including additionality and 
potential displacement effects, are presented.
Econometric Modelling (RSA Scheme only) 
The econometric models are used to ‘explain’ the variation in performance 
(employment, turnover and turnover per employee) between the respondents 
and, while controlling for selection bias, estimate whether the assistance 
parameter is significant. As noted above this is the core of the evaluation 
methodology for the RSA Scheme. This assistance parameter can be estimated 
in a number of ways reflecting not only a dichotomous assisted/non-assisted 
status but also reflect the scale of assistance. Additionality (or the counterfactual 
if you prefer) is imbedded within this step of the analysis. However, there are no 
estimates of the displacement or multiplier effects available from the models.
The whole point here is whether the assistance has made the treated firms/plants 
perform better. This is the whole burden of the impact modelling – to estimate the 
3 Another view expressed in the past by some Government departments might be to suggest that there is a multiplier 
effect associated with all public sector expenditure and, therefore, this can be applied to any Scheme under 
evaluation without the necessity to derive a ‘banded’ point estimate.
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real effect of the assistance. In terms of the equations we develop (productivity, 
turnover and employment growth) the ‘additional’ impact of assistance is 
measured. Estimates of displacement are not derived from the econometric 
modelling work (see above) but within the equations we included variables on 
the cross-elasticity of products and services and make the assumption that if 
they are not significant then displacement effects may not important. Similarly, 
estimates of a multiplier effect associated with the impact of assistance are not 
derived from the models.
1.3.2 SFIE CASE STudIES
In order to develop further the issues raised in the analysis of the telephone 
survey the evaluation methodology included a ‘case study’ element. Overall, 10 
such ‘case studies’ of SFIE beneficiaries were undertaken across England. They 
were identified from those respondents to the telephone survey who agreed 
to be contacted for a follow-up in-depth discussion of the effect of the Scheme 
on their business. A range of firms/plants were identified on the basis of their 
responses to the Scheme impact questions (e.g., high and low levels of self-
assessment additionality; high and low impact on a range of business outcomes) 
and the detail behind their original answers was pursued.
Such follow-up discussions with the senior management of the assisted firm 
sought to assess the extent to which wider benefits (e.g., spillovers, skills 
enhancement of the workforce/management) are associated with the Scheme 
and their likely extent and impact. Issues of additionality were re-visited but 
further evidence was gathered on the nature and possible scale of displacement 
and multiplier effects associated with Scheme assistance.
The case studies were also used to explore the operational issues associated 
with the Schemes with particular interest focused on the changes in the 
operation of the Scheme from RSA to SFIE in England. Further, an assessment 
of the relevance of the current Scheme to the firm/plant was investigated.
In summary, these resultant ‘narratives’ with the owner-managers or senior 
executives of SFIE assisted firms and plants on the impact of assistance 
augment our understanding of Scheme impact identified from the descriptive 
and statistical analysis of the telephone survey.
1.3.3 TELEPhONE SuRvEy OF NON-TAkE-uP CASES
The survey contacted those firms/plants who applied for, and were offered, 
financial assistance under both the RSA/SFIE Scheme and who subsequently 
declined this offer of assistance. We were interested in exploring the background 
to that decision in order to draw out any lessons for the operation of the current 
SFIE Scheme. 
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The following areas were explored with these non-take-up cases:
reasons that led to an application to the RSA/SFIE Scheme for financial ●●
assistance in the first place
proportion of total project costs sought from the RSA/SFIE Scheme●●
other sources of finance used to fund the project●●
circumstances that eventually led the firm/plant to decline the offer of financial ●●
assistance under the RSA/SFIE Scheme
what happened to the project (proceeded/abandoned):●●
If abandoned – reasons for abandoning the project and who took ●■
this decision (e.g., management at this site/parent company in UK/
overseas)
If proceeded – did it proceed as initially envisaged – and if Yes, how was ●■
the project then funded in the absence of financial assistance under the 
RSA/SFIE Scheme. If No – how was the project changed and what were 
the reasons for changing the nature of the project – an who took this 
decision (management at this site/parent company in UK/overseas)
1.3.4 RdA CASE OFFICER SuRvEy
This was designed to elicit evidence on Scheme operation from the perspective 
of the individual RDA Case Officers who performed an appraisal or monitoring 
role on the SFIE Scheme. This was undertaken for the RDA Case Officers in 
England (n=25). The issues investigated were as follows:
Profile of the Case Officer●●
Changes to the Scheme/Organisational Context●●
Scheme Guidelines – relevance and ease of operation●●
Scheme Monitoring and Impact●●
1.4 Structure of the Report
The structure of the report is as follows:
A review of some of the key arguments and evidence relating to the rationale ●●
for regional policy interventions through state aid to businesses. The rationale 
for both the RSA and SFIE Schemes is set out. A discussion of the impact of 
other area-based initiatives in the Assisted Areas is presented (Chapter 2).
A description of the population of RSA and SFIE assisted businesses in ●●
the 2000-04 and 2004-05 periods (i.e., the ‘in-scope’ records), the survey 
methodology and response rates are presented. In addition, a discussion 
of the timing of the assistance over the two ‘in-scope’ periods is presented 
(Chapter 3).
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The comparative profile of RSA and SFIE assisted businesses, together with ●●
the non-assisted control group of businesses, is presented and analysed 
(Chapter 4).
The detailed approach and results of the econometric modelling of the effects ●●
of RSA assistance are presented (Chapter 5).
Self-assessment measures of the benefits and additionality (including ●●
behavioural) of RSA and SFIE assistance are presented. The issues arising 
from the follow-up case studies of SFIE Scheme beneficiaries are discussed 
(Chapter 6).
The results of the RDA Case Officer Survey on emerging operational issues ●●
for the SFIE Scheme are presented and discussed (Chapter 7).
A summary of the key conclusions (Chapter 8). ●●
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Chapter 2: Public Policy 
and Regional Development: 
RSA and SFIE Schemes 
in Context 
2.1 Introduction: a Rationale for Intervention
The persistence of disparities in regional development across the European 
Union (EU) clearly presents a considerable challenge to public policy in the 
post-enlargement period (European Commission, 2004). In that context, the 
importance of developing even more effective regional policy interventions 
cannot be understated. However, as Martin and Tyler (2006) argue it is just as 
important to develop an understanding of what the impact of previous regional, 
or ‘area-based’ policies have been. At an EU level the operation of the Structural 
and Cohesion Funds represents the most explicit policy tools that seek to 
enhance the social and economic development of ‘lagging’ regions.
As part of the evaluation of the RSA and SFIE Schemes we were asked to 
review the international literature on regional policy and state aids to assess 
the continuing rationale for the programme aims and objectives of existing 
area-based BERR products. The Chapter starts with a brief summary of the 
background to the RSA and SFIE Schemes and then moves on to outline the 
general arguments underpinning the rationale for a state aid designed to provide 
discretionary financial assistance to the private sector in the less developed 
regions of a national economy. The Chapter goes on to outline issues concerning 
the measurement of the effectiveness of regional policy interventions and 
develops a discussion around the firm-level effects and externalities associated 
with assisting private sector investment in UK or Foreign-owned businesses.
2.1.1 RSA ANd SFIE SChEMES: BACkgROuNd
The RSA Scheme has been a prominent feature of regional policy in Great 
Britain (GB) for more than 30 years (1972-2004) and has been used as a key 
‘product’ in attempting to address the labour market inequalities which have 
been a persistent feature of the UK regions4. In 2000, in response to the 1998 
DTI White Paper on Competitiveness it was aimed at more high quality projects 
with skilled jobs. RSA support came in the form of a discretionary grant award 
to private sector firms or plants for primarily capital investment projects in the 
Assisted Areas that will lead to job creation. Safeguarding ‘at risk’ jobs was also 
an important objective of the Scheme. Consequently, it has been the subject of 
4 Wren (2005) provides a useful summary of the expenditure on regional industrial assistance, including the 
discretionary component represented by RSA, over the period 1960-2003.
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many evaluations and discussions concerning its effectiveness both in terms of 
the number of jobs actually created and at what cost (see, for example, King, 
1990; PACEC, 1993; Swales, 1997; Wren, 2005; Harris and Robinson, 2005). 
The RSA Scheme was replaced by the SFIE Scheme in April 2004 with a focus 
on increasing productivity and the proportion of skilled jobs in the Assisted 
Areas of England. The Scheme explicitly incorporated a gross value added 
(GVA) test and a skills test. This new scheme was designed to be more in line 
with BERR’s overall objectives on regional policy which sought to develop the 
competitive strengths of the region through more sustainable forms of industrial 
development. The introduction of the GVA and skills test as part of the new SFIE 
Scheme signalled a commitment to move towards higher quality projects and a 
recognition that the operation of the RSA Scheme in the 2000-04 period lacked 
the tools to ensure that this anticipated outcome could be measured.
In essence, the transformations of the old RSA Scheme and the objectives of 
the new SFIE Scheme reflect the overall shift in regional policy from a policy 
intervention designed to redistribute jobs to the Assisted Areas to one aimed 
at raising productivity through the creation of highly skilled jobs in these areas. 
The business case for the new SFIE Scheme is predicated on these principles 
and job creation remains a crucial aspect as the regional imbalances in skills are 
an important dynamic in the enduring nature of regional disparities in England. 
The programme expenditure for the new SFIE Scheme is approximately £110 
million a year. Applications for grant assistance up to £2 million are handled by 
the RDAs.
2.1.2 RSA ANd SFIE IN CONTExT: Eu REgIONAL POLICy ANd STATE AIdS
The objectives of EU Regional Policy5 are challenging: to reduce inequalities 
between regions, to increase efficiency at the national and European level 
and to decrease inequalities between the Member States of the EU. The main 
instruments available to the European Commission for direct regional aid have 
been the Structural Funds (strengthened in 1988) and the Cohesion Funds 
(since 1993). Inevitably, these objectives lead to a trade-off at the spatial level 
as the ongoing tension between equity and efficiency becomes paramount in 
the execution of individual policy programmes and initiatives. This tension can 
be written perhaps more succinctly as a choice between supporting economic 
regeneration or boosting growth (see for example, Haughton and Counsell, 
2004: 192-4). Using the East of England region as an example they suggest that 
the strategic importance of the Cambridge sub-region meant that it took centre 
stage in the overall regional planning strategy. This type of ‘agglomeration’ effect, 
manifested in what might be termed positive localized spillovers, can produce 
efficiency effects through the self-sustaining nature of these ‘agglomerations’. 
5 The intention here is not to provide an overview of the ‘politics’ of EU Regional Policy since its formal inception in 
1989 and the associated debates on the Budget allocation. A useful summary is provided by Bachtler and Wishlade 
(2005).
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However, the long-term unwelcome or incompatible aspects of this 
‘agglomeration’ process to a desire to reduce regional inequalities emerges when 
investment gravitates to where transaction costs are seen to be lower – whether 
through infrastructure improvements (financed through public expenditure) 
or through the availability of skilled labour which reduces, for example, the 
costs of recruitment and retention. The role of regional policy is to balance the 
needs of lagging regions with the demands of fast-growing regions. If these 
equity considerations are accepted then the issue becomes one of ensuring the 
efficiency of these public policy interventions. 
Western governments have spent significant sums of public money in attracting 
inward investment, and indeed it may even be argued that attracting (and 
retaining) inward investment has been the main focus of industrial and regional 
policy in the UK. The merits of various approaches to regional policy are 
discussed in some detail in Armstrong and Taylor (1993). Leaving aside the 
issue of whether governments should intervene to address regional disparity, 
the theoretical literature on regional policy makes one essential distinction. This 
focuses on the debate concerning whether regional policy should be designed 
to address the symptoms of regional disparity such as unemployment and low 
levels of investment, or whether it should seek to address the underlying causes, 
such as low productivity and low levels of innovation. Largely, UK regional 
policy has been concerned to identify regions with high levels of unemployment 
that could benefit from new fixed capital formation.6
A review of the regional economic development literature in recent decades 
points to one overriding conclusion. Despite periods of convergence the overall 
trend is towards the persistent nature of regional inequalities throughout the EU, 
including the UK. Traditionally, many economists have regarded this to be the 
result of three types of market failure as related to the level of the individual firm 
(which is our interest in this evaluation). 
Market failure can be specified in many different forms but in the context of this 
evaluation, the most important elements are incomplete markets, externalities 
and information failure (Stiglitz, 2000). These principles are contained within the 
recently revised business case for the SFIE Scheme. 
Incomplete markets●● : incomplete markets are interpreted as the existence 
of a gap in the availability of private sector external finance (e.g., formal 
or informal equity capital) to firms for start-up and expansion activity in 
particular regions. The reason for this can be related to the unwillingness 
of the private sector to become involved in projects which they deem to be 
‘high risk’. The new SFIE Scheme has an important, but not a single role, to 
play here alongside other recent initiatives in the English regions such as the 
Regional Venture Capital Funds (RVCFs). 
6 This recognises that there are certain areas of inner cities for example that may have above average unemployment, 
but that seeking to attract large scale investment is not feasible due to congestion or other constraints. This is an 
essential reason why regional policy is based on relatively large areas rather than very small jurisdictions. 
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Externalities●● : externalities are viewed as the positive indirect effects that result 
from firms being located together. These positive externalities may include 
collaboration and networking opportunities (technological externalities – e.g., 
spillovers, linkages), information transfer, the freeing up of internal human 
and financial capital (which can then be utilised in other innovative actions 
within the firm), the leverage of additional private sector financial support, or 
the range of perceived or actual benefits associated with large urban labour 
markets (e.g., skill sets).
Information Asymmetries●● : information or co-ordination failures (asymmetries) 
arise when firms are unaware of sources and mechanisms to access the 
necessary amounts of external finance required for new plants and/or the in 
situ expansion of existing operations.
The enduring scale of regional, and indeed sub-regional, inequalities across the 
EU and within the UK provides prime facie evidence that some combination 
of these market failures can be said to exist. The evolving map of the Assisted 
Areas in England was designed to reflect these ‘enduring’ regional and sub-
region inequalities. The task in this evaluation is to provide evidence of the 
precise ways in which schemes such as RSA, and currently SFIE, can serve to 
overcome these operating difficulties for individual firms/plants. 
While it may be useful to derive an average effect of intervention upon assisted 
businesses the challenge is to understand the ways in which the intervention can 
achieve a set of positive outcomes. For that reason, we adopt a methodology 
for this evaluation which has both econometric and case-study elements, with 
the latter designed to collect information directly from the owner-manager or 
Managing Director about how, and to what extent, the financial assistance has 
helped change behaviour within the firm/plant and in so doing achieve specific 
measurable outcomes.
2.2 Firm-Level and Regional Effects – Developing Externalities
The aim of this section is to bring together the most recent research evidence to 
inform the debate on the expected effects of public subsidy on the private sector 
in the Assisted Areas in the UK. We concentrate here on two dimensions which 
have attracted considerable research and policy attention in recent decades. 
Both are seen as important drivers of regional productivity and competitiveness 
and can be broadly summarised as:
Innovation●●  – at the firm level and also at the regional level – for example, 
within ‘regional innovation systems’.
Inward Investment (FdI)●●  and the anticipated direct effects on jobs, skills 
as well as the wider benefits through spillovers, competition and supply 
chains.
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To what extent has the RSA Scheme, and its successor the SFIE Scheme, been 
successful in enhancing regional competitiveness through these processes? 
These firm-level effects are examined further in the comparison between assisted 
and non-assisted firms and plants (Chapter 4), the econometric work seeking to 
explain firm/plant performance (Chapter 5) and the self-reported benefits of RSA 
and SFIE financial assistance (Chapter 6).
2.2.1 INNOvATION
Regional innovation policy has been a major component of EU Regional Policy 
in recent years. In brief, the emphasis has been upon building the innovation 
capability of individual firms as well as developing networks and clusters 
around the links between knowledge generating (universities) and knowledge 
applying (firms) organisations (Roper, 2004). Policies designed to raise the level 
of innovation at the firm level has wider benefits. Roper (2004) points to the 
positive spillovers associated not necessarily with the innovating firm itself, but 
rather with those ‘trading’ with it in a supply chain context. Spillovers to these 
other companies stimulated by public policy to raise the level of innovation 
activity represents clear evidence of the market failure rational for intervention 
as they are associated with substantial wider benefits.
Nevertheless, it is worth flagging that the extent to which positive ‘spillover’ 
effects from regional innovation policies are realised depends on the nature 
of the research (Roper, 2004). The effects (or footprints) from ‘basic’ research 
are considerably different from those obtained from ‘applied’ research, which 
in turn are very different from those available from ‘near market’ research 
activity. Further, the absorptive capacity of the local or regional economy will 
also dictate the extent to which positive spillovers will be realised. There must 
be some connectivity with the local economic base. Finally, and related to this 
point, lagging regional with very few high-tech firms have the most difficulty in 
capturing the benefits of ‘basic research’. Overall, therefore, the impact of regional 
industrial policy interventions designed to stimulate spillovers is conditional and 
heavily dependent upon the precise characteristics of the lagging region.
2.2.2 INWARd INvESTMENT (FdI)
FDI has been the subject to a large body of research over the years in terms of 
its role in the regional economic development process. Some of the accepted 
wisdom has been summarised by Roberts (2002) with respect to the UK and is 
presented in Table 2.1. 
15
Public Policy and Regional Development: RSA and SFIE Schemes in Context 
Table 2.1: Impact of FdI in the uk
Issue/Outcome? uk
New jobs, industrial 
diversification
yes – e.g. 1984-1991, 200,000 new jobs identified by IBB, around £25bn of 
investment.
Overall competition effects, 
resource allocation
yes – Driffield (2001a); Geroski (1995).
Overall productivity spillovers yes – Barrell and Pain, 1997;1999; Hubert and Pain, 1999. Cumulative 
effects of foreign manufacturing investment in terms of UK location 
competitiveness. 
Specific value chain effects yes – Dunning, 1993, Munday 1995, Driffield et al., 2002. Externalities in 
domestic firms that purchase from the foreign sector.
Profits and performance yes – Superior performance of the foreign manufacturing sector (Davies and 
Lyons, 1992). Superior productivity not always reflected in profit performance 
(Munday and Peel, 1997).
Earnings and labour markets yes – Higher earnings, also pay spillovers identified.
Trade unions and industrial 
relations
Varies, but Japanese investors connected to wider development of single 
union deals, and moves towards strike-free arrangements in enterprises. 
HRM and Operational 
Techniques
Japanisation of British Industry but evidence of take-up of novel personnel 
and operational methods by competitors (Oliver and Wilkinson, 1992).
Source: Roberts (2002)
What follows is a more intensive look at the range of potential effects of FDI with 
reference to a number of more recent studies.
NEW JOBS ANd INduSTRIAL dIvERSIFICATION
The UK government has welcomed incoming FDI for bringing “new jobs, 
new management techniques, innovation, dynamism and competition to the 
economy” and has backed this up with substantial subsidies.7 This view is 
supported by academics such as Eltis (1996) who see foreign transnationals in 
particular as raising quality and productivity levels.8 At the regional level the 
emphasis for many years for the less favoured regions of Britain has been on 
alleviating structural unemployment via inward investment inflows (Dunning and 
Yannopoulos, 1976) using regional support for assisted areas (Gripaios et al, 1997). 
With the decentralisation of industrial policy to RDAs, there has been intensified 
competition between agencies to attract FDI through subsidy packages.9 
7 Evidence on this support is limited. Brech and Sharp (1984) estimated that in 1981-1982 the overall level of 
assistance offered by the British government to incoming transnationals was £1.5 billion. Excluding tax relief their 
estimate was £370 million. Girma et al., (2001) note that in attracting Samsung and Siemens to the North East, the 
British government provided $30 000 and $50 000 per worker respectively, while Cowling et al (1999) cite a figure 
of £42,000 subsidy per job created in attracting FDI to Wales in the late 1990s.
8 See Girma et al (2001). Driffield (2001) explores the subtleties involved in evaluating the effects of FDI in bringing 
superior technology, such as the motivation behind the investment.
9 Witness for example the bidding war in 1997 between two British regions, Wales and the North, to win a plant of 
the Taiwanese-based computer firm Acer.
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For the British regions at least the emphasis has been on using inward investment 
to:
reduce structural unemployment;●●
reduce inequalities, both intra-regionally and inter-regionally via raised ●●
productivity through technology transfer and spillover effects. 
It is clear, therefore, that several regions of the UK, in particular those perhaps 
hardest hit by the structural changes in UK manufacturing, have significantly 
increased their reliance on foreign investment in terms of employment and 
output. While this in general is seen as a sign of success, both by and for the 
respective development agencies, the issue of the long term benefits of such a 
policy, and its contribution to the reduction in structural unemployment is still 
open to question. 
In pursuing a range of economic objectives including reduced unemployment 
and social inclusion, RDAs still see FDI as particularly important as part of 
this regionally-based industrial policy. However, Driffield (2004) suggests that 
inward investment actually reduces the demand for unskilled labour. In so far 
as a key objective of regionally-based industrial policies in attracting inward 
investment is to reduce structural unemployment, it is doubtful as to whether 
this is achieved by a heavy reliance on inward investment when the effect is to 
reduce demand for unskilled workers (the latter are often those most likely to 
experience long-term unemployment and be the target of policy intervention in 
the first place). This suggests that there is perhaps an incompatibility between 
the attraction of inward investment to reduce unemployment on the one hand 
and the goal of social inclusion on the other, suggesting in turn the need for 
greater attention in regionally-based industrial strategies to assist workers who 
lose out from such inward investment inflows.10
INWARd INvESTMENT ANd SkILL uPgRAdINg
There are a number of studies that identify substantial differences in factor 
demand between foreign and domestic firms. The inference here is that MNEs 
demonstrate higher levels of labour productivity, and in turn greater demand 
for high quality labour, linking this to technological differences between inward 
investors and other firms. Driffield (1996) finds that foreign firms will pay wages 
above the industry average of around 7 per cent, partly due to productivity 
differences. Conyon et al. (1999) find a wage differential of 3.4 per cent wholly 
attributable to productivity, and Girma and Wakelin (2001) find wage and 
productivity differentials of 5 per cent. 
Bailey and Driffield (2006), however, question the ability of inward investment 
to generate a greater demand for skilled workers at the expense of unskilled 
workers. While this can be seen in a positive light, in that it leads to a potentially 
10 Trade, on the other hand, can have a beneficial effect on labour, with again the benefits being greater for skilled 
workers.
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improved skill base, it also potentially increases inequality. Driffield et al 
(2006), however, also demonstrate that there are regional differences in these 
effects, and that inward investment in assisted areas appears to reduce wage 
inequality. 
Wren and Taylor (1999) demonstrate that investment incentives have had the 
effect of changing the regional distribution of economic activity across the UK 
in general. As such, investment incentives have had the effect of encouraging 
firms to locate away from regions that demonstrate a more obvious location 
advantage. Consequently, spillovers from inward investment are perhaps lower 
than may be expected. 
FdI ANd COMPETITION EFFECTS
Caves (1996) suggested that FDI would have the effect of increasing competition 
in host country markets. The essential rationale for this, following Teece (1986), 
is that FDI flows are determined by the desire to internalise across national 
boundaries (vertical FDI), or to exploit assets through foreign production 
(horizontal FDI). Teece (1986) then makes the point that, as is well known, vertical 
integration is seen as a response to market failure, and as such therefore, vertical 
FDI may facilitate foreign entry, and reduce the monopoly problem. 
While empirical papers linking FDI to host country concentration are limited in 
number, several authors have tested more indirectly whether inward FDI can 
affect domestic firms market shares or profitability. Aitken and Harrison (1999) 
for example, argue that one of the impacts of inward FDI is that the output of 
domestic firms is reduced as a result of the increased competition from the 
foreign entrant. If domestic industries were characterised by high levels of 
competition and low concentration then this result would be a matter of concern 
as one may expect concentration rates to rise following large scale foreign entry. 
However, there is also evidence that FDI is attracted into sectors where host 
country profitability is high (Geroski, 1995), and that FDI generates a decline in 
domestic firms’ profitability, Driffield and Munday (1998). Such ideas are tested 
directly by Driffield (2001a; 2001b), and in general he finds that while there is 
some evidence that FDI is associated with more concentrated industries (in 
terms of explaining FDI flows), FDI acts to reduce concentration and increase 
competition. 
PROduCTIvITy SPILLOvERS FROM FdI
There is a growing literature which suggests that over time, domestic firms 
are able to appropriate productivity spillovers from foreign MNEs11. This can 
occur directly, through the licensing of a particular technology, through supplier 
networks or subcontracting arrangements, or indirectly as knowledge becomes 
public, and spillovers are assimilated by the domestic sector.
11 See for example , Blomström (1989), Driffield (2001), Rodriguez-Clare (1996), and Aitken and Harrison (1999).
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Evidence is emerging that such spillovers are generating increases in technological 
capability of domestic firms (Markusen, 1995). Barrell and Pain (1997) find that in 
the UK manufacturing sector that a 1 per cent rise in the FDI stock is estimated 
to raise technical progress by 0.26 per cent. Barrell and Pain (1997), however, 
are unable to distinguish between the aggregate improvement in technical 
progress, and the impact solely on the domestic sector. Both the productivity 
and spillover effects are likely to have an impact upon relative employment. 
Indeed, Hubert and Pain (1999) suggest that inward investment is virtually solely 
labour augmenting, and as such, inward investment acts to reduce the demand 
for unskilled workers, while Aitken et al (1996) suggest that such productivity 
gains may be translated into increased wages within the domestic sector.
Markusen and Venables (1999) outline the two main impacts on local firms 
of inward investment, as do Aitken and Harrison (1999). In addition to the 
standard productivity gains argument, Aitken and Harrison (1999) explain a 
further impact of a large MNE entering an industry. The foreign firm captures 
some of the domestic firms’ market shares forcing them to operate at a smaller 
scale, reducing output and (possibly) increasing unit cost. This is expected to 
be significant in imperfectly competitive markets, and is similar to the result 
reported by Driffield and Munday (1998)12. 
There is now a substantial body of evidence that positive productivity spillovers 
do indeed occur13. A large review of this literature can be found in both Görg 
and Greenaway (2004) and Görg and Strobl (2001). In general this literature finds 
that spillovers do occur, but that they are neither guaranteed nor automatic, 
and is also potentially problematic to isolate. First, there is the possibility of a 
market stealing effect, in which more productive MNEs take market share from 
less efficient domestic producers, forcing them up the average cost curve and so 
lowering their productivity (Aitken and Harrison, 1999). 
Secondly, there is the possibility that outward FDI may be undertaken not to 
exploit the technology of an MNE in a new location, but to source the technology 
of a host country and use it to advantage either in the foreign affiliate or in the 
MNE’s home economy. Under such circumstances, any productivity spillovers 
may be very limited, or may run in the reverse way from the conventional model 
i.e. from domestic to foreign enterprises. This phenomenon has become known 
in the literature as technology sourcing. Technology sourcing behaviour may 
be particularly important in the flows of FDI between technologically advanced 
countries; indeed Van Pottelsberghe de la Potterie and Lichtenberg (2001) 
suggest that much of the outward FDI among the major industrialised countries 
is of this sort.14 
12 This phenomenon would still be expected in contestable markets. Theory suggests that firms in contestable 
markets operate at, or very close to their minimum efficient scale. As such, entry by a (superior) MNE would result 
in a loss of market share for the domestic firm, thus forcing it back up its long run AC curve, increasing average 
costs.
13 See Blomström and Kokko (1998) for a review of the evidence. However, Görg and Strobl (2001) demonstrate that 
this may be sensitive to the measure of foreign involvement.
14 However, Love (2003) finds little evidence of technology sourcing among inward or outward US FDI over the period 
1981-95.
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The most recent work on this issue (De Propis and Driffield, 2006) examine the 
role of FDI in developing spillover effects with the creation of local clusters and 
conclude that perhaps previous thinking was overstating the case. Rather than 
generating clusters FDI would appear to be locating in certain regions to benefit 
from pre-existing clusters of established firms (which develops and supports 
their earlier work on Italy).
FdI ANd SuPPLy ChAIN LINkAgES
The literature cited in the previous section reveals a potential for domestic 
suppliers to the foreign-owned sector to benefit in terms of both productivity and 
performance. Such a potential, however, needs to be assessed in the context of 
the modern manufacturing environment. For example, a large number of foreign 
firms in the UK (particularly those in electronics, engineering, and automotive) 
form part of an increasingly global system of production, which in the 1980s and 
1990s saw a growing emphasis on flexible production systems (see for example, 
Delbridge et al., 1998). 
Connected to this new emphasis has been a restructuring of buyer-supplier 
partnerships (Helper 1991a, 1991b; Imrie and Morris, 1992) and a greater focus on 
long term contracts with a reduced number of suppliers, with an accompanying 
movement away from short term arms-length contractual relationships. This 
provides increased scope for significant production externalities, particularly 
where a foreign party possesses a set of ownership advantages embodied in 
specific assets, technology and knowledge (Dunning, 1993). In this manufacturing 
environment in particular, foreign manufacturers can act in ways that improve 
the technical capability of their domestic suppliers, for example, in terms of 
design, procurement, market information and tooling, and in promoting quality 
and efficiency improvements (Munday et al., 1995). In this way significant 
production externalities may be generated by the foreign sector through the 
value chain. As a result there could be productivity gains in domestic industries 
linked to sectors with significant foreign investment. 
The existence of production externalities from the foreign owned sector may 
not always be reflected in value added growth in the domestic supplier sector. 
The observed productivity externality from the foreign sector back through the 
supply chain could be mediated by a series of factors. These might include 
the nature of the foreign subsidiary, and the freedom of local management 
teams to direct purchasing decisions against the need to realise global level 
economies in complex component purchasing decisions. Other mediating 
factors include the degree of vertical integration, technology levels, and finally 
the mix of components and materials bought locally i.e. low or high value-added 
components. 
Domestic firms (primarily SMEs) may have particular difficulties in contracting 
to large multinationals. Factors influencing the magnitude of this problem 
include the ‘relationship-specificity’ of the investment required, and the strength 
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of contracting parties in appropriating any quasi-rents available in the presence 
of small numbers. Thus, upon re-negotiation of contracts, the domestic firms 
face an adverse selection problem. Graham et al. (1999) concluded that where 
significant buyer power is present, gains due to productivity growth in the 
upstream sector, are largely appropriated by the downstream sector. Azzam 
(1998) found a similar result with input prices inversely related to concentration 
in downstream sectors.
More specifically for multinational firms may be concerns of loss of resource 
control where knowledge and expertise is transferred to the supplier. This 
possibility is enhanced in the presence of information technology links between 
firms which have been shown to increase the potential for opportunistic behaviour 
(Clemons et al., 1993). For these reasons an element of explicit or implicitly 
agreed ‘exclusivity’ is common in such buyer-supplier partnerships, whereby the 
purchasing firm can achieve a degree of co-ordination similar to that achieved 
with in-house production, without experiencing the full costs associated with 
transactions risk. Then exclusivity can remove the agency problems that could 
discourage technology transfer. However, this also leads to the supplier firms 
facing adverse selection problems when contracts are re-negotiated (for general 
discussion see Comanor and Rey, 2000). 
A range of studies have suggested that buyer-supplier partnerships involving 
foreign firms are a mechanism for productivity spillovers, technology diffusion 
(Morris et al., 1993; Görg and Ruane, 1998), and more fundamental value chain 
restructuring (O’hUallachain and Wasserman, 1999). In a wider review, Crone 
and Roper (2001) examined the specific literature on knowledge transfers from 
multinationals, and concluded that the supply chain is the main route through 
which knowledge is transferred from multinational plants to indigenous firms, 
and that such transfers lead to important improvements in supplier performance. 
The more system-wide efficiency effects of growth in FDI were also demonstrated 
by Gillespie et al., (2000) for Scotland. 
Despite its importance, examining the significance of production externalities 
generated by FDI in the supply chain has hitherto been problematic, largely due 
to data constraints. Nevertheless, there is some case evidence of the importance 
of such effects (see Oliver and Wilkinson 1992; Morris et al., 1993). Moreover, 
there is an apparent consensus that low levels of input-output linkages between 
the foreign and domestic sectors are an impediment to cluster development, a 
theme which is increasing in importance in several UK RDA strategy documents. 
Indeed there is more general evidence purporting to demonstrate that those 
foreign investors with the lowest rates of local linkages contribute least to 
regional growth prospects and competitiveness (Crone and Roper 2001; see 
also Brand et al. 2000). There is then an underlying assumption that higher 
levels of transaction linkages between foreign and domestic firms are beneficial 
to the domestic sector, with an implicit recognition that the intensity of input-
output linkages encourage knowledge and technology spillovers to indigenous 
sectors. 
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2.3 Area-Based Policy Initiatives in the UK
How does any assessment of the cost-effectiveness of regional industrial policy 
compare with other area-based policies in the UK? This is an important question 
in the context of developing the most effective and efficient set of policy 
instruments with which to maximise the benefit to the less-developed cities 
and regions of the UK. Area-Based Initiatives (ABIs) have been a central feature 
of policy interventions designed to regenerate the more deprived local and 
regional economies of the UK through community engagement and partnership 
(Lawless, 2006). Two recent reviews by Lawless (2006) and Rhodes et al., (2005) 
provide a useful overview of what the objectives of ABIs have been in general 
and what they have actually achieved using, respectively, the examples of the 
New Deal for Communities and the Single Regeneration Budget (SRB).
As part of this evaluation of the RSA and SFIE Schemes in England we were 
asked to assemble the existing evidence on the cost-effectiveness of other area-
based programmes in England. An immediate issue to recognise is that many 
national programmes targeted at either businesses (e.g., SMEs – Business Link), 
groups (e.g., unemployed/inactive – New Deal) or universities (KTP, University 
Challenge or LINK) do have a spatial component to them but many of the 
evaluations do not apportion the overall net benefit to particular geographical 
areas. That is not meant as a criticism of the evaluations of these programmes 
but an important recognition that the task is probably impossible. This does, 
however, create a double challenge for the comparative assessment of the cost- 
effectiveness of Schemes such as RSA and SFIE because, as they are tightly 
focused on the Assisted Areas, they tend to get compared to other area-based 
programmes as well as other BERR Business Support Products.
An overview of the major area-based programmes and their impacts (where 
available) are summarised in Appendix 3 (Tables A1-A8). This was compiled 
specifically for this evaluation. What we summarise below in Table 2.2 and 
Table 2.3 is a comparative review of the impact of area-based business support 
initiatives in deprived urban areas and is taken from the recent report on the ‘State 
of the English Cities” published in March 2006 by the ODPM. Making the case 
for the importance of cities to regional growth the document brought together 
the available evaluation evidence. This has been supplemented with recent 
evidence on their evaluation work on New Deal for Communities Programme 
and the Single Regeneration Budget (Lawless, 2006; Rhodes et al., 2005).
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Table 2.2: Impact of Business Support Initiatives in deprived urban Areas
Programme/Scheme Impact
Regional Selective Assistance (1991-95) – 
based on AEP (2000) and Wren (2005)
Created or safeguarded 84,000 jobs (40% of gross figure) – AEP, •	
2000.
14% reduction in Assisted Areas unemployment at cost per net •	
discounted job of £17,500.
Further calculations by Wren on ‘permanent net job equivalents’ •	
reduce the employment effect to 21,000 and 39,000 for England 
and GB respectively at an increased cost per job of between 
£17,500 and £53,750.
urban development Corporations (focus 
on property)
Enabling expansion of existing business into more modern •	
premises – Tyne & Wear and Sheffield
Low-levels of displacement of economic activity (Bristol, •	
Manchester and Leeds)
Low-levels of local recruitment by resident firms – issues of mis-•	
match 
Enterprise Zones Low-levels of displacement•	
Highest additionality with manufacturing firms – lowest with retail •	
and distribution
58,000 additional jobs•	
Cost-per-job at 1994/95 prices was £1,700 per year (£17,000 on the •	
standard assumption of a 10 year job life
City Challenge 8,700 new business created•	
87,000 business receiving advice•	
170,000 gross jobs (created and safeguarded)•	
estimate of 20,000 net jobs•	
cost-per-job £37,000•	
cost effective in supplying business advice but expensive •	
regarding new business formation (due to displacement and 
sustainability issues)
Single Regeneration Budget Rounds 1 to 5 of the SRB over the period 1995 to 2000 created or •	
safeguarded 512,355 jobs (ODPM). 
67,926 new businesses have started up under SRB funded •	
schemes
only 15% of schemes primarily concerned with business •	
development/inward investment
Business development in the Coalfields Overall, limited success in attracting inward investment•	
Cost-per-net-job of providing business support relatively high – •	
£28,000 and additionality relatively low (38%)
Source: Based on Chapter 10, “State of the English Cities” (ODPM, 2006) with additional inserts from original 
programme evaluation documents. 
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Table 2.3: ABIs: headline Evaluation Evidence on value for Money 
Policy Measure (1981-2000) Estimated Public 




by other Private 
and Public Sector
 (£bn)




London Docklands Development Corporation 2.90 9.69 44,000
Other Urban Development Corporations 1.70 9.26 81,387
Enterprise Zones 1.00 2.00 58,000
City Challenge 1.14 6.25 32,000
English Partnerships 1.00 2.30 90,000
SRB Challenge Fund 2.20 8.81 44,728
Total 9.94 38.31 350,115
Source: Dabinett et al., (2001)
From Table 2.3 we can see a summary of the evaluation evidence across ABIs 
in the 20 years to 2000 (Dabinett et al., 2001). Overall, it is possible to associate 
the creation of 350,115 net additional jobs in the targeted areas. Although 
the comparative assessment of alternative policy instruments is an important 
question to address it can also be seen as an artificial one. It must be noted that 
this comparative assessment between the effects of the RSA/SFIE Schemes and 
other areas-based programmes is problematic and may remain so due to the 
difficulties in making worthwhile comparisons between ‘evaluations’ employing 
very different methodologies. Lawless (2006) and Armstrong and Wells (2006) 
argue that the challenge for evaluation is a very real one and demands greater 
emphasis on less positivistic approaches.
For example, Rhodes et al., (2005: 1945) acknowledge the conceptual and 
measurement issues associated with evaluating ABIs and through their case 
study work on seven SRB areas in England prefer to talk about ‘small, but valuable 
improvements in the well-being of their residents across a range of social, 
economic and physical indicators that might have been expected a priori to have 
been affected…’. To derive comparative value for money assessments of ABIs, 
such as that undertaken by Dabinett et al., (2001) raises obvious methodological 
concerns about what do statistics on, for example, ‘net additional jobs’ actually 
mean and overlook the less tangible programme outcomes. The problem is 
that to embark upon such comparisons necessitates indicators which ‘translate’ 
across programmes even if they are methodologically suspect. In that context, 
to reduce an assessment of the relative contribution of the SFIE Scheme to the 
social and economic development of the Assisted Areas to ‘point estimates’ of 
the numbers of net jobs and their associated costs is potentially misleading.
More importantly, however, we would argue that the problem relates to the 
nature of the intervention to be evaluated as many of the ABIs are property 
focused and tied in to a regeneration agenda. The operation of a mainstream 
business support product, such as the current SFIE Scheme, cannot sit in 
isolation from these other area-based programmes and initiatives. Therefore, 
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there is a real danger that policy-makers are drawn towards the continuation of 
those schemes that produce the largest ‘effects’ (jobs, skills, export sales etc..) 
in the shortest time period without an acceptance that the work of say the Urban 
Development Corporation in creating the infrastructure has been instrumental in 
facilitating the benefits under a business support product. 
The emerging biotechnology cluster in Teesside is an example where the SFIE 
Scheme has been able to assist new and existing businesses on the back of 
a recently developed modern business infrastructure. Similarly, and again in 
the North East, the regeneration of the Derwent Valley is interconnected to 
the operation of the SFIE Scheme in providing capital investment to projects 
located in the area. So, a ‘league table’ of policy interventions aimed at showing 
which ones are the most successful (defined as large and wide-ranging effects 
combined with cost effectiveness) needs to be interpreted with care. Indeed, one 
could argue it is a less than helpful exercise and misunderstands how, at the 
local level, the process of economic development actually takes place. 
The details of the impact reported in Table 2.2 and Table 2.3 concentrate on the 
quantitative impacts at this stage rather than the range of other more qualitative 
outcomes (wider benefits) of these policy interventions, which as we argued 
above are equally important outcomes to capture.
2.4 Summary
The rationale for developing and maintaining a business support product such 
as the SFIE Scheme rests on the notion that the needs of the Assisted Areas in 
England are best served by a ‘state aid’ that produces a wide range of effects at 
the firm level and, more importantly, at the broader regional and national level. 
The review of the literature on regional and industrial policy serves to highlight 
the potential role of innovation and FDI in producing important externalities 
which may produce sustainable economic impacts in the Assisted Areas. The 
empirical evidence would suggest that these effects are not inconsiderable. 
The task in the remainder of this report is to harness the evidence across the 
various components of our evaluation study to provide a clear commentary 
on whether the RSA Scheme, and its successor the SFIE Scheme, were able to 
produce effects at the firm level (e.g., increased R&D, greater levels of innovation, 
increased productivity, employment growth, spillover effects on domestic 
industry through linkages and/or supply chain effects of inward investment 
projects). Chapter 4 provides an overview of the profile of both RSA and SFIE 
beneficiaries in our survey and will pick up on a number of these issues in a 
descriptive manner. Chapter 5 presents the results of our econometric modelling 
which seeks to identify if there is ‘an assistance effect’ in the growth model and 
in so doing test for the contribution of a range of firm/plant characteristics in the 
overall explanation of that growth over the period 2004 and 2006.
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Finally, it is our view that the SFIE Scheme, even within a policy framework 
underpinned by competing departmental priorities and budget constraints, 
should not be seen as competing with other policy instruments in the Assisted 
Areas. We base this conclusion on the fact that it is the most significant public 
sector budget available for investment in the private sector and has the potential 
to work in partnership with other ABIs (i.e., regeneration programmes) to 
redress the social and economic fortunes of the most deprived areas in England. 
To engage in comparative cost effectiveness exercise across this range of policy 
instruments, even if it could be achieved with methodological rigour, would be 
potentially damaging.
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Chapter 3: RSA and SFIE 
Beneficiary Surveys: 
Background and Sampling 
Issues 
3.1 Profile of RSA and SFIE Offers of Assistance
The sampling frame was drawn from the population of RSA and SFIE 
beneficiaries in the period since April 2000. The SFIE Scheme, which replaced 
the old RSA Scheme, was introduced in April 2004. We set out below the nature 
of the population of the two beneficiary groups. 
3.1.1 RSA SChEME (2000-2004)
In the four years to March 2004 there were 78415 ‘in-scope’ RSA beneficiary 
firms/plants in England which were included in the survey. Just under two-thirds 
(61.7%) located in the Assisted Areas of the North East, North West and Yorkshire 
and Humberside. The average mean employment size of a RSA beneficiary 
in this period was 202 employees (median 96 employees) and in total there 
were 155,510 employees in these 784 businesses. Just over a quarter (26%) of 
beneficiaries employed less than 50 employees. With respect to ownership, just 
over a fifth (22.2%) of RSA beneficiaries were foreign-owned businesses: 7.9 per 
cent of all beneficiaries were US-owned, 2.8 per cent Japanese-owned. Three-
quarters (74.4%) of the assisted business were in the manufacturing sector with 
a further 10.7 per cent in Financial and Business Services.
Overall, these businesses received offers totalling £462.5 million in the period 
with an average mean level of financial assistance of £590,635 (median £200,000). 
On average foreign-owned firms/plants received offers totalling £1.17 million 
(median £400,000), although this is distorted by 18 cases offered in excess of 
£2 million each. By contrast, UK-owned businesses received on average an 
offer of £428,475 (median £180,000), although this too is influenced by 10 cases 
each offered in excess of £2million. Just over one in ten of all offers of financial 
assistance in the period were over £1 million. 
Overall, the £462.5m offered to businesses was related to the estimated 
‘creation’ of 83,613 total jobs in the assisted businesses in the period 2000-04, 
15 This number was reached after a substantial cleaning process of the original dataset of 1,137 cases received 
from BERR and the RDAs with, for example, the removal of those applications rejected, offered but not accepted, 
application withdrawn, duplicates, firms in receivership and businesses that had ceased trading. It is, therefore, 
a slight under-estimate (i.e., not counting offers that were declined) of the total number of businesses receiving 
financial assistance under the RSA Scheme in the period. See Appendix 1 for a full account of the attrition 
process. 
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of which 43,716 were new jobs and 39,897 were safeguarded jobs (Table 3.1). 
UK businesses were responsible for almost two-thirds (62.0%) of these total 
jobs. Further, UK-owned businesses were slightly more likely to be supported 
to create new jobs rather than safeguard existing jobs: it is estimated that they 
would be creating 29,067 new jobs (mean 53.9 jobs) and safeguarding 22,760 
jobs (mean 72.9 jobs). By contrast, foreign-owned firms/plants were slightly 
more likely to have received financial assistance to safeguard jobs rather than 
creating new jobs. Just under two-fifths (38.0%) of the total estimate of created 
or safeguarded jobs under the RSA Scheme were in foreign-owned plants. 
Table 3.1: Number of Estimated New and Safeguarded Jobs by Ownership in 
RSA-Assisted Businesses (2000-04)
New Jobs New Jobs Safeguarded Jobs Safeguarded Jobs
Mean Total Mean Total
UK-Owned 54.2 29,067 72.9 22,760
Foreign-Owned 112.7 14,649 150.3 17,137
Total 65.3 43,716 93.7 39,897
Source: BERR and RDA Client Administrative Data
From the RSA Scheme administrative data received from BERR and the RDAs 
we estimate that of this total offer amount £192.3 million (41.6%) has been paid 
to date (mean value of payment: £319,437; median value of payment £140,000). 
However, as Table 3.2 shows, there is a great deal of variation in the status of 
each project with two-fifths of supported businesses currently (i.e., as at January 
2006) receiving payments against the original offer amount. Only a third of 
cases (34.4%) could be considered completed at the time of the evaluation (i.e., 
‘completed case, conditions period expired’ or ‘project in conditions period’).
Table 3.2: RSA Cases by Project Status 
 Project Status No. of Cases %
Accepted by company 194 24.7
Completed case, conditions period expired 29 3.7
 Payment being made 320 40.8
 Project in conditions period 241 30.7
 Total 784 100.0
Source: BERR and RDA Scheme Administrative Database
For these completed cases we estimate that 92 per cent of the financial assistance 
offered was paid by the end of the project. This varies slightly between 94.4 per 
cent for UK-owned firms/plants and 87.6 per cent for Foreign-owned plants 
(Table 3.3). 
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Table 3.3: RSA Cases by Project Status and Amount Offered and Paid by 
Ownership (completed cases only)
Ownership Latest Amount Offered Amount Paid (January 2006) Paid/Offer (%)
Foreign £33,937,600 £29,731,600 87.6
UK £57,776,000 £54,520,776 94.4
Total £91,713,600 £84,252,376 91.9
Source: BERR and RDA Scheme Administrative Database
3.1.2 SFIE SChEME (2004-2005)
In the 18 months from April 2004 to December 2005 there were 52616 ‘in-scope’ 
SFIE beneficiary firms/plants in England which were included in the survey. Just 
under two-thirds (66.8%) were located in the North East, North West and Yorkshire 
and Humberside regions. Just over two-thirds (69.6%) of beneficiaries employed 
less than 50 employees at the time of offer. The average mean employment size of 
a SFIE beneficiary in this period was 586 employees (median 19 employees) and 
in total there were 307,268 employees in these 526 businesses17. Approximately, 
one in ten (9.3%) of SFIE beneficiaries were foreign-owned businesses (a further 
2.7% were unknown on the SFIE dataset) – 3.4 per cent of all SFIE beneficiaries 
were US-owned. Almost three-quarters (72.6%) of the assisted business were in 
the Manufacturing sector with a further 12.2 per cent in Financial and Business 
Services.
Overall, these businesses received offers totalling £100.1 million in the period 
with an average mean level of financial assistance of £190,265 (median £80,000). 
Just over one in ten of all offers of financial assistance in the period were over 
£1 million. From the data received from BERR and the RDAs we estimate that of 
this total offer amount only £17.9 million has been paid to date (mean value of 
payment: £34,101) or 18 per cent of the total.
This total offer of £100.1m was related to the estimated ‘creation’ of 19,790 
total jobs in recipient businesses in the period 2004-05, of which 9,660 were 
new jobs and 10,130 were safeguarded jobs (Table 3.4). UK businesses were 
responsible for almost two-thirds (62.0%) of these total jobs, which was an 
identical proportion to that observed for the previous RSA Scheme (see Table 
3.1). Further, UK-owned businesses were more likely to be supported to create 
new jobs rather than safeguard existing jobs: it is estimated that they would be 
creating 7,049 new jobs (mean 18.6 jobs) and safeguarding 5,177 jobs (mean 30.8 
jobs). These average levels of jobs for UK-owned businesses were significantly 
16 Again, as with the RSA dataset, this number was reached after a substantial cleaning process of the original 
dataset of 951 businesses received from BERR and the RDAs with the removal, for example, of those cases were 
the application was rejected, offers made but not yet accepted and those being vetted by the project officer. It is, 
therefore, an under-estimate of the total number of businesses receiving financial assistance under the new SFIE 
Scheme in the period. See Appendix 1 for a full account of the attrition process.
17 However, it would appear that the beneficiary dataset may include some reporting of worldwide employment in 
this total and the mean is perhaps inflated as a result. Removing these outliers it is clear that the SFIE beneficiary 
is much smaller in employment size than the previous RSA beneficiary. 
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lower than for the RSA Scheme and reflects the smaller amounts of financial 
assistance offered. 
By contrast, foreign-owned firms/plants supported under the new SFIE Scheme 
were more likely to have received financial assistance to safeguard jobs 
rather than creating new jobs – by a ratio of almost 2:1. The average number 
of safeguarded jobs in foreign-owned firms/plants was 183.4 jobs compared 
to 150.3 jobs in the previous RSA Scheme. By contrast, foreign-owned SFIE 
beneficiaries estimated that they would create 74.6 new jobs compared to 112.5 
new jobs under the RSA Scheme. 
Table 3.4: Number of Estimated New and Safeguarded Jobs by Ownership in 
SFIE Assisted Businesses (2004-05)
New Jobs New Jobs Safeguarded Jobs Safeguarded Jobs
Mean Total Mean Total
UK-Owned 18.6 7,049 30.8 5,177
Foreign-Owned 74.6 2,611 183.4 4,953
Total 23.2 9,660 51.9 10,130
Source: BERR and RDA Client Administrative Data
Before beginning to assess the degree of additionality associated with the 
financial assistance provided under the two Schemes, we are able to observe 
that, on average, a ‘promised’ job under the new SFIE Scheme costs £5,058 
(£5,160 for foreign-owned businesses and £4,993 for UK-owned businesses) 
compared to £5,531 (£6,333 for foreign-owned businesses and £5,039 for 
UK-owned businesses) under the previous RSA Scheme18.
3.2 Response Rates and Sample/Population Profiles 
Given the relatively small universe of assisted businesses under the two schemes 
and the resources available the approach to sampling was simply to undertake 
a census of the population of assisted businesses under the two schemes in 
anticipation of response rates of around 50 per cent. Overall, out of the total 
population of 1,310 RSA and SFIE beneficiaries there were 886 respondents to 
the telephone survey and they were distributed across the two sample groups 
as follows:
RSA Beneficiary – 319 (Response Rate 60%)●●
SFIE Beneficiary – 162 (Response Rate 58%)●●
Non-Beneficiary – 405 (Response Rate 20%)●●
Response rates can be calculated in a variety of ways. A common approach 
is simply to express the number of completed interviews as a percentage of 
18 No allowance is made here for the administrative costs in the RDAs or BERR associated with the operation (i.e., 
appraisal and monitoring) of these two Schemes.
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the number of completed interviews plus refusals. This was not our preferred 
method as it tends to over-state the level of response in the survey. Rather, the 
response rates were calculated on the basis of the ‘usable’ sample loaded into 
the CATI system for the telephone survey. In effect, the ‘in scope’ sample drawn 
from the BERR and RDA databases was greatly reduced as a result of further 
identification of duplicates, no company name/contact name and the CATI 
system rejecting the telephone number. Appendix 1 sets out the calculations of 
the response rates for the beneficiary and non-user surveys. 
3.2.1 RSA SChEME
With such high response rates for the beneficiary groups the comparison 
between respondents and non-respondents reveals almost identical profiles in 
terms of size, sector, and ownership for the RSA Scheme (Tables 3.5 to 3.7). 
Table 3.5: Comparison of RSA Respondents and Non-Respondents by 
Size1
Interviewed Not interviewed Total in scope
% % N %
(Blank) 3 1 13 2
None 3 3 24 3
1-9 1 1 9 1
10-19 3 3 23 3
20-49 19 19 148 19
50-99 26 24 195 25
100-249 26 26 206 26
250-499 11 15 103 13
500-999 6 6 47 6
1000+ 2 2 16 2
Total 100 100 784 100
1 This size profile for the RSA Scheme is slightly different to that reported for completed RSA projects in the period 
1990-2003 – in that period 28 per cent employed 100 persons or more compared to 47 per cent in the 2000-2004 period 
(see Roome, 2005 “Linking BERR Business Support Schemes to the IDBR and SAMIS”).
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Table 3.6: Comparison of RSA Respondents and Non-Respondents by Sector 
Interviewed Not interviewed Total in scope
% % N %
Construction 2 3 22 3
Production 74 74 583 74
Services 21 21 162 21
(Blank) 2 1 13 2
(Not used) 1 0 4 1
Total 100 100 784 100
Table 3.7: Comparison of RSA Respondents and Non-Respondents by 
Ownership
Interviewed Not interviewed Total in scope
% % N %
UK Owned 78 76 603 77
Foreign-Owned 21 23 174 22
(blank) 1 1 7 1
(Not used) 1 0 4 1
Total 100 100 784 100
The timing of assistance in the 2000-04 period will be an issue that needs to be 
addressed in the econometric analysis in Chapter 5 (see section 5.4) but it is 
important to present some descriptives on the nature of the potential problem 
at this stage. From Figure 3.1 it is clear that almost two-thirds (64.3%) of RSA 
beneficiaries who received assistance to safeguard jobs only had been offered 
this assistance in the period since January 2003. Importantly, around a fifth of 
RSA beneficiaries had only received assistance since January 2004 which means 
that there is, a priori, a greater likelihood of the econometric models under-
estimating the effects of assistance in the 2004-06 period. This also explains 
why only two-fifths (41.6%) of the offered amount of assistance had been paid 
by January 2006.
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Figure 3.1: RSA Beneficiaries: Safeguarded and/or Job Creations by 

















Figure 3.2 presents the data in terms of the proportion of jobs created or 
safeguarded. The data shows that four-fifths (79.6%) of all the safeguarded 
jobs were supported under the RSA Scheme in the period 2002-04. This has 
implications for the ability of the econometric model to fully capture the 
employment effects of assistance through the mechanism of safeguarded jobs. 
We return to this issue in some detail in section 5.4 of the report.
Figure 3.2: RSA Beneficiaries: Safeguarded and/or Job Creations by 
















Estimated new jobs at offer (Sample) Estimated safeguarded jobs at offer (Sample)
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3.2.2 SFIE SChEME
With respect to the SFIE Scheme Tables 3.8 to 3.10 illustrate that the profile of 
respondents and non-respondents is also well matched which increases the 
confidence we have in presenting unweighted results.
Table 3.8: Comparison of SFIE Respondents and Non-Respondents 
by Size
Interviewed Not interviewed Total in scope
% % N %
No. employees 3 4 20 4
1-4 6 6 30 6
5-9 10 10 55 10
10-19 13 15 75 14
20-49 20 18 96 18
50-99 12 8 47 9
100-199 6 7 33 6
200-249 1 1 5 1
250-499 2 2 11 2
500 or More 4 6 28 5
Unknown 23 24 126 24
Total 100 100 526 100
Table 3.9: Comparison of SFIE Respondents and Non-Respondents by 
Sector 
Interviewed Not interviewed Total in scope
% % N %
Construction 1 4 18 3
Production 73 73 383 73
Services 25 23 125 24
Total 100 100 526 100
Table 3.10: Comparison of SFIE Respondents and Non-Respondents by 
Ownership
Interviewed Not interviewed Total in scope
% % N %
Don’t know 2 3 14 3
UK-Owned 91 87 463 88
Foreign-Owned 6 11 49 9
Total 100 100 526 100
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In only one respect do the two samples of RSA and SFIE respondents appear to 
differ. In terms of the latest offer (in the case of RSA) or forecast payments (in the 
case of SFIE) it would appear that, in the case of the SFIE Scheme, the survey was 
more likely to include beneficiaries of smaller amounts of financial assistance – 
defined here as less than £250,000 (Table 3.11). This is borne out by the fact 
that of the total £100.1 million offered to businesses under the SFIE Scheme, 
respondents to the evaluation survey only represented around a quarter of that 
total (i.e., £25.5 million: median size of financial assistance in the sample was 
£75,000). However, with respect to the RSA Scheme respondents to the survey 
represented just over a third (35.5%) of the total amount of £462.5 million offered 
under the scheme – that is, £164.3 million (median size of financial assistance in 
the sample was £200,000). 
The reason for this is that the SFIE Scheme was designed to incorporate the 
former Enterprise Grant Scheme (EGS) which was closed at the time of the launch 
of the new scheme. We address this issue in the analysis by disaggregating the 
sample for both the RSA and SFIE Schemes into two groups on the basis of 
financial assistance offered: that is, above and below £100,000. 
Table 3.11: Size of Financial Assistance by Respondents and Non-
Respondents
Scheme and Size of Financial Assistance Interviewed Not interviewed
% %
SFIE: <=£250,000 92 88
RSA: <=£250,000 73 68
The distribution of the size of the financial assistance offered to respondents is 
displayed in Figure 3.3 and is in line with the aggregate data on the population 
of ‘in-scope’ businesses discussed above. There is a clear difference between 
the two schemes with almost three quarters (71%) of the assistance provided 
under the new SFIE scheme falling in the category of less than £100,000. This 
compares to only 14.4 per cent under the old RSA Scheme which was also much 
more likely to be offering assistance in excess of £1 million.
However, this difference can be explained by the fact that the new SFIE Scheme 
is designed to include beneficiaries who would have been assisted under the old 
Enterprise Grant Scheme (EGS) which provided grant assistance up to £100,000. 
For this reason direct comparisons between the old RSA and the current SFIE 
Scheme cannot be undertaken on a like-for-like basis. Within the sample of 
162 SFIE beneficiaries there were 47 firms/plants (29%) who received offers of 
financial assistance of £100,000 or more. In subsequent chapters we address 
this issue by presenting the results for the SFIE Scheme split into two groups in 
order to identify a ‘proxy’ EGS group of beneficiaries: less than and greater than 
(or equal to) £100,000 of financial assistance. In addition, we access results from 
previous assessments of the impact of the old EGS in order to compare it with 
the smaller grant element of the new SFIE Scheme.
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3.3 Regional Distribution of the Sample 
The regional distribution of the achieved sample is set out in Table 3.12 and 
serves to confirm that just over two-thirds of assisted firms are located in the 
four Assisted Areas of the North East, North West and Yorkshire and Humberside: 
69.6 per cent of RSA beneficiaries (i.e., 222 businesses) and 67.9 per cent of SFIE 
beneficiaries (i.e., 110 businesses). 
One of the implications of this skewed distribution is that it will reduce the scope 
of the regional dimension to the econometric modelling in that a full set of 9 
regional dummies for England will be problematic. However, it will be possible 
to undertake analysis using the three northern regions individually as well as 
other broad groupings such as the ‘rest of England’ or ‘London and the South’.
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N % N % N % N %
London 13 4.1 8 4.9 17 4.2 38 4.3
East Midlands 21 6.6 8 4.9 30 7.4 59 6.7
East of England 15 4.7 5 3.1 23 5.7 43 4.9
North East 88 27.6 38 23.5 86 21.2 212 23.9
North West 75 23.5 36 22.2 95 23.5 206 23.3
South East 4 1.3 1 0.6 24 5.9 29 3.3
South West 16 5.0 8 4.9 22 5.4 46 5.2
West Midlands 28 8.8 22 13.6 46 11.4 96 10.8
Yorkshire & Humberside 59 18.5 36 22.2 62 15.3 157 17.7
Total 319 100.0 162 100.0 405 100.0 886 100.0
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and SFIE Beneficiaries
4.1  Introduction 
In this chapter as a prelude to the modelling of the effects of RSA assistance 
we consider the characteristics of RSA beneficiaries compared to the control 
group of non-assisted firms. Our objective here is to identify the key differences 
between each group which might influence their differential performance 
between the two groups. As we discussed in Chapter 3 the new SFIE Scheme 
is not directly comparable to the old RSA Scheme in that they include financial 
assistance to businesses that would normally have been supported under the 
old EGS Scheme. As a result we present a discussion of the profile of assisted 
businesses for the two Schemes separately compared to the non-user group19. 
However, a comparison of those SFIE cases that were offered assistance of 
£100,000 or more with RSA beneficiaries is presented at the end of the chapter. 
The chapter is organised as follows:
Section 4.2 focuses on the characteristics of RSA beneficiaries and the control ●●
group in terms of ownership, corporate structure and firm size and age all 
factors which have been shown to be important in other studies of business 
growth;
Section 4.3 focuses on the characteristics of the partners and directors of ●●
assisted and non-assisted firms reflecting the quality of leadership in these 
enterprises and their openness to sharing equity as a means of promoting 
growth;
Section 4.4 focuses on the strategic direction of assisted and non-assisted ●●
firms and the extent of business planning in the enterprise. Again both factors 
have been linked to business growth in previous studies;
Section 4.5 focuses on the market situation and local market presence of ●●
assisted and non-assisted firms. In each case these factors will help to explain 
business performance. They are also important, however, in terms of shaping 
the multiplier or spillover effects from assisted firms;
Section 4.6 focuses on both R&D and innovation which will again contribute ●●
to our understanding of firm performance and the outcomes of assistance;
Section 4.7 presents a direct comparison between the characteristics of RSA ●●
and SFIE beneficiaries;
Section 4.8 focuses on business growth – the key focus of the analysis of ●●
Chapter 5;
19 It should also be remembered that the profile of the non-users was based on the RSA beneficiary profile (size, sector 
and region) as this was the control group to be used in the econometric analysis.
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Section 4.9 presents estimates of GVA measures derived from a series of ●●
questions on purchased inputs in the telephone survey.
4.2 Characteristics of RSA Beneficiaries
As part of the survey respondents were asked whether their business was 
UK-owned, foreign-owned or jointly owned and responses are given in Table 4.1. 
No statistically significant difference in the nationality of ownership was evident 
between RSA beneficiaries and the control group (χ2 (2) =0.620, ρ =0.733). RSA 
assisted businesses were, however, more likely to be part of a larger multi-site 
group (53.6 per cent) than the control group of non-beneficiaries (44.9 per cent)20. 
The vintage of businesses in receipt of RSA (24.4 years) was also significantly 
less than that of the general population of firms (34.4. years)21.









UK owned 73.4 75.8 74.7
Foreign owned 25.1 23.0 23.9
Jointly UK and foreign owned 1.6 1.2 1.4
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0
Notes: No significant difference was evident between the ownership profile of RSA beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries 
(χ2 (2) =0.620, ρ =0.733).
Another factor which has proved important in previous studies of business 
growth has been the initial scale or size of the company with larger firms 
generally tending to grow more slowly. Here we consider two measures of size 
relating to the overall size of the business being assisted and then the site itself. 
Table 4.2 summarises firms responses in terms of the proportion of firms falling 
into various employment sizebands. Overall, there was no significant difference 
between the profile of company-wide employment in RSA beneficiaries and 
non-beneficiaries. RSA beneficiary sites do, however, tend to be larger than the 
group of non-beneficiaries as Table 4.3 suggests.
20 χ2 (1) =5.365, ρ =0.021.
21 T-statistics are as follows: t=-5.043, ρ <0.000. Non-parametric tests (Mann-Whitney U) also suggested that the 
distribution of ages of RSA beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries were significantly different (Z=-5.175, ρ <0.000).
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Number of employees % % %
Less than 100 9.9 13.2 11.8
100-249 20.4 18.6 19.4
250-499 13.4 13.7 13.6
500-999 14.8 10.8 12.4
1,000-1,999 9.9 7.4 8.4
2,000-4,999 8.5 11.3 10.1
5,000-9,999 8.5 5.4 6.6
10,000+ 14.8 19.6 17.6
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0
Note: No significant differences exist between the distribution of company sizes for RSA beneficiaries and non-
beneficiaries (χ2 (7) =5.601, ρ = 0.587).








Number of employees % % %
1-10 1.6 7.5 4.9
11-24 5.0 12.4 9.2
25-49 17.4 19.7 18.6
50-99 27.1 21.9 24.2
100-249 28.1 25.1 26.4
250+ 20.8 13.4 16.7
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0
Note: Significant differences are evident between the distribution of employment in RSA assisted sites and non-
assisted sites (χ2 (5) = 32.051, ρ < 0.000).
Within the group of RSA beneficiaries, however, externally-owned firms or those 
which were partly externally owned were likely to have larger employment at the 
assisted site than was the case for UK-owned RSA beneficiaries. Most notably, 
14.2 per cent of UK-owned, RSA beneficiaries had more than 250 employees 
compared to 38.3 per cent of externally-owned RSA beneficiaries. 
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Number of employees % % %
1-10 1.7 1.2 1.6
11-24 6.5 1.2 5.0
25-49 19.0 12.9 17.4
50-99 28.9 22.4 27.1
100-249 29.7 23.5 28.1
250+ 14.2 38.8 20.8
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0
Note: Sites which were jointly UK and Foreign owned are allocated to the externally-owned group in this analysis. 
Significant differences are evident between the distribution of employment in UK-owned and externally-owned RSA 
assisted sites (χ2 (5) = 27.78, ρ < 0.000).
4.3 Partners and Directors in UK Single Site Businesses
In this section we focus on a small number of indicators reflecting different 
dimensions of the leadership of RSA assisted businesses compared to the non-
assisted controls. Our choice of indicators here reflects our previous experience 
of modelling small business performance as well as more general studies which 
have emphasised the importance of the characteristics, background and attitudes 
of the MD of a business in shaping its growth performance22. Note, however, 
that this type of indicator is less relevant in multi-national organisations. We, 
therefore, restrict our comparisons here to the group of UK-owned single-site 
businesses in the group of RSA beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries. To set this 
group in context, Table 4.5 compares employment in UK-owned, single site 
beneficiaries of RSA assistance and other RSA beneficiaries. UK-owned single-
site RSA beneficiaries are markedly smaller than other RSA beneficiaries with 
only 6.3 per cent having employment greater than 250 compared to 32.6 per cent 
of other RSA beneficiaries. 
22 See, for example, Barkham et al., (1996); Roper and Hart (2005); Mole et al., (2007).
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Table 4.5: Business Size of RSA Beneficiaries: UK-owned, single-site 







Number of employees % % %
1-10 2.8 0.6 1.6
11-24 9.2 1.7 5.0
25-49 23.2 12.6 17.4
50-99 30.3 24.6 27.1
100-249 28.2 28.0 28.1
250+ 6.3 32.6 20.8
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0
Note: Significant differences are evident between the distribution of employment in UK-owned single-sites and other 
RSA assisted sites (χ2 (5) = 43.10, ρ < 0.000).
First, in terms of the involvement of non-executive directors we see only a 
weak statistical difference between the proportions of RSA assisted firms with 
non-executive directors (27.7 per cent) and that for non-beneficiaries (24.2 per 
cent), and the proportion of firms in which the MD has an ownership stake in 
the business (Table 4.6). Significant differences are evident, however, between 
the involvement of the MD in other start-up businesses and their willingness to 
share equity. In both cases the MD’s of RSA beneficiaries seem to have stronger 
entrepreneurial and growth orientations. 









Company has Non-exec directors 27.7 24.2 25.8
MD has ownership stake (>20 per cent) 73.9 73.0 73.4
MD is involved in other start-ups 45.2 30.4 37.2
MD would be willing to share equity to grow 
the business
54.7 39.4 46.7
Notes: Statistics are as follows: non-executive directors, t = 0.677, ρ = 0.499; ownership stake, t=0.170, ρ = 0.865; MD’s 
involvement in other business start-ups, t=2.619, ρ = 0.009; and finally, willingness to share equity, t=2.415, ρ = 0.016.
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A degree, HND, masters degree or other higher degree 74.0 62.2 67.9
A-levels, AS-levels, Highers or OND 9.6 12.6 11.2
5 or more GCSEs grades A to C, 5 or more O-levels 5.8 12.6 9.3
NVQ level 2 or similar  3.6 1.9
CSEs or less than 5 GCSEs grades A to C or NVQ level 1 5.8 6.3 6.0
Other 4.8 2.7 3.7
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0
Note: Difference between distribution of highest qualifications of MDs of RSA beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries is not 
significant (χ2(5) = 8.663, ρ < 0.123).
In terms of other characteristics of company MDs which have been found to be 
important in previous studies of company growth, we find here no significant 
difference in the qualification profile of MDs between RSA beneficiaries and non- 
beneficiaries (Table 4.7) and or their age distribution (Table 4.8). 








Age band of Md % % %
25-34 3.5 6.7 5.2
35-44 20.6 18.3 19.3
45-54 41.8 34.8 38.0
55-64 29.8 29.9 29.8
65 and over 4.3 10.4 7.5
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0
Note: Difference between age distribution of MDs of RSA beneficiaries and non- beneficiaries is not significant (χ2 (4) = 
6.403, ρ < 0.171).
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4.4 Strategic Direction and Management of UK-owned Single 
Site Firms 
We focus now on the strategic direction and management approach of RSA 
assisted firms compared to non-beneficiaries focussing again on the group of 
UK-owned single-site firms. It is worth noting initially, however, that among 
each group of firms 77-80 per cent of businesses had a formal business plan with 
no significant differences between groups23. 
Firms were then asked to identify their main business objective(s) (with multiple 
responses being allowed) with a focus on whether their aim was maintaining 
or increasing their market share with current products or the development of 
new products or services. The percentage of firms giving each response is given 
in Table 4.9. RSA beneficiaries were both more likely than non-beneficiaries to 
highlight increasing sales as a business objective rather than simply maintaining 
current levels of sales. Perhaps surprisingly, however, there was no statistical 
difference between the proportions of RSA beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries 
identifying the development of new products or services as a strategic priority 
(see notes to Table 4.9).








Business Objectives % % %
Maintaining sales of your current products or 
services
20.7 26.9 24.2
Increasing sales of your current products or 
services
74.6 67.2 70.4
Developing new products or services 23.8 21.7 22.7
Notes: Statistics are as follows for firms emphasising maintaining sales as their main business objective: t=1.965, 
ρ=0.050; for firms emphasising increasing sales as their main business objective: t=2.204, ρ=0.028; for firms 
emphasising the development of new products or services as their main business objective: t=0.666, ρ=0.506
In terms of management style we asked firms to indicate which approaches most 
closely matched their management approach, again allowing multiple responses. 
Four alternatives were provided, intended to provide an indication of the extent 
to which managers were adopting a hierarchic or more consensual approach to 
managing and organising the business. In general terms we find most evidence 
of team-working in RSA beneficiaries rather than non- beneficiaries with RSA 
beneficiaries also placing significantly less emphasis on close supervision. No 
significant differences were evident between groups in terms of either working 
practices or initial recruitment (see notes to Table 4.10). 
23 Statistics are as follows comparing the proportion of firms having a business plan: t=0.754, ρ=0.451.
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Teamworking across staff and management 75.5 68.4 71.5
Close supervision 16.0 21.2 18.9
The establishment of standard working 
procedures
27.3 25.7 26.4
Careful initial staff selection, and investment in 
training and development
27.9 32.6 30.5
Notes Statistics are as follows for firms emphasising teamworking: t=2.141, ρ=0.033; for firms emphasising close 
supervision: t=-1.814, ρ=0.070; for firms emphasising the development of standardised working practices: t=0.481, 
ρ=0.630; for firms emphasising initial selection and staff development: t=-1.368, ρ=0.172.
4.5 Markets and Local Linkages
Comparing profiles of export intensity highlights significant differences between 
RSA beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries with RSA beneficiaries having a stronger 
export market orientation (Table 4.11). Nearly a fifth of RSA beneficiaries but only 
around a tenth of all non-beneficiaries were exporting more than 75 per cent 
of their sales. Conversely, RSA non-beneficiaries had a stronger local market 
orientation with around a third of these firms having more than 30 per cent of 
their sales in local markets compared to around 22 per cent of RSA beneficiaries 
(Table 4.12). The impression created here is that the group of RSA beneficiaries 
were, in general, more export and less locally focussed in terms of sales.








Percentage Export Sales % % %
Up to 5 24.2 33.8 29.0
Between 6 -10 13.9 14.9 14.4
Between 11 -15 5.7 3.6 4.6
Between 16 -25 9.8 8.7 9.3
Between 26 -50 13.4 18.5 15.9
Between 51 -75 14.4 10.3 12.3
More than 75 18.6 10.3 14.4
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0
Notes: Export orientation of RSA beneficiaries is stronger than that for non-beneficiaries (χ2(6) = 11.781, ρ < 0.067).
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Table 4.12: Proportion of Sales which are local (within 20 miles) for 








Zero/nothing 0.0 1.4 0.8
Up to 10% 61.9 45.0 52.3
11-20% 11.3 11.8 11.6
21-30% 5.0 8.1 6.7
More than 30% 21.9 33.6 28.6
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0
Notes: Local market orientation of RSA beneficiaries is weaker than that for non-beneficiaries (χ2 (4) = 12.922,  
ρ < 0.012).
Significant differences were also evident in terms of firms’ assessments of the 
cross and own price sensitivity of the markets in which they were operating. 
Specifically, in the survey firms were asked by how much the demand for their 
own product would change if they and their main competitor were able to reduce 
their price by 10 per cent. In terms of the cross price sensitivity the greatest 
impact was anticipated by RSA beneficiaries with smaller effects anticipated by 
non-assisted firms. The implication being that RSA beneficiaries regarded their 
markets as significantly more price sensitive than those of non-beneficiaries. In 
terms of own-price sensitivity the results largely conform to the same pattern 
with RSA beneficiaries suggesting larger impacts on demand of a 10 per cent 
price cut than the general population of firms (see notes to Table 4.13). 
46
Evaluation of Regional Selective Assistance (RSA) and its successor, Selective Finance for 
Investment in England (SFIE)









Cross Price Sensitivity (% change)
The same 26.1 31.6 29.2
Up to 10 lower 31.3 37.8 34.9
10 – 20 lower 19.8 16.2 17.8
20 – 30 lower 10.4 6.8 8.4
Or, more than 30 lower 12.3 7.7 9.7
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0
Own Price Sensitivity (% change)
The same 18.6 27.0 23.3
Up to 10 lower 34.9 33.9 34.4
10 – 20 lower 15.9 15.8 15.8
20 – 30 lower 15.1 8.8 11.6
Or, more than 30 lower 15.5 14.5 15.0
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0
Notes: Statistics are as follows for firms’ cross price sensitivity comparing RSA beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries, 
χ2(4)=10.057, ρ =0.039 and for own-price sensitivity: χ2(4)=9.491, ρ =0.050.
As part of the survey we also asked firms around their purchasing patterns 
asking companies to identify the location of their suppliers. A relatively complex 
pattern emerges, with RSA beneficiaries less likely to have intra-group suppliers, 
but more likely to have non-local suppliers within the local region, extra-regional 
suppliers and international suppliers (Table 4.14). Local suppliers were also 
quantitatively less important for RSA beneficiaries than for other firms with only 
a quarter of RSA beneficiaries having more than 30 per cent of their inputs from 
local suppliers, something true of 38 per cent of non-beneficiaries (Table 4.15). 
47
Profiling RSA and SFIE Beneficiaries









Other parts of your parent company 7.8 9.9 9.0
Local suppliers, within 20 miles of your site 54.5 53.3 53.9
Suppliers based elsewhere in the region 55.8 45.4 50.0
Suppliers based elsewhere in the UK, but 
outside of the region
81.5 72.1 76.2
Suppliers based overseas 65.5 49.9 56.8
Notes: Statistics are as follows for firms reporting purchases from other group firms: t=-0.964, ρ =0.0335; for firms 
reporting purchases from other local suppliers: t=0.324, ρ =0.746; for firms reporting purchases from other regional 
suppliers: t=2.781, ρ =0.006; for firms reporting purchases from other UK firms outside their home region: t=3.017, ρ 
=0.003; for firms reporting international purchases: t=4.290, ρ <0.000.









Zero/nothing 0.0 0.6 0.3
Up to 10% 45.0 38.5 41.6
11 -20% 20.1 11.8 15.8
21 -30% 10.7 11.2 11.0
More than 30% 24.2 37.9 31.3
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0
Notes: Statistics are as follows for firms reporting international purchases: t=9.774, ρ <0.044.
4.6 R&D and Innovation 
In terms of the proportion of RSA-assisted firms undertaking R&D we find a 
marginal difference between RSA beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries although 
there is no consistent evidence of RSA beneficiaries undertaking different types 
of R&D activity to non-recipient firms. Similarly, while RSA beneficiaries are as 
likely as non-beneficiaries to be making product changes they are more likely to 
be making process changes (Table 4.16). 
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Undertaking R&D 50.9 44.8 47.5
Basic product research 22.6 22.2 22.4
Applied product research 36.4 29.6 32.6
Basic process research 12.2 12.3 12.3
Applied process research 20.7 17.3 18.8
Product innovation 57.7 56.9 57.3
Process innovation 55.7 41.6 47.9
Notes: T statistics are as follows: undertaking R&D t=1.645, ρ = 0.100; basic product research, t= 0.111, ρ=0.911; applied 
product research, t = 1.909, ρ=0.057; basic process research; t=-0.049, ρ=0.961; applied product research; t=1.155, 
ρ=0.249; product innovation; t=0.224, ρ = 0.822; process innovation, t=3.762, ρ = 0.000.
4.7 Characteristics of RSA and SFIE Beneficiaries
We now present the characteristics of the SFIE beneficiaries in the sample and 
compare them directly to RSA beneficiaries. However, due to the issue of the new 
Scheme incorporating former EGS cases the tables include data on a sub-group 
of SFIE beneficiaries which could be said to correspond to the previous RSA 
Scheme – namely those in receipt of financial assistance of £100k or more. 
Table 4.17 shows that a notably larger proportion of SFIE beneficiaries in England 
were UK owned (93 per cent) than was the case with RSA (73 per cent), with very 
similar proportions being jointly-owned (0.6-1.6 per cent). This difference was 
statistically significant at the 1 per cent level (χ2 (2) =24.75, ρ <0.000). However, if 
one restricts the analysis to only those SFIE cases in receipt of financial assistance 
of £100k and over, to ensure a more accurate like-for-like comparison with the 
previous RSA Scheme, it is clear that this difference is no longer significant.








UK owned 73.4 92.6 78.7
Foreign owned 25.1 6.8 21.3
Jointly UK and foreign owned 1.6 0.6 0.0
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0
N=319 N=162 N=47
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Although it would appear that the move from RSA to SFIE has focussed assistance 
away from externally-owned firms and towards those owned from within the 
UK or jointly by UK and external partners, this can be simply attributed to the 
SFIE Scheme now incorporating previous EGS assisted cases. The vintage of 
businesses assisted by RSA (24.4 years) and SFIE (21.8 years) is broadly similar 
and again when we restrict the comparison to the larger SFIE cases (i.e., £100k 
and above) the average age for SFIE beneficiaries rises to 26.4 years.
Table 4.18 summarises responses in terms of the proportion of firms falling into 
various employment size bands with a clear focus among SFIE beneficiaries 
on smaller firms with less than 100 employees. This is consistent with the 
incorporation of former EGS cases noted earlier. Nevertheless, once the smaller 
SFIE grant cases are removed this difference is still in evidence, although the 
sample size here is very small. 







Number of employees % % %
Less than 100 9.9 50.0 26.1
100-249 20.4 16.7 21.7
250-499 13.4 4.8 4.3
500-999 14.8 7.1 8.7
1,000-1,999 9.9 2.4 4.3
2,000-4,999 8.5 9.5 17.4
5,000-9,999 8.5 2.4 4.3
10,000+ 14.8 7.1 8.7
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0
N=195 N=43 N=23
Similar differences are evident if we focus on the employment of the assisted site 
with a clear tendency for SFIE beneficiaries to be smaller than RSA beneficiaries 
(χ2 (5) =121.14, ρ <0.000) (Table 4.19). However, this difference disappeared once 
the smaller SFIE cases were removed from the comparison.
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Number of employees % % %
1-10 1.6 16.0 2.1
11-24 5.0 27.2 4.3
25-49 17.4 25.9 23.4
50-99 27.1 17.3 29.8
100-249 28.1 8.6 25.5
250+ 20.8 4.9 14.9
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0
N=319 N=162 N=47
In terms of non-executive directors we see only a weak statistical difference 
between the proportion of RSA assisted firms with non-executive directors (27.7 
per cent) and that for SFIE beneficiaries 18.4 per cent, Table 4.20)24. Again this 
difference is not in evidence once the smaller SFIE cases are removed from the 
analysis.









Company has Non-exec directors 27.7 18.4 28.6
MD has ownership stake (>20 per cent) 73.9 89.4 61.9
MD is involved in other start-ups 45.2 43.9 38.1
MD would be willing to share equity to grow 
the business
54.7 56.0 57.1
As one might expect the full sample of SFIE beneficiaries were more likely to be 
owner-managed enterprises than RSA beneficiaries (t=-3.216, ρ =0.001), but this 
is reversed once the smaller SFIE cases are removed. In terms of beneficiaries’ 
MDs’ involvement in other business start-ups we find no difference between 
RSA and SFIE beneficiaries (t=0.195, ρ =0.848). This is reflected in MD’s attitude 
to sharing equity to facilitate business growth, with similar open attitudes among 
both RSA and SFIE beneficiaries (Table 4.20). 
In terms of other characteristics of company MDs which have been found to be 
important in previous studies of company growth, we find here no significant 
difference in the qualification profile of MDs between assisted and non-assisted 
24 T-statistics for non-executive directors are as follows: RSA v SFIE t =0.677, rho=0.499.
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groups, irrespective of size of grant received by the SFIE beneficiaries (Table 
4.21)25.









A degree, HND, masters degree or other higher 
degree
74.0 65.4 73.3
A-levels, AS-levels, Highers or OND 9.6 15.4 13.3
5 or more GCSEs grades A to C, 5 or more 
O-levels
5.8 7.7 13.3
NVQ level 2 or similar 1.3




Total 100.0 100.0 100.0
N=114 N=115 N=21
More interesting differences emerge in the age band of MDs, with SFIE 
beneficiaries being on average younger than RSA beneficiaries. On the basis of 
previous studies which have tended to suggest a negative correlation between 
MD or owner-manager age and business growth, we would expect this to 
contribute positively to more rapid growth in SFIE beneficiaries26. 







Age band of Md % % %
25-34 3.5 5.5 11.1
35-44 20.6 35.8 38.9
45-54 41.8 23.9 22.2
55-64 29.8 24.8 22.2
65 and over 4.3 10.1 5.6
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0
N=144 N=115 N=18
25 Statistics are as follows: comparing the qualification profile of RSA beneficiaries and SFIE beneficiaries, χ2 (5) = 
4.119, rho=0.532.
26 Statistics for the age distribution of MDs are as follows: comparing the profile of RSA beneficiaries and SFIE 
beneficiaries, χ2 (5)=15.259, rho=0.004.
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We focus now on the strategic direction and management approach of both 
groups of assisted firms, but it is worth noting initially that among each group of 
assisted firms 75-80 per cent of businesses had a formal business plan with no 
significant differences between groups27. Interestingly, for the larger SFIE grant 
beneficiaries the percentage rises to from 75 to 87.2 per cent which perhaps 
reflects the complexity of the application process under the new scheme. We 
return to this point later in the report (see Chapters 5 and 6).
Firms were then asked to identify their main business objective (with multiple 
responses being allowed) with a focus on whether their aim was maintaining or 
increasing their market share with current products or the development of new 
products or services. The percentage of assisted firms giving each response is 
given in Table 4.23. RSA and SFIE beneficiaries were both as likely to highlight 
increasing sales as a business objective rather than simply maintaining current 
levels of sales. Perhaps surprisingly there were no statistical differences between 
the proportions of firms in each group identifying the development of new 
products or services as a strategic priority (see notes to Table 4.23). Controlling 
again by the size of grant received by the SFIE assisted businesses illustrates 
that the larger SFIE grant beneficiaries were less likely to report maintaining 
sales as a main business objective.







Business Objectives % % %
Maintaining sales of your current products or 
services
20.7 15.4 12.8
Increasing sales of your current products or 
services
74.6 80.2 72.3
Developing new products or services 23.8 28.4 27.7
Notes:
Statistics are as follows for firms emphasising maintaining sales as their main business objective: RSA beneficiaries •	
and SFIE beneficiaries, t=1.443, ρ =0.150.
Statistics are as follows for firms emphasising increasing sales as their main business objective: RSA beneficiaries •	
and SFIE beneficiaries, t=-1.418, ρ =0.157.
Statistics are as follows for firms emphasising the development of new products or services as their main business •	
objective: RSA beneficiaries and SFIE beneficiaries, t=-1.067, ρ =0.287.
We find a significantly higher proportion of RSA beneficiaries emphasising team 
working than SFIE beneficiaries although this narrows when we focus only on the 
larger SFIE grant beneficiaries. No significant differences were evident between 
the two full samples of assisted groups in terms of either working practices or 
initial recruitment (see notes to Table 4.24), although larger SFIE beneficiaries 
reported higher proportions. 
27 Statistics are as follows: comparing the proportion of firms having a business plan: RSA beneficiaries and SFIE 
beneficiaries, t=0.602, rho=0.548.
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Teamworking across staff and management 75.5 64.8 70.2
Close supervision 16.0 18.5 17.0
The establishment of standard working 
procedures
27.3 25.9 36.2




Statistics are as follows for firms emphasising teamworking: RSA beneficiaries and SFIE beneficiaries, t=2.402, •	 ρ 
=0.017.
Statistics are as follows for firms emphasising close supervision: RSA beneficiaries and SFIE beneficiaries, •	
t=-0.686, ρ =0.493.
Statistics are as follows for firms emphasising the development of standardised working practices: RSA •	
beneficiaries and SFIE beneficiaries, t=0.316, ρ =0.752.
Statistics are as follows for firms emphasising initial selection and staff development: RSA beneficiaries and •	
SFIE beneficiaries, t=0.712, ρ =0.477.
Comparing profiles of export intensity between the two assisted groups highlights 
significant differences between RSA and SFIE beneficiaries (Table 4.25)28. Nearly 
a quarter of RSA beneficiaries and around a third of SFIE beneficiaries had little 
export sales (less than 5 per cent). 
Table 4.25: Export Intensity of RSA and SFIE Beneficiaries







Up to 5 24.2 35.5 31.8
Between 6 -10 13.9 17.1 9.1
Between 11 -15 5.7 6.6 9.1
Between 16 -25 9.8 10.5 9.1
Between 26 -50 13.4 15.8 18.2
Between 51 -75 14.4 9.2 18.2
More than 75 18.6 5.3 4.5
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0
N=196 N=76 N=22
For more than a third of SFIE beneficiaries local sales accounted for 30 per cent 
or more of all sales compared to 21 per cent for the larger firms which received 
RSA assistance (Table 4.26)29. The impression created here is that the group of 
28 Statistics are as follows for the pattern of firms export sales: RSA beneficiaries and SFIE beneficiaries, χ2 (6) =10.908, 
rho=0.091.
29 Statistics are as follows for the pattern of firms local sales: RSA beneficiaries and SFIE beneficiaries, χ2 (4) =11.695, 
rho=0.020.
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SFIE assisted firms (less so for the larger grants) were in general less export and 
more locally focussed in terms of sales than RSA beneficiaries.
Table 4.26: Proportion of Sales Which are local (within 20 miles) for 








Zero/nothing 0.0 2.3 0.0
Up to 10 61.9 42.0 57.1
11-20 11.3 15.9 9.5
21-30 5.0 6.8 4.8
More than 30 21.9 33.0 28.6
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0
N=185 N=94 N=23
Significant differences were also evident in terms of firms’ assessments of the 
cross and own price elasticity of the markets in which they were operating. As 
we stated earlier in the survey firms were asked by how much the demand for 
their own product would change if they and their main competitor were able to 
reduce their price by 10 per cent. In terms of the cross price elasticity a greater 
impact was anticipated by RSA beneficiaries on their own sales from any price 
reduction on the part of their competitors compared to SFIE assisted firms. The 
implication being that RSA beneficiaries regarded their markets as significantly 
more price sensitive than those inhabited by SFIE beneficiaries. 
In terms of own-price elasticity the results largely conform to the same pattern 
with RSA beneficiaries suggesting larger impacts on demand of a 10 per cent 
price cut than SFIE beneficiaries (see notes to Table 4.27). Alongside this 
difference in own and cross price elasticity there is also a significant difference 
in the proportion of firms in each assisted group (74% for SFIE beneficiaries and 
82% for RSA beneficiaries) which regard themselves as facing intense or very 
intense competition in their main markets30. The proportion of larger SFIE cases 
was 81 per cent.
30 Statistics are as follows where these relate to the proportion of firms reporting either intense or very intense 
competition: RSA beneficiaries and SFIE beneficiaries, t=2.187, rho=0.030.
55
Profiling RSA and SFIE Beneficiaries









Cross Price Elasticity 
The same 26.1 38.9 37.8
Up to 10 lower 31.3 26.0 35.1
10 – 20 lower 19.8 19.8 13.5
20 – 30 lower 10.4 4.6 2.7
Or, more than 30 lower 12.3 10.7 10.8
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0
N=318 N=160 N=37
Own Price Elasticity 
The same 18.6 33.6 31.4
Up to 10 lower 34.9 31.3 34.3
10 – 20 lower 15.9 12.2 11.4
20 – 30 lower 15.1 9.2 8.6
Or, more than 30 lower 15.5 13.7 14.3
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0
N=319 N=162 N=35
Notes:
Statistics are as follows for firms’ cross-price elasticities: RSA beneficiaries and SFIE beneficiaries, •	 χ2 (4) = 9.380, 
ρ =0.052.
Statistics are as follows for firms’ own-price elasticities: RSA beneficiaries and SFIE beneficiaries, •	 χ2 (4) =11.913, 
ρ=0.018.
In terms of the type of customers (e.g. public bodies, other firms, consumers) 
we find little evidence that SFIE assisted firms, controlling for size of grant, 
are in any sense different from RSA assisted firms. In each case, however, it is 
important to realise that firms were allowed to identify more than one type of 
end-customer. Public sector sales were most common among the full sample 
of SFIE beneficiaries (35%) and only a fifth of RSA beneficiaries (Table 4.28). 
RSA-assisted firms were also significantly less likely to be dealing with private 
end-users than all SFIE beneficiaries but this difference does not hold for SFIE 
assisted firms who received more than £100,000.
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Public Sector 22.3 34.6 25.5
Other Businesses 94.7 92.6 93.6
Private Consumers 14.4 28.4 17.0
Notes:
Statistics are as follows for firms highlighting public sector customers: RSA beneficiaries and SFIE beneficiaries, •	
t=-2.789, ρ =0.008.
Statistics are as follows for firms highlighting sales to other businesses: RSA beneficiaries and SFIE •	
beneficiaries, t=-0.860, ρ =0.391.
Statistics are as follows for firms reporting sales to end users: RSA beneficiaries and SFIE beneficiaries, t=-3.439, •	
ρ =0.00.
Purchasing patterns with local suppliers were broadly similar across the assisted 
groups. The larger, more export oriented RSA beneficiaries were also more likely 
to have national or international suppliers. 65.5 per cent of these firms indicated 
they had international suppliers compared to 43.2 per cent of SFIE beneficiaries, 
but 51.1 per cent of SFIE cases receiving financial assistance of £100,000 or more 
(Table 4.29). 








Other parts of your parent company 7.8 3.7 2.1
Local suppliers, within 20 miles of your site 54.5 51.2 44.7
Suppliers based elsewhere in the region 55.8 39.5 38.3
Suppliers based elsewhere in the UK, but 
outside of the region
81.5 71.6 76.6
Suppliers based overseas 65.5 43.2 51.1
Notes:
Statistics are as follows for firms reporting purchases from other group firms: RSA beneficiaries and SFIE •	
beneficiaries, t=1.951, ρ =0.052.
Statistics are as follows for firms reporting purchases from other local suppliers: RSA beneficiaries and SFIE •	
beneficiaries, t=0.686, ρ =0.493.
Statistics are as follows for firms reporting purchases from other regional suppliers: RSA beneficiaries and SFIE •	
beneficiaries, t=3.427, ρ =0.001.
Statistics are as follows for firms reporting purchases from other UK firms outside their home region: RSA •	
beneficiaries and SFIE beneficiaries, t=2.375, ρ =0.018.
Statistics are as follows for firms reporting international purchases: RSA beneficiaries and SFIE beneficiaries, •	
t=4.719, ρ =0.000.
Local sourcing was also more intensive among SFIE beneficiaries than among 
RSA beneficiaries, irrespective of grant size, with around 50 per cent of SFIE 
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beneficiaries indicating that local purchases accounted for more than 30 per cent 
of total purchases compared to 24 per cent of RSA beneficiaries (Table 4.30). 








Zero/nothing 0.0 0.0 0.0
Up to 10 45.0 18.6 25.0
11 -20 20.1 20.3 6.6
21 -30 10.7 8.5 18.8
More than 30 24.2 52.5 50.0
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0
N=188 N=59 N=19
Notes:
Statistics are as follows for firms reporting international purchases: RSA beneficiaries and SFIE beneficiaries, t=18.593, 
ρ =0.000.
In terms of the proportion of grant beneficiaries undertaking R&D (Table 4.31) 
we find no significant difference between RSA beneficiaries and those firms 
which received SFIE assistance (t=1.21, ρ =0.227), irrespective of grant size. 
Few significant differences were evident between the types of research and 
development activity being undertaken by the two assisted groups, although 
RSA beneficiaries were more likely than SFIE beneficiaries to be undertaking 
applied product research (t=2.963, ρ =0.003), but this difference disappears if we 
control for grant size.








Undertaking R&D 49.9 44.4 46.8
Basic product research 23.5 25.3 31.9
Applied product research 34.5 27.8 34.0
Basic process research 11.6 10.5 14.9
Applied process research 18.7 18.5 19.1
Product innovation 59.0 59.3 63.8
Process innovation 57.0 56.3 55.3
In terms of product innovation there is a broad similarity between the proportions 
of firms undertaking innovative activity across the groups of assisted firms. 
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4.8 Business Growth: RSA and SFIE Beneficiaries and Non-
Beneficiaries
Comparing growth between beneficiary groups is complicated both because of 
the different periods over which assistance was received and because newer 
start-up firms may have particularly fast percentage growth rates. We, therefore, 
focus our comparisons on firms in each of the respondent groups which existed 
in 2000. 
Table 4.32 below summarises the key growth comparisons for RSA beneficiaries 
and the non-beneficiary group. In each period both employment and turnover 
growth of the RSA beneficiaries is more rapid than that of non-beneficiaries 
both in terms of mean and median growth rates. The suggestion is that prior to 
receiving grant support and afterwards RSA beneficiaries were outperforming 
non-beneficiaries. The difference in growth performance is statistically significant 
for each variable and period with the exception of employment growth in the 
2000 to 2002 period. In addition to comparing mean growth rates we are able 
to use non-parametric tests to compare the distributions of growth rates of 
RSA beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries. Again we find consistently significant 
differences (see notes to Table 4.32). 















2000 to 2002 6.98 0.00 -2.20 0.00
2002 to 2004 16.20 4.17 0.57 0.00
2004 to 2006 9.42 5.84 0.48 0.00
Turnover growth
2000 to 2002 27.14 6.25 6.84 0.00
2002 to 2004 16.07 6.87 4.96 0.57
2004 to 2006 20.90 8.33 5.53 4.54
Notes: 
Growth comparisons between RSA beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries are as follows: employment growth 2000 •	
to 2002, t=0.900, ρ =0.369; employment growth 2002 to 2004, t=3.063, ρ =0.003; employment growth 2004 to 2006, 
t=3.036, ρ =0.003; turnover growth 2000 to 2002, t=2.081, ρ =0.038; turnover growth 2002 to 2004, t=3.684, ρ <0.000; 
turnover growth 2004 to 2006, t=2.702, ρ =0.008.
Non-parametric Mann-Whitney tests are as follows: employment growth 2000 to 2002, Z=-3.967, •	 ρ <0.000; 
employment growth 2002 to 2004, t=-6.248, ρ <0.000; employment growth 2004 to 2006, t=-6.702, ρ <0.000; turnover 
growth 2000 to 2002, t=-4.394, ρ <0.000; turnover growth 2002 to 2004, t=-4.665, ρ <0.000; turnover growth 2004 to 
2006, t=-3.456, ρ =0.001.
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For SFIE beneficiaries, data collection focussed on performance before and after 
receipt of support with some evidence that firms in receipt of support increased 
their average turnover and employment growth rate (Table 4.33). However, 
given the recent award of financial assistance under the scheme for many of 
the respondents it is extremely difficult to draw many conclusions from these 
figures. We report later in Chapter 6 evidence from the survey on the timing of 
the benefits for SFIE beneficiaries and some self-assessment of performance 
outcomes for the business.







2004 to 2006 15.9 10.0
2004 to 2005 11.6 8.7
2005 to 2006 16.4 8.7
Turnover growth
2004 to 2006 19.4 12.5
2004 to 2005 17.0 9.6
2005 to 2006 20.8 14.3
4.9 GVA Measures
As part of the evaluation methodology we have attempted to estimate the impact 
of assistance on the value added at firm/plant level by using a proxy based on 
the percentage of annual turnover taken up by purchased inputs. This proxy has 
been developed in recognition of the difficulty in obtaining GVA information 
directly from the respondent business through the telephone survey. We present 
below the outcome of the analysis of the proxy variable for 2004 and 2006 (Table 
4.34). 
A GVA figure for each firm/plant is constructed for 2004 and 2006 by deriving 
an actual figure for purchased inputs using the percentage provided by the 
respondent. Once obtained an overall GVA figure and GVA per head figure are 
calculated for the business. Overall, 546 of the 886 respondents (61.6%) were 
able to indicate what proportion of their annual turnover in 2006 was made up of 
purchased inputs: that is, 225 RSA beneficiaries (70.5%); 111 SFIE beneficiaries 
(68.5%) and 210 non-beneficiaries (51.9%). These proportions fell dramatically for 
2004: 21.6 per cent, 19.1 per cent and 16.0 per cent respectively. Accordingly, we 
were reliant on a supplementary question which sought to ascertain whether the 
proportion had changed or remained the same. This had the effect of increasing 
the proportion of firms/plants for which we were able to calculate a figure for the 
percentage of purchased inputs to 68.7 per cent (n=219) for RSA beneficiaries, 
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56.2 per cent (n=91) for SFIE beneficiaries and 45.2 per cent (n=183) for non-
beneficiaries.
The results for changes in overall GVA, and GVA per head, over the period 2004-
2006 for RSA beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries are presented in Table 4.34. 
Again we concentrate on only those firms/plants that were in existence in 2000 
in order to control for the effects of newer firms/plants growing faster.




















% pa % pa % pa % pa % pa
gvA growth
2004 to 2006 18.8 7.6 2.1 4.2 11.6 9.0
N=150 N=122 N=72
gvA per head growth 
2004 to 2006 11.4 2.1 7.0 4.4 5.7 2.3
N=148 N=117 N=68
gvA per head
2004 £40,473 £45,000 £28,314 £39,625 £43,626 £38,833
N=169 N=142 N=74
2006 £71,951 £47,600 £70,316 £44,097 £60,565 £45,448
N=178 N=158 N=84
Notes:
Growth comparisons between RSA beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries are as follows: GVA growth 2004 to 2006, •	
t=2.378, ρ =0.018; GVA per head growth 2004 to 2006, t=0.649, ρ =0.517.
Non-parametric Mann-Whitney U tests are as follows: GVA growth 2004 to 2006, Z=-3.222, •	 ρ =0.001; GVA per head 
growth 2004 to 2006, Z=-2.408, ρ =0.016.
Over the period 2004 and 2006 growth in GVA of the RSA beneficiaries is more 
rapid than that of non-beneficiaries both in terms of mean and median growth 
rates. The difference in growth performance is statistically significant. However, 
with respect to GVA per head growth the difference in mean growth rate is not 
statistically significant. The implication here is that the employment size of RSA-
assisted firms/plants is larger than that of non-beneficiaries (see Table 4.3). In 
addition to comparing mean growth rates we are able to use non-parametric 
tests to compare the distributions of growth rates of RSA beneficiaries and non-
beneficiaries. Again we find consistently significant differences (see notes to 
Table 4.34). 
A final point to note is that the number of respondents in the sample providing 
even this proxy information is much reduced and will constrain its usefulness 
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as a dependent variable in the econometric modelling of the effects of the RSA 
assistance. We observe that the median GVA per head figure in both 2004 and 
2006 was slightly higher than for non- beneficiaries (Table 4.34). 
We include the SFIE beneficiaries in the analysis for indicative comparative 
purposes31. We note that the GVA per head figures (median) were marginally 
lower than for RSA beneficiaries which may well reflect, once again, the inclusion 
of what would have been former EGS cases within this group of assisted firms 
and the fact that the comparison will be affected by timing issues. However, the 
percentage growth in GVA over the 2004-06 period is similar to RSA beneficiaries 
and higher than the non-assisted group. The median growth in GVA per head 
over the same period is almost identical to RSA beneficiaries.
4.10 Summary
The previous descriptive analysis has highlighted a number of significant 
differences between each group of firms (i.e., RSA and SFIE beneficiaries 
and non-assisted firms). This is important as it suggests the importance of a 
multivariate analysis of firm growth and the impact of RSA assistance. The key 
contrasts between the characteristics and performance of RSA beneficiaries and 
non-beneficiaries are:
RSA beneficiaries grew faster than non-beneficiaries both before and after ●●
receiving assistance.
Over the period 2004 and 2006 growth in GVA of the RSA beneficiaries is ●●
more rapid than that of non-beneficiaries. However, with respect to GVA per 
head growth the difference in mean growth rate is not statistically significant 
due to the larger size of RSA beneficiaries in terms of employment.
RSA beneficiaries tended to be younger (average 24.4 years) than non-RSA ●●
beneficiaries (34.4 years).
RSA beneficiaries also tended to be larger than non-beneficiaries both in ●●
terms of employment in the assisted site but also in terms of employment in 
the whole company.
RSA beneficiaries are more export oriented and less focussed on local ●●
markets than the general population of firms and operate in more price 
elastic markets. They are also less likely to be selling to the public sector and 
individual consumers than firms in the general population.
Finally, RSA beneficiaries are more likely to be undertaking R&D and product ●●
and process innovation than non-beneficiaries.
31 The non-beneficiary control group was constructed against the profile of RSA assisted firms and not SFIE assisted 
firms for the reasons already discussed in the evaluation methodology.
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Comparing RSA and SFIE beneficiaries is complicated by the fact that the ●●
replacement Scheme includes former EGS assisted businesses. For that 
reason the comparison of the two Schemes is limited. However, we do 
endeavour to control for this by presenting data on those SFIE assisted 
business who had received £100,000 or more in grant support (n=47). The 
results of this comparison reveal that SFIE beneficiaries are more likely to:
be smaller firms (i.e., less than 50 employees)●■
have younger owner-managers (i.e., less than 45 years)●■
have a business plan although this is clearly connected to the application ●■
process and the use of consultants (see Chapter 6)
be less likely to report ‘maintaining sales for current products and ●■
services’ as a business objective
be less export oriented and more locally focused in terms of sales●■
be operating in markets which were less price sensitive●■
have local suppliers and had higher levels of local purchasing●■
Overall, this comparative analysis is consistent with a conclusion suggesting the 
targeting of RSA assistance on larger firms, which might be expected to have 
many of the characteristics highlighted above. Further, it would appear that 
RSA assistance has been targeted at firms what are more likely to benefit from 
that assistance. Interestingly, however, the general expectation would be that 
larger firms would grow more slowly than smaller companies. This makes the 
performance of RSA assisted firms of particular interest, a subject we now turn 
to in Chapter 5. 
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Chapter 5: Estimating the 
Business Level Effects of 
RSA Assistance 
5.1 Introduction: the fundamental econometric problem
The essential econometric problem is to determine the effect that RSA financial 
assistance has on firm performance. In other words to determine whether RSA 
beneficiaries grow faster than non-beneficiaries as a result of the assistance 
received. As is discussed in detail below, and in the annex to this chapter, there 
are certain econometric considerations associated with this. First, there are 
sample selection issues to be addressed and also, whether, in the case of inward 
investors, the availability of RSA financial assistance is essentially determined at 
the same time as the investment decision (i.e., an issue of endogeneity). 
In these data, there are three potential measures of performance, output, 
employment, and a proxy for productivity. Output is perhaps the most intuitively 
appealing, though also the most problematic, as output in this context is 
measures by sales, which of course are the outcome of two structural equations, 
both of which include the price of the final good, which is unobservable. As 
such, one can estimate a sales equation without the identification problem, but it 
is likely to perform poorly. Productivity can be measured in any number of ways, 
though this again relies on good data, and proxying this as output/ employment, 
without good information on the capital stock is again unreliable. This leaves 
employment, which in general is perhaps the least appealing measure, though 
for the purposes of RSA is particularly attractive, as one of the main aims of RSA 
was to boost employment. 
Within an econometric framework, the standard approach is to regress 
employment on a measure of RSA incidence, and a set of control variables, to 
determine whether RSA does indeed boost employment. Notice that this assumes 
a direction of causality here that may or may not be testable within the data, that 
firms in receipt of RSA tend to grow faster, rather than, for example, firms with 
high growth potential are better at obtaining RSA. It is reasonable to assume that 
“good” firms – those with high levels of managerial competence, good products, 
good processes, highly innovative etc., will be those that will perform well and 
grow. Equally, it is reasonable to assume that such firms are also those that are 
attractive for policy makers, especially at a local level looking to boost output 
and employment. Therefore, if one were to run a simple regression of growth 
against RSA, and detect a positive result, this positive implied effect of RSA may 
be subject to an upward bias, as it may be that better performing firms are also 
better at attracting RSA. In other words, we may have a strong correlation, but 
not necessarily a reliable inference for policy makers. Equally, if RSA is to an 
64
Evaluation of Regional Selective Assistance (RSA) and its successor, Selective Finance for 
Investment in England (SFIE)
extent targeted, at ailing firms, then OLS will understate the importance of RSA 
to the beneficiary firm compared with the counterfactual. 
With a survey of cross sectional data, ascribing this causality can be problematic, 
and while our survey was conducted at a point in time, we do have employment 
and output data for the period prior to, and after, RSA was awarded. We 
can, therefore, to some degree, address this causality problem. The analysis 
presented here offers two approaches to the problem. The first is an approach 
based on all of the firms in the sample, irrespective of whether or not they 
are RSA beneficiaries, while the second looks at the subset of firms that are 
beneficiaries.
5.2 Addressing the Problem of Selection or Endogeneity
The econometric issues surrounding this type of problem are discussed in 
more detail in the technical Annex A to this chapter, but we make the following 
summary points. There are numerous ways of addressing the issue of sample 
selection, all of which rely in some sense on being able to treat the policy 
instrument, not as an exogenous variable (something determined outside of 
the system) but as an endogenous variable, that is that the likelihood of a firm 
receiving RSA financial support is in part dependent on the quality of the firm. 
Before discussing the alternative econometric approaches, it is important further 
to consider the nature of the sample of firms that one is dealing with in such 
studies. In theory, all firms within a geographic (and sometimes sectoral) domain 
dictated by the particular policy are potential beneficiaries for support. One 
then has information on all beneficiaries (and sometimes either unsuccessful 
applicants and even successful applicants who subsequently did not follow 
through), but no information on those firms that either considered applying and 
did not, or those firms that for whatever reason did not consider applying. 
One possible solution therefore to this, is to use a “Heckman” model. These 
are common in industrial economics, for example in relating ownership change 
to firm performance – is it that firms who have been taken over perform better 
(or worse) or is it that good (or bad) firms are the targets for takeover. This 
approach firstly involves estimating a Probit model, which seeks to explain the 
probability of a firm being a recipient of the policy. The purpose of this is to test 
whether there are any common factors in RSA beneficiaries, and also to capture 
additional characteristic differences between beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries 
that could not be identified when the sample was constructed.32 If, however, 
the Probit fails to identify any systematic patterns in the recipient firms, then 
subject to the other considerations above, one can again revert to OLS. The 
results presented here, however, are suggestive of selection issues, or at least 
32 One may ask why this is necessary, when one has the information on recipient firms, but of course only limited 
information is available. Firms have, for example different types of customers, different growth trajectories, and 
even different ownership patterns, information on which may only be available after the survey. 
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that one can explain a high proportion of the probability of a firm obtaining RSA 
assistance with just a few key variables. 
5.3 Limitations and Alternatives
However, it is also fair to say that this approach has its limitations and it is 
important to consider alternatives. This also depends on what one assumes 
with respect to the process of the allocation of RSA financial assistance. Before 
coming to the estimation results, it is important, as we noted earlier, to consider 
the nature of the firms/plants receiving assistance. RSA beneficiaries broadly 
fall into two categories. Firstly, single plant domestically owned enterprises 
seeking relatively small amounts of funds, and secondly large (typically foreign) 
multinationals seeking large grants. The work by Harris and Robinson (2005) 
focus to a large degree on the latter, while it is clear that in terms of both size and 
scope the former group became more important in the later years of RSA. Rather 
than simply pooling all of these firms together, we therefore present three sets 
of estimates, one for the full sample, and one for each of these two subgroups 
of firms/plants.33
The sample selection model essentially assumes that there exists a given set 
of projects or potential projects, some of which are eligible for RSA. Investors 
then bid for RSA funding, and based on a set of criteria, funding is then awarded 
to those projects for which the scheme is most applicable. This seems most 
appropriate for those firms who are UK-owned single site firms. Here, RSA is 
less important in the location decision than it is for MNEs, though the evidence 
hitherto suggests that it is important for future development. 
However, for MNEs (be they UK or foreign owned) the allocation decision is 
rather different. This is not a matter of selecting “potential winners” or dealing 
with applications to determine whether an existing investment project meets 
a set of criteria, so much as RSA being determined simultaneously with the 
investment and location decision of the firm. The case studies undertaken as 
part of this evaluation, albeit with SFIE beneficiaries34, and a large literature on 
the location decisions of firms confirms this, see for example Driffield (2004), 
and as such the econometric problem of determining the effect of RSA on the 
employment growth of foreign subsidiaries is perhaps not so much sample 
selection as endogeneity. 
It is relatively easy to test whether a variable may be treated as exogenous, 
though in general these tests are recognised as having only relatively weak 
power. If a variable cannot be treated as exogenous, a common way of dealing 
with such problems in econometrics is to find an “instrument” – that is, a variable 
which is correlated with the endogenous variable, but is determined outside of 
33 It is important to note that there around 60 RSA cases that are UK owned multi-site businesses in the English 
sample. These are too small to be treated as a separate group for the econometrics, and while they are “more like” 
the UK single site businesses they are only included in the full sample estimation.
34 However, they were all with firms in receipt of over £100,000 and matched many of the characteristics of former 
RSA Scheme beneficiaries. Indeed, some had previously received RSA assistance.
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the model. A fundamental problem in policy evaluation is that there are seldom 
good “instruments” for policy initiatives – as they are in general designed in 
some sense to correct market failure, and the policy maker attempts to gather as 
much information as possible about the firm when implementing the policy. We 
test the assumption of exogeneity of RSA assistance in the employment growth 
equation. This is strongly rejected in the case of MNEs, and borderline for the full 
sample and for UK singles (the probabilities that RSA assistance is exogenous 
are 0.06 and 0.14 respectively). It is well known, however, that such tests are 
sensitive to the choice of instruments, and to the issue of identification which 
is further discussed in the annex to this chapter. The convention therefore with 
such results is to proceed with caution, on the understanding that OLS is likely 
to produce biased results. 
Perhaps the most simple is the straightforward “two stage least squares” or 
“instrumental variables” approach outlined above – subject to being able to 
obtain a suitable instrument. Finally, one can adopt a more conventional sample 
selection model, which tests for sample selection bias, but then only estimates 
the growth effects on the selected firms. This is similar to Heckman’s “other” 
famous model, the treatment model. 
Once one has determined whether endogeneity or sample selection bias exists, 
the issue then becomes one of how to proceed, and how to distinguish between 
these approaches. Here, we rely on what is intuitively appealing and consistent 
with previous literature on small firms, FDI and financing, along with some basic 
econometric tests. 
In order to generate the final models, we draw upon a range of variables 
(obtained through the bespoke survey for this evaluation) derived from theory 
that have been shown to relate to the performance of firms and plants (e.g., 
R&D, innovation activity, business strategy, management capacity) as well as 
the descriptives from the previous chapter in order to generate some priors. 
The latter include, for example, that nationality is important, along with past 
growth, and the regional embeddedness of firms may also in part determine the 
probability of a firm to apply for, and receive RSA assistance. These priors were 
then coupled with a general-to-specific approach, where successive models were 
run, excluding insignificant variables until a parsimonious form was obtained for 
each of the three samples of firms. 
5.4 Timing of Effects: Some Issues
What we are modelling is the performance (particularly employment given 
the objectives of the scheme) of the RSA-assisted business after an input of a 
capital subsidy and embedded within this model is the counterfactual position 
represented by a group of non-assisted businesses. In the case of the safeguarded 
component of assistance, either on its own or with assistance to create jobs as 
well, we can make the assumption that the employment performance of the 
firm or plant in the period 2004-06 would have been different from unassisted 
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firms or plants as a consequence of receiving the financial subsidy. For example, 
and taking the positive outcome of RSA assistance, they may have declined 
less quickly than similar unassisted businesses. Further, the intervention to 
safeguard jobs may have served to keep the firm or plant in business and as 
a result enables it to be ‘present’ at the start of the 2004-06 period. As such, 
its performance in this period is included in the model which seeks to assess 
whether the RSA assistance parameter is significantly associated with net 
employment creation in the 2004-06 period. 
There is another broad issue with regard to the timing of the financial assistance 
received, especially with respect to the safeguarded jobs. The conceptual 
problem here is that we are conducting a cross-sectional econometric analysis 
to isolate the effects of RSA assistance when in effect the assistance has 
come at varying ‘distances’ back from the start of the modelling period for 
employment change – that is, 2004. At the design stage of this evaluation these 
issues were considered and the decision was taken that within the constraints 
of an evaluation using cross-sectional survey data modelling the effects of RSA 
assistance received in the 2000-04 period for the 2004-06 period was the only 
feasible option available. 
This decision does, however, create a number of specific issues. First, the nature 
of the RSA assistance package allows businesses to draw down the monies 
offered over a 3-year period which means that a business receiving an offer in 
the first quarter of 2004 (i.e., the last quarter of the operation of the RSA Scheme) 
will not perhaps have fully realised the benefits of assistance and therefore, the 
model of employment change in the 2004-06 period may under-estimate the 
effects of assistance. Second, assistance received to safeguard jobs at the start 
of the period for this evaluation (i.e., 2000 or 2001) will already have had its effect 
on the firm or plant and to model employment change in a period far removed 
from the point of assistance may be problematic and lead to an over-estimate 
of the effects of assistance. We argue, however, that the assistance may have 
kept the firm in existence for the following 6 years. This is, of course, conjecture 
as we simply do not know what the answer to this question is35. Third, there is 
an assumption that the actual realisation of the effects of RSA assistance that 
was received by businesses in 2002 or 2003 will be fully captured by the models 
presented below. This may not be the case and again may under-estimate the 
effects of RSA assistance. In order to address these issues we will re-specify the 
econometric estimates to introduce a sensitivity analysis for an impact period 
2002-2006 against which we can assess the original results. This is presented in 
section 5.7 along with the assumptions used and a more detailed discussion of 
the specification of the equation.
35 We present evidence in Chapter 6 which suggests that for a large number of ‘safeguarded only’ cases (i.e., 27 out of 
43 or 62.8%) the provision of RSA financial assistance was fully additional (i.e., the definitely or probably achieved 
the same business outcomes categories) suggesting that without it the firm or plant would have been unable to 
have safeguarded a large proportion of the jobs indicated to BERR at the time of application and/or offer.
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5.5 The Probit Estimates
The first stage in estimating the impact of RSA assistance on beneficiaries is 
therefore the development of a series of Probit models of the probability of 
receiving RSA support. There are two purposes for doing this. Firstly, as outlined 
above, to test for any selectivity bias in RSA assistance and its subsequent 
growth effects, and secondly identify any elements of the targeting of policy 
which are not ‘controlled’ for by the structuring of our sample survey of non-
beneficiaries. Initial estimates are reported in Table 5.1. Three models are 
reported with slightly different specifications to give an indication of robustness, 
with Model 3 providing the preferred model specification (Table 5.3). In each 
initial specification we also included a full set of regional dummy variables. 
These proved largely insignificant, however. Some key variables such as firm 
size have been retained in each model as this is perceived to be important for 
policy analysis. 
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Table 5.1: The Full Sample Probit: Dependent variable is receipt of 
RSA (0/1) 36
Parameter36 Estimate dp/dx37 t-statistic P-value
C -1.26843 -0.39703 -3.71794** [.000]
US owned -.456234 -0.14280 -1.26563 [.206]
Japan owned .912532 0.28563 1.92990* [.054]
ROW owned .909183 0.28458 1.38723 [.165]
employment 2004 -.680525E-05 -2.13008D-06 -.024754 [.980]
Log(emp. growth 02-04) .550291 0.17224 2.99345** [.003]
Business Plan .148258 0.046406 .905939 [.365]
Firm age -.506121E-02 -0.0015842 -2.01065** [.044]
Ltd company .436314 0.13657 1.00594 [.314]
Multi-plant -.352060 -0.11020 -2.51352** [.012]
Yorks & Humber .265130 0.082987 1.39157 [.164]
North West .308522 0.096569 1.84021* [.066]
North East .344296 0.10777 1.98985** [.047]
UK customers .374497 0.11722 1.73339* [.083]
EU customers .345491 0.10814 2.46310** [.014]
Generated productivity growth .220390 0.068983 1.70989* [.087]
Public sector customers -.764807 -0.23939 -5.29508** [.000]
Sell to other businesses .570256 0.17849 2.17172** [.030]
Source inputs from abroad .429751 0.13451 2.94547** [.003]
Sector dummies Yes
Number of observations = 482; Number of positive observations. = 223 
LR (zero slopes) = 131.051 [.000]
Mean of dep. var. = .462656 
Log likelihood = -267.226
Fraction of Correct Predictions = 0.701245 
Pseudo R-sq 0.27; LM heteroscedasticity test ~ χ2 (1) 1.0985 (0.295)
It is important to interpret these variables correctly, particularly in the context of 
the ownership variables. A very high proportion of Japanese firms in the sample 
are RSA beneficiaries, while the same cannot be said of US firms. As one would 
expect, RSA is strongly correlated with three regions (only the North West and 
North East dummies are statistically significant), and younger firms are more 
likely to be RSA beneficiaries. It is also noticeable that firms that may be seen as 
being more “dynamic” in that they sell to other businesses, and source inputs 
from abroad are more likely to be supported by RSA, while firms that sell to the 
public sector are less likely to be beneficiaries. 
36 Annex B to this chapter contains definitions of all the variables used in the modelling reported in this chapter. 
37 We present evidence in Chapter 6 which suggests that for a large number of ‘safeguarded only’ cases (i.e., 27 out of 
43 or 62.8%) the provision of RSA financial assistance was fully additional (i.e., the definitely or probably achieved 
the same business outcomes categories) suggesting that without it the firm or plant would have been unable to 
have safeguarded a large proportion of the jobs indicated to BERR at the time of application and/or offer.
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Table 5.2: The UK Single Plant Sample: Dependent variable is receipt 
of RSA (0/1)
Parameter Estimate δp/δx t-statistic P-value
C -1.32160 -0.40396 -3.69549** [.000]
Employment 2004 .748737E-03 0.00022886 1.27156 [.204]
Log (emp growth 02-04) .443930 0.13569 1.76001* [.078]
Business Plan .279578 0.085455 2.35129** [.0.01]
Firm age -.013916 -0.0042535 -3.52152** [.000]
UK customers .855601 0.26152 2.78111** [.005]
EU customers .350281 0.10707 1.72477* [.085]
Source inputs from abroad .700664 0.21416 3.55108** [.000]
Number of observations = 250 Scaled R-squared = .290866
Number of positive obs. = 122 LR (zero slopes) = 76.1000 [.000]
Log likelihood = -135.165
Pseudo R-squared = .366994
Fraction of Correct Predictions = 0.716000 
LM heteroscedasticity test ~ χ2 (1) 1.7885 (0.181)
With relatively few variables, the model predicts well for UK single plant firms, 
and again suggests that nationally and internationally orientated firms are more 
likely to be beneficiaries of RSA support, as are younger firms. The key variable 
here is the Business Plan variable used to ‘instrument’ the likelihood of obtaining 
RSA. SMEs that have an existing business plan (usually associated with seeking 
finance from elsewhere) are more likely to obtain RSA than those without38. 
Overall, these results are encouraging for policy makers, in that young, dynamic 
firms with international links are more likely to be beneficiaries of RSA than 
those with merely a local focus. This is potentially good news for policy makers, 
in that it suggests that domestic beneficiaries are more dynamic than average 
with higher rates of growth. This is again important when seeking to relate RSA 
to subsequent growth. 
38 This is a common finding in studies of this type (e.g., Barkham et al., (1996); Roper and Hart (2005); Mole et al., 
(2007). SMEs have to produce a business plan when seeking private sector finance, and while this may be correlated 
with the ability of managers, the writing of these is often subcontracted, and the existence of a business plan is 
seldom found to be related to firm performance. 
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Table 5.3: The Multinational Sample: Dependent variable is receipt of 
RSA (0/1)
Parameter Estimate dp/dx t-statistic P-value
C -1.63954 -0.51355 -2.36415** [.018]
Employment 2004 .180986 0.056689 1.54764* [.122]
Firm age -.831119E-02 -0.0026033 -1.83109* [.067]
Exporter .228100 0.071447 .647293 [.517]
R&D .211847 0.066356 .714129 [.475]
US owned .283567 0.088820 .806671 [.420]
Japan owned 1.46358 0.45843 2.05609** [.040]
ROW owned 1.47076 0.46068 2.35420** [.019]
UK MNE .224804 0.070414 .689333 [.491]
Local sourcing .582807 0.18255 2.38633** [.017]
Number of observations = 142 
Number of positive obs. = 64 LR (zero slopes) = 39.2621 [.000]
Mean of dep. var. = .450704 
Log likelihood = -78.1046
Pseudo R-squared = .344055
Fraction of Correct Predictions = 0.690141 
LM heteroscedasticity test ~ρ χ2 (1) 2.399 (0.124)
Of the three Probits the set of results for the MNE sample is most suggestive 
of a sample selection problem. The problem is, however, that very few inward 
investment projects into the UK are not at some point in receipt of RSA support. 
As a result, while the matched non-beneficiary group includes a sample of 
MNEs, many of these are UK firms rather than foreign ones. This is therefore 
suggestive of an endogeneity problem rather than a sample selection problem. 
Virtually all inward investors from Japan and the rest of the world (typically SE 
Asia) have been in receipt of RSA at some point, and firms that engage in local 
sourcing are some 18 per cent more likely to be RSA beneficiaries. Firm size is 
positively related to RSA, but with a very low level of significance. 
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5.6 The Employment Growth Equation Results39
In this section we report the estimates of the effect of RSA assistance during the 
2000 to 2004 period on subsequent employment growth (over the 2004 to 2006 
period). In each case our performance models are estimated for log growth rates 
in employment to allow for the standard log-normal distribution of business 
growth rates. As suggested above, and given the considerations outlined in the 
annex to this chapter, the preferred approach is to assume sample selection for 
UK single site operations (i.e., there is a link between management ability and 
the ability to get RSA assistance), and endogeneity rather than sample selection 
for the MNEs. For comparison we present the results from both estimations for 
the full sample of firms. For comparison, the OLS estimates are presented in the 
annex to this chapter, though we advise caution when reading the OLS results, 
for the reasons outlined above and in the Annex to this chapter.
The results presented in Table 5.4 suggest that, overall, there is indeed a sample 
selection issue, but that it acts if anything to understate the growth effects of 
RSA. This means that RSA has a positive effect on employment for the overall 
sample of RSA-assisted firms, but that for at least some firms, this takes the 
form of protecting employment rather than stimulating new jobs. As such, the 
selection term in the Heckman models is negative. The specific reasons for these 
results become clear when one looks at the UK single plants and MNE sub-
groups separately (Tables 5.5 and 5.6). 
Nevertheless, these results are broadly good news in that RSA financial support 
is positively related to employment growth, and the estimates are broadly 
consistent across all of the estimators. It is also clear that many of the individual 
factors associated with RSA in Table 5.1, are negatively associated with growth. 
UK MNEs have grown faster than others, while Japanese and SE Asian firms 
have not. Firms that source through imports have grown slower, and not 
surprisingly firm size is inversely related to growth. 
39 This section only reports the results for employment – dependent variable defined as the difference in the log of 
employment in 2004 and 2006. Equations were run for both sales and ‘productivity’ growth but were not significant 
and are not reported here.
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Table 5.4: The Full Sample (Number of observations: 477)
heckman Stage 2 2SLS
variable Coefficient t-stat Coefficient t-stat
C .135 1.529 .158 1.430
RSA .654 4.745* .671 3.658**
LEMPG42 -.0600 -1.108 -.0537 -.806
EMP04 -.0003 -4.186 -.0000 -3.306**
UKMNE .133 2.565* .133 2.070**
JAPAN -.0463 -.481 -.067 -.545
ROW -.3230 -2.292** -.321 -1.836*
EXPORTER -.011 -.247 -.013 -.233
LON -.150 -1.781* -.182 -1.737*
SW -.168 -2.294** -.193 -2.130**
WM -.040 -.637 -.057 -.729
YH -.094 -1.661* -.109 -1.520*
NW -.061 -1.159 -.078 -1.161
NE -.149 -2.739* -.163 -2.358**
CUSUK -.131 -2.403** -.136 -1.973**
PUBSECT .136 2.787* .139 2.221**
BUSINESS -.118 -1.880 -.106 -1.382
DIRECT .043 1.044 .061 1.190
SOUPAR .115 1.904 .136 1.782*
SOUUK .044 1.157 .011 .219
SOUIMP -.071 -1.771 -.067 -1.347
Selection term40 -.305 -3.588*
LM het. test = 5.499 [.019]; SSR = 45.850; RESET = 2.348 [.124]
Adjusted R-squared = .157 ; Log L = -118.234
Adjusted R-squared = .113; SSR = 70.4278 
In the UK-owned single plant growth model RSA assistance is again strongly 
associated with firm growth, but again the negative selection term suggests that 
support is given to firms who perform worse than average (Table 5.5). As such, 
the OLS coefficient on RSA is biased downwards compared with the instrument 
variable (IV) or sample selection estimates (See Tables A5.1 in the Annex). For 
these firms, firm age is positively associated with growth, while firms whose 
main aim has been to maintain the status quo have done worse than those 
seeking new markets or products. Ownership appears insignificant, as does the 
location of customers, while firms that both sell and source abroad tend to do 
worse than average. These results contrast markedly with the results for the 
multinationals sample. 
40 In the case of the Heckman model the selection term is the inverse Mills ratio.
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Table 5.5: UK Owned Single Plants Growth Models – Heckman 

















Selection term -.559 -4.144**
SSR = 19.2270 
RESET = 1.17587 [.279]
Adjusted R-squared = .192891
Log L = -35.5298
The Probit results discussed above suggest that larger firms within this group are 
more likely to receive RSA, but that after receiving RSA the beneficiaries do not 
grow as fast as the non-beneficiaries. However, it is also clear that beneficiaries 
do better than they would have done without RSA. The reason for this is that 
RSA is offered in order to secure jobs, as well as to create new ones. In the case 
of domestic singles, the total “secured jobs” protected by RSA in England was 
2,624 over the period, while the number of new jobs that firms claimed would 
be created was 7,212. This explains the negative sample selection term, as only 
RSA beneficiaries can have “secured jobs” in this way.
For the multinational group (Table 5.6) beneficiaries of RSA grow more slowly 
(the RSA dummy is not significant), and the OLS estimator (see Annex A5.3 to 
this Chapter) again understates this effect. Therefore, we note that the Heckman 
model gives the largest estimate of the RSA effect, and the Mills ratio suggests 
sample selection issues. These results, unlike those discussed above, are in 
line with the findings of Harris and Robinson (2005). This suggests that MNEs 
who receive RSA support may have done so as the result of some bargaining 
mechanism, where what matters is not the creation of further jobs after the 
RSA assistance, but the creation of jobs at the point of RSA intervention. It is, 
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therefore, perhaps not that surprising that the RSA coefficient is not significant 
in the estimated model.
































Adjusted R-squared = .327
SSR = 10.2674
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The Probit results discussed above suggest that larger firms within this group are 
more likely to receive RSA, but that after receiving RSA these firms do not grow 
as fast as the non-beneficiaries. However, it is also clear that assisted firms do 
better than they would have done without RSA. The reason for this is that RSA 
is offered in order to secure jobs, as well as to create new ones. In the case of 
MNEs, the total “secured jobs” protected by RSA in England was 7,154 over the 
period, while the number of new jobs that firms claimed would be created was 
8,053. This extremely large number of secured jobs suggests that the impact of 
RSA on growth of employment in MNEs may be small, but its effects on relative 
decline may be large. 
These results highlight the distinctions between the two types of firms, but even 
further suggest at least two groups within the MNE sample. For example, MNEs 
that have been seeking to grow, or introduce new products have been successful 
in this respect, though this appears unrelated to RSA assistance. This is all 
indicative of there being a group of inward investors for whom the RSA Scheme 
was an incentive to stay in the UK rather than to come to the UK. This result is 
robust to the inclusion of the country dummies. 
5.6.1 RE-ESTIMATINg ThE gROWTh MOdELS WITh vALuE OF gRANT
With the availability of information on the actual amount of money offered 
to the individual RSA-assisted firms it is possible to be more precise about 
the effects of that assistance on employment growth over and above the use 
of a dichotomous dummy variable (i.e., whether or not a firm had received 
assistance). The approach here is to develop the growth models presented 
above by including the value of the RSA support received, and therefore, obtain 
an elasticity of employment growth with respect to RSA support. 
This is obviously different from the approach thus far which has been based 
on a full set of firms in the sample, and seeking to compare beneficiaries and 
non-beneficiaries. The preceding analysis highlighted the sample selection and 
endogeneity problems associated with the approach and this still applies when 
evaluating the effects of RSA on the set of assisted firms only.
Technically, this approach involves estimating a relatively standard selection 
model, where the probit and the outcome equation are estimated simultaneously, 
but the second stage (the employment growth model) is only performed on the 
selected firms (i.e. RSA assisted firms). This tests, and subsequently allows for, 
sample selection bias but then only estimates the growth effects on the selected 
firms. This is similar to Heckman’s “other” famous model, the treatment model. 
This model permits the inclusion of some variables that are only pertinent 
to beneficiaries, such as grant size. This approach is potentially important in 
allowing for sample selection bias, in that if one simply runs an OLS regression 
on this, the selectivity question is ignored, and the effect of RSA financial 
assistance on employment growth is likely to be overstated. The results for the 
three different groups of firms/plants are reported in Tables 5.7-5.9.
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Log L = -319.069
Corr(Y,Yfit) = 0.54
Overall, the selection model for the full sample is not particularly informative 
(Table 5.7). The size of the RSA offer is not significant in explaining subsequent 
employment growth. This, however, merely serves to demonstrate the 
heterogeneity of the sample, in that pooling UK single site firms with subsidiaries 
of MNEs is not informative when we are working with the actual amount of 
financial support offered to these businesses. Tables 5.8 and 5.9 are more 
informative.
41 The reported value for the sample Selection model is not a sample selection term, but merely a term that must lie 
between 0 and 1 to confirm that a global maximum in Log L is found.
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Table 5.8: Domestically Owned Single Plants Growth Models – 
selection model (Number of observations: 122)
variable Coefficient t-stat
C -.235 0.651















% positive obs. = 48.37
Corr (Y,Yfit) = 0.48
Log L -48.324
For UK singles, the model suggest that, in broad terms, a 10 per cent increase 
in grant size will increase subsequent employment in these firms by less than 
1 per cent (Table 5.8). Similarly, for MNEs, the estimation incorporating the 
actual grant size suggests that a 9 per cent increase in grant size will increase 
subsequent employment by 1 per cent (Table 5.9). We can see, therefore, that 
the specification of the employment growth models with the inclusion of a 
variable capturing the amount of financial assistance offered has potential value 
in the development of a method to calculate cost-per-job estimates.
Overall, the specification of the models for UK singles and MNEs are consistent 
with the previous results but in the case of the latter the RSA ‘instrument’ is 
positive and significant which contrasts with the earlier result which used a 
simple dichotomous RSA dummy. The implication here is that there is some 
sensitivity to the size of the grant awarded which allows us to identify an 
assistance effect for these firms.
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Log L = – 43.41212
Corr (Y,Yfit) = 0.33
5.7 Capturing Safeguarded Jobs in the Model: Sensitivity 
Analysis
As we discussed in Section 5.4 above an important issue that emerged in the 
discussion of these results is the ability of the employment growth model to 
capture both elements of the RSA assistance package, that is, job creation 
and safeguarding jobs42. We have already seen in Chapter 3 that the financial 
assistance provided to firms and plants under the RSA Scheme was a mixture 
of job creations only (47.9% of cases for UK single plants and 39.5% for MNEs); 
safeguarded jobs only (9.0% of cases for UK single plants and 17.1% for MNEs) 
42  In total, there were 39,897 safeguarded jobs supported in the ‘in scope’ RSA-assisted firms in the 2000-04 period: 
22,759 in UK single plants and 17,138 in MNEs (both UK and Foreign-owned).
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and a mixture of both job creations and safeguarded jobs (43.1% of cases for UK 
single plants and 43.4% for MNEs). 
It is our view, therefore, following the reasoning set out above that a substantial 
proportion of the employment effects of the financial assistance received by a 
firm or plant in the period 2000-04 will be captured in the model of employment 
change in the 2004-06 period, irrespective of the proportion of job creations and 
safeguarded jobs in the assistance package offered. 
However, in the models presented above we may understate the importance 
of safeguarded jobs as we are only estimating a model of employment growth 
in the period 2004-06. If employment retention was not an issue for unassisted 
firms, then the models may not fully capture the importance of RSA assistance, 
as the relative importance of job retention (i.e., 39,897) may be understated. 
Nevertheless, a large proportion of these jobs are included in the sense that the 
performance of these plants in the 2004-06 period may be associated with the 
financial assistance received at some stage in the 2000-04 period. That is, as 
we state above, the assistance received may have enabled them to be ‘still in 
existence’ in the 2004-06 period, and as such ‘counted’.
Does the nature of the over- and under-estimates average themselves out over 
the RSA beneficiaries in the sample? In short, we do not know the answer to that 
question for sure but what we can do is re-specify the employment growth model 
in order to introduce a sensitivity analysis into the results. Two approaches were 
considered for testing for this. The first was to effectively impose a two year time 
constraint for all of the employment effects to have occurred, and to estimate for 
several subsets of the data over a two year moving window. This was rejected 
for several reasons. Firstly, one is concerned that all of the employment gains 
from RSA may take longer than two years to materialise, and secondly that this 
would render it impossible to carry out a proper sample selection model based 
on previous performance. In addition, many of the sample sizes would become 
small, making if difficult to capture all of the inter-firm variation, and the other 
determinants of employment growth.
Therefore, we undertook an alternative sensitivity test, by carrying out the 
estimation discussed above for the sub-sample of RSA-assisted firms that 
obtained RSA assistance between 2002 and 2004, effectively seeking to ensure 
that we captured the “safeguarded jobs” effect within the employment growth 
period, which we re-specified to be 2002-06. While we have several reservations 
about this, such as sample size and the fact that the matching process with 
non-beneficiaries was not designed to allow for this (though it is not clear how 
one could practically do this, other than by doing a matching process for each 
year before constructing a stratified sample), this was done, and the results 
summarised below.
Rather than present all of the results again for the sub-sample, Table 5.10 
provides the coefficient on the RSA term for the various estimation procedures 
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for the basic employment growth equation, across the full sample and the two 
sub-samples. It also provides the coefficient on the “grant size” variable for the 
final sample selection model. The full set of models is presented in the Annex C 
to this chapter (Tables C5.1-C5.3).
Table 5.10: Employment Growth Models (2002-06) – Sensitivity 
Analysis
Full sample uk singles MNEs



































Note: (t values in parentheses).
It is noticeable when comparing the models that in each case the coefficients 
and implied elasticities are smaller for this sub-sample than for the overall 
sample. However, the fact that there is less time for the created jobs to occur and 
be captured by the model will reduce these numbers so we cannot be sure they 
represent good estimates of the RSA effect. 
More importantly, these differences are not significant. From these results we 
conclude that the concern in using all the ‘in scope’ assisted firms/plants in the 
2000-04 period in the econometric analysis would lead to a failure to capture the 
full “secured jobs” effect is unlikely. In other words, the tendency of the base 
line estimation to understate job retention is less important than the tendency of 
imposing a window of arbitrary (shorter) length to capture the full employment 
effects (i.e., job creations and safeguarded jobs) of RSA assistance.
5.8 Displacement Issues
The previous section has provided evidence that there is clear additionality 
associated with RSA financial support in the 2000-04 period. However, an 
important dimension of the overall assessment of the impact of the RSA Scheme 
concerns displacement. One element of the discussion concerning displacement 
relates to understanding the nature of the projects being assisted by the RSA 
Scheme. The extent to which displacement can be considered at the micro-level 
rather than a macro-level consideration is also a matter of some debate. 
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One might expect, a priori, that displacement will be higher in the case of 
indigenous UK firms. Smaller indigenous firms may be more likely to be 
associated with higher displacement levels (particularly regional displacement) 
given that they are more likely to sell a higher proportion of their output within 
the local, regional and/or national markets. On the other hand, one might expect 
that foreign-owned firms would use the Assisted Area where they are located 
as an export base. Foreign-owned firms would be expected to cause less local, 
regional and/or national displacement given their higher propensity to export43. 
Table 5.11 and Figure 5.1 illustrate that very few (around 10%) of cases relate to 
a move into the Assisted Area. The vast majority of assistance relate to financial 
assistance provided to firms who are already operating in the Assisted Areas. 
This data is taken from the administration data held by the RDAs and BERR 
on the 784 in-scope records used for the survey. With this profile of assisted 
projects one may further infer that displacement, in the form of inward-moving 
firms/plants competing for local and regional sales, is not an issue for a large 
proportion of RSA beneficiaries.
Table 5.11: RSA Cases by Project Type
 Type of Assisted Project Number of Cases %
 Buy-out or acquisition 25 3.2
 Modernisation / Expansion at existing site 377 48.1
 New branch plant 60 7.7
 New project on existing site 83 10.6
 Start up of RSA eligibility activity at new site 66 8.4
 Transfer to new site in same TTWA 131 16.7
 Transfer to new site not in same TTWA 33 4.2
 Missing Description 9 1.1
 Total 784 100.0
43 Lenihan, H and Hart, M (2006) ‘Evaluating the Additionality of Public Sector Assistance to Irish Firms: A Question of 
Ownership?’ Policy Studies, Vol. 27, No. 2.
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Foreign (N=173) UK (N=611) All (N=784)
Table 5.12 presents data from the survey on the nature of the market orientation 
of RSA assisted firms and, in particular, the proportion of sales to customers in 
the region where they are located. A further question asks about the extent to 
which there may be regional competition for these sales.




uk Owned MNEs Non-Assisted
(All)
Mean % of sales to the regional market (i.e., local 
plus rest of region)1
37.0 39.2 26.2 51.9
Proportion of firms indicating sales taken up by 
competitors in the region if they ceased trading2
23.0 28.3 10.6 41.0
Notes: 
1  SFIE figure is 53.4 per cent (there are too few MNE plants in the SFIE sample to provide a disaggregation by 
ownership).
2  SFIE figure is 29.4 per cent. 
Taking these two bits of information together (and we deliberately avoid formally 
combining them to produce a point estimate of displacement) would lead us to 
conclude that overall displacement will be relatively low for the RSA Scheme in 
the period 2000-04. Disaggregating this information by ownership implies that 
the degree of displacement associated with MNE plants is much lower than for 
UK-owned businesses.
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5.9 Summary
The findings of the econometric investigation are broadly supportive of RSA 
intervention. There are clearly two separate groups of firms within these data. 
While there is little evidence that the beneficiaries of RSA financial assistance 
are those that will generate the highest employment growth, it does stimulate 
employment in domestic firms, and is largely associated with firms with an 
international and national, rather than local focus. R&D however seems largely 
unrelated to RSA assistance. RSA paid to MNEs, however, seems largely 
associated with encouraging firms to stay rather than grow, and grant size is 
more important than the existence of RSA in generating employment.
However, as we have argued throughout this chapter these results may under-
estimate the effects of RSA financial support due to the benefits not yet being 
fully realised and a small proportion of the safeguarded jobs not fully captured 
in the employment growth model. Sensitivity analysis would suggest that this is 
not a significant issue in the analysis.
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Annex A to Chapter 5
In order to evaluate the impacts of a policy initiative, one would ideally, survey the 
whole population of potential beneficiaries, and then determine the relationship 
between the policy instrument and firm performance. 
For obvious reasons, this is not practical, and so one constructs a stratified sample 
of non-beneficiaries, to match as closely as possible the recipient group, in terms 
of firm size, type, location, industry sector, type of ownership etc, with a view 
to comparing this stratified sample of non-beneficiaries with the recipient firms. 
If receipt of a policy instrument is essentially a random event, and if everyone 
who is surveyed replies, the a straightforward ordinary least squares (OLS) 
regression will suffice, and providing no other econometric problems arise, will 
provide an unbiased estimate of the policy effects. In practice however, these 
conditions seldom arise. Also, while one can seek to obtain a stratified sample 
of non-beneficiaries that matches closely the recipient group, this can never be 
perfect as there are essentially an infinite number of firm level characteristics.
There are further considerations however. Firstly, the offer of RSA will be 
determined at the same point as the location decision (especially for foreign 
MNEs). As such, it is likely that sample selection is not the only problem, but also 
that the RSA variable is endogenous in employment growth. Testing for this is 
straightforward.
Testing for endogeneity
The standard approach to testing for endogeneity is the Hausman test (updated 
to the Durbin-Wu-Hausman test). This involves the following:
Consider a regression 
 y = β0 + β1*z + β2*x3 + e1    (a1)
where z is endogenous. Suppose that x1 and x2 are instrumental variables for z. 
One should decide whether it is necessary to use an instrumental variable, i.e., 
whether a set of estimates obtained by least squares is consistent or not. 
An augmented regression test can easily be formed by including the residuals 
of each endogenous right-hand side variable, as a function of all exogenous 
variables, in a regression of the original model. We would first perform a 
regression 
 z = γ0 + γ1*x1 + γ2*x2 + γ3*x3 + u    (a2)
to get residuals z_res, then perform an augmented regression: 
 y = δ0 + δ1*z + δ2*x3 + δ3*z_res + ε    (a3)
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If δ3 is significantly different from zero, then OLS is not consistent. 
In this context, the potentially endogenous variable is whether they received 
RSA. This means that formally the equation (a3) must be estimated as a probit, 
for reasons discussed above. One can rely on the t test of the estimate of δ3 
in these circumstances, though the ‘variable addition’ likelihood ratio test is 
potentially more stringent.
ThE IdENTIFICATION PROBLEM ANd FINdINg A SuITABLE INSTRuMENT
In all of the cases discussed above, the essential problem remains, firstly, that the 
two equations are separately identified, that is that there is at least one variable 
that impacts on stage 1 but not on stage 2, and vice versa. The existence of such 
variables is notoriously problematic in policy evaluation, as one is seeking a 
factor that impacts on whether the policy is “turned on”, but not subsequently 
on firm performance. Equally, these factors will vary across the sub-samples, 
being different for foreign MNEs compared with small single plant domestic 
firms. 
The selection of these variables is as follows:
dOMESTIC SINgLE SITES:
The existence of a published business plan: this is a factor often associated with 
the ability of small firms to raise finance, though is uncorrelated with growth. 
This is consistent with work done elsewhere on firm financing, including work 
being done concurrently with this for the Small Business Service on the Annual 
Small Business Service data.
Firm age: older firms appear less likely to obtain RSA, though this is again 
uncorrelated with growth in our sample. With models of any of this type, there is 
always the possibility of a variable being correlated with the dependent variable 
in both equations, and but appearing as significant in only the first for example. 
However, this appears unlikely in this case, and previous evidence linking firm 
age to performance is patchy, and usually sensitive to man y other factors.
FOREIgN MNES:
The region of the investment, particularly the north east of England, and the 
degree of local R&D both impact on the likelihood of RSA, but not on employment 
growth. Local sourcing was also considered, though the large literature on the 
importance of agglomeration in firm (and MNE performance in particular) 
would reject this. These have intuitive appeal, as firms generally make a case 
for RSA based on region issues, and phenomena such as local R&D, though 
for a multinational the success of global R&D is potentially more important for 
performance than the location of R&D locally.
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However, what one say here is that the hypothesis of RSA being an exogenous 
event for MNEs in the UK can be rejected, and the significance of the sample 
selection terms in the UK singles models (along with the evidence from the 
case studies) suggests that the estimates presented here are more reliable than 
simple OLS.
ECONOMETRIC APPROACh – ALLOWINg FOR SELECTIvITy IN RSA 
ASSISTANCE
Our focus here is the impact of RSA assistance provided during 2002 to 2004 on 
business growth between the 2004 and 2006 business years. If π is any potential 
indicator of business growth, a basic model that encapsulates these effects can 
be defined as follows: 
εδβπ ++= zx  (1)
Where: x is a vector of firm characteristics, and z is a binary variable taking 
value 1 if a firm received RSA, and 0 otherwise. In this model, the size, sign 
and significance of the coefficient on the ‘treatment’ term (i.e. δ) will give an 
indication of the impact of RSA on business growth. Other studies have shown, 
however, that such treatment coefficients will give an unbiased indication of 
the real effect of assistance only if assistance is randomly distributed across the 
population of small firms. Where there is any element of systematic targeting 
or selection, the coefficient on the treatment term will reflect a combination of 
‘assistance’ and ‘selection’ effects. 
Rather than direct estimation of equation (1) a preferable approach is therefore 
to allow explicitly for this type of selection bias. Specifically, we assume that 
the likelihood or probability of receiving RSA (z*) is itself related to a set of 
business and owner-manager characteristics, v. This suggests a model of the 
form (Greene, 1995, p. 642):
 z*= γ’v + w (2)
What is observed, however, is not the probability of receiving RSA (zi*) but a 
categorical variable which indicates whether a firm received RSA or not during 
the 2002 to 2004 period. In this situation the standard estimation method for 
this type of model is the two-stage procedure outlined in Heckman (1979). This 
involves the estimation of a Probit model to estimate the probability of a firm 
receiving RSA and the incorporation of a selection parameter in the treatment 
model for business performance (see Greene, 1995, p. 639 for details). In these 
terms, a positive (negative) and significant coefficient on the Mills ratio is 
indicative of a positive (negative) sample selection problem, RSA being skewed 
towards high (low) performance firms.
εδβπ ++′= zx '
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An important issue in operationalising the Heckman type model is the avoidance 
of too much overlap between the selection and performance models. In the 
probit models we therefore focus on external characteristics of the firm which 
may have been visible ex ante, and which may have provided the basis for 
administrative criteria for the targeting of assistance. In the growth models, 
wherever possible, we include more organisational factors which may initially 
have been unobservable but which may nonetheless have contributed to 
performance. 
Table A5.1: The Full Sample OLS estimates of employment growth. 























LM het. test = 3.121 [.077]
 SSR = 51.743 
RESET = 2.860 [.091]
Adjusted R-squared = .129 
Log L = -129.627
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Table A5.2: Domestically Owned Single Plants, OLS estimates of 





















SSR = 36.2751 
RESET = 2.4188 [.120]
Adjusted R-squared = .189596 
Log L = -111.293
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SSR = 9.978 
RESET = 1.655 [.202]
Adjusted R-squared = .346 
Log L = -20.718
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Annex B to Chapter 5: Variable definition used in Econometric 
Modelling
Parameter category
BUSINESS sells to other businesses dummy
Business Plan does the business have a formal business plan dummy
CLOSE does the business closely monitor employees dummy
CUSEU do you have customers elsewhere in the EU dummy
CUSREG do you have customers in your region dummy
CUSUK do you have customers elsewhere in the UK dummy
DIRECT do you sell direct to the public dummy
EA East of England regional dummy dummy
EM East Midlands regional dummy dummy
EMP04 employment in 2004 log
Generated productivity growth have you generated productivity growth over the past 2 years dummy
GRANT SIZE size of assistance log
GROW have you sought to generate growth dummy
Japan owned Japanese owned dummy
LON London regional dummy dummy
Ltd company is the business a limited company dummy
MAINT has the major objective to be to maintain output at existing levels dummy
Multi-plant is the business a multi-plant company dummy
NE North East England regional dummy dummy
NEWPROD has the business introduced new products over the period dummy
NW North West England regional dummy dummy
OWN20% does the MD/ CEO own at least 20% of equity dummy
PROCIN has the business engaged in process innovation dummy
Public sector customers does the business sell to the public sector dummy
R&D have you undertaken R&D over the period dummy
RSA dummy for RSA dummy
SOUPAR do you source components from the parent dummy
Source inputs from abroad do you source inputs from abroad – not through a foreign parent dummy
SOUUK do you source from elsewhere in the UK dummy
STAND has the business standardised its operating process dummy
SW South West England regional dummy dummy
TEAM does the business have formal teamworking dummy
UK customers are customers elsewhere in the UK dummy
UKMNE is the firm a UK owned MNE dummy
US is the firm a US owned MNE dummy
WM West Midlands regional dummy dummy
YH Yorkshire and Humberside regional dummy dummy
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Annex C to Chapter 5: Sensitivity Analysis – Full Models for 
Table 5.10
Table C5.1: Full Sample
heckman Iv FIML sampsel
C 0.22 1.77 0.21 1.60 0.31 2.42 2.53 3.33
RSA 0.38 3.37 0.38 3.43 0.37 2.74 0.03* 0.73
LEMPG02 0.04 2.45 0.04 3.16 0.04 3.40 0.62 3.32
EMP04 0.00 4.34 0.00 -1.18 0.03 0.54 0.00 -2.40
UKMNE 0.07 1.37 0.03 0.15 0.38 0.57 0.12 0.91
JAPAN 0.01 0.06 -0.23 -0.58 0.24 0.28 0.17 0.71
ROW -0.40 -2.18 -0.14 -2.16 -0.08 -1.81 -0.92 -2.55
EXPORTER 0.01 0.20 0.52 2.07 0.05 0.38 0.28 1.84
LON -0.06 -0.53 -0.05 -0.13 -0.03 -0.21 -0.04 -0.13
SW -0.11 -1.19 -0.20 -0.55 0.05 0.46 -0.64 -2.21
WMM 0.03 0.39 -0.19 -0.57 0.58 1.72 -0.68 -2.44
YH 0.01 0.12 -0.40 -1.25 0.40 1.44 -0.58 -2.48
NW 0.07 0.99 -0.18 -0.64 0.59 1.96 -0.36 -1.53
NE -0.03 -0.37 -0.34 -1.15 0.34 1.38 -0.59 -2.83
CUSUK -0.10 -1.77 -0.03 -0.13 -0.04 -0.48 -0.25 -1.14
CUSOTH -0.06 -1.09 0.07 0.37 -0.45 -1.83 -0.06 -0.47
PUBSECT 0.05 1.08 0.36 2.13 1.10 2.42 0.07 0.48
BUSINESS -0.15 -2.01 -0.62 -2.01 0.06 0.90 -0.15 -0.61
DIRECT 0.09 1.73 0.42 2.05 0.08 0.73 0.12 0.94
SOUPAR 0.11 1.55 0.09 0.33 0.10 1.52 -0.12 -0.65
SOUUK 0.07 1.48 -0.15 -0.84 0.41 1.85 0.14 0.81
SOUIMP -0.02 -0.54 -0.22 -1.28 0.00 -0.40 -0.27 -2.32
Selection term -0.17 -2.20 0.48 6.55
Mean of dep. var. = 
.068466 
Sum of squared 
residuals = 41.6942 
F (zero slopes) = 
17.6949 [.000]
R-squared = .630883 
Adjusted R-squared = 
.595230
Log likelihood = 
-117.999
R-squared = .058850
Adjusted R-squared = 
.043652
Log likelihood = 
-207.590
Number of positive 
obs. = 121 
Log likelihood = 
-164.815
* this is the coefficient on the continuous grant variable
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Table C5.2: UK Singles
heckman Iv FIML sampsel
C 0.33 1.83 0.37 2.14 0.36 2.16 0.39 2.87
RSA 0.48 2.51 0.44 4.01 0.45 3.48 0.08* 3.29
EMP02 0.00 -2.41 0.00 -3.70 0.00 0.75 0.00 -4.83
RANDD 0.13 1.49 0.14 1.63 0.08 1.17 0.21 1.92
VINTAGE 0.00 -2.56 0.00 -2.20 -0.03 -1.46 0.00 -1.56
MAINT -0.11 -1.10 -0.12 -1.19 -0.12 -1.42 -0.14 -0.82
TEAM -0.10 -1.03 -0.13 -1.37 -0.07 -0.93 -0.47 -3.36
CLOSE 0.03 0.25 0.04 0.37 0.10 1.08 0.19 0.93
STAND 0.03 0.31 0.04 0.35 -0.05 -0.52 -0.02 -0.12
OWN20% 0.07 0.76 0.03 0.31 -0.06 -0.90 -0.19 -1.60
CUSREG -0.07 -0.77 -0.10 -1.11 -0.03 -0.33 -0.03 -0.20
CUSUK -0.11 -0.91 -0.09 -0.76 1.63 1.24 -0.43 -1.93
CUSEU -0.02 -0.18 0.00 -0.04 1.05 0.93 0.01 0.07
SOULOC 0.16 1.89 0.17 2.04 0.09 1.37 0.09 0.82
SOUIMP -0.02 -0.25 0.00 -0.05 1.17 1.22 -0.01 -0.12
Selection term -0.10 -1.66 0.65 5.66
F (zero slopes) = 
2.85949 [.000]
R-squared = .265540 
Adjusted R-squared = 
.172677
Log likelihood = 
-142.890
R-squared = .291455
Adjusted R-squared = 
.206429
 F (zero slopes) = 
3.38923 [.000]
Log likelihood = 
-90.9354
Log likelihood = 
-43.5168
* this is the coefficient on the continuous grant variable
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Table C5.3: MNEs
heckman Iv FIML sampsel
C 0.28 0.66 0.27 0.07 0.19 0.46 0.12 0.11
RSA 0.08 2.12 0.06 0.72 0.07 1.75 0.07* 1.75
LEMPG02 0.33 2.62 0.38 2.46 0.33 2.15 0.21 2.02
EMP02 -0.15 -2.35 -0.23 -1.35 -0.15 -2.13 0.17 1.47
RANDD 0.11 0.54 0.46 0.48 0.01 0.05 -0.98 -4.07
VINTAGE -0.00 -1.11 -0.00 -0.36 -0.00 -0.69 -0.02 -4.46
PROCIN 0.19 1.66 0.28 0.57 0.19 1.17 -0.08 -0.57
EXPORTER 0.11 0.63 0.43 0.29 0.09 0.35 0.19 3.62
MAINT 0.33 1.66 0.29 0.93 0.32 1.36 0.11 3.53
GROW 0.43 2.58 0.17 0.33 0.43 2.05 0.13 3.75
NEWPROD 0.18 1.17 0.21 0.82 0.18 0.80 -0.33 -0.98
EA -0.81 -3.32 -0.92 -0.64 -0.79 -4.24 -0.26 -5.50
LON -0.36 -1.54 -0.92 -0.44 -0.36 -0.79
SW -0.31 -1.73 -0.52 -0.64 -0.30 -1.39 -0.08 -0.36
NW -0.27 -1.79 -0.28 -1.03 -0.26 -1.06 0.15 0.74
US 0.00 0.01 0.36 0.39 -0.09 -0.45 -0.07 -0.28
JAPAN 0.38 0.66 0.99 0.35 0.04 0.04 -1.30 -3.33
ROW -0.06 -0.11 -0.79 -0.25 -0.35 -0.96 -0.11 -0.41
UKMNE 0.13 0.61 0.45 0.42 0.03 0.14 0.27 1.26
SOUPAR -0.07 -0.48 0.31 0.52 -0.07 -0.45 -0.25 -1.79
SOULOC 0.27 1.16 0.12 0.88 0.15 1.01 0.08 0.62
Selection term 0.33 0.57 0.51 6.87
R-squared = .490536 
Adjusted R-squared = 
.259686 
Log likelihood = 
-39.8110
F (zero slopes) = 
2.12491 [.006]
R-squared = .255048
Adjusted R-squared = 
.15844
F (zero slopes) = 
1.09264 [.370]
Log likelihood = 
-88.0969
Log likelihood = 
-28.2958
* this is the coefficient on the continuous grant variable
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Chapter 6: Motivations for 
Seeking Assistance, Effects 
and Additionality
6.1 Introduction
The aim of this chapter is to present the results from a series of self-assessment 
questions in the telephone survey which asked the respondent to indicate the 
effects of the assistance received under the RSA and SFIE Schemes on their 
business. The intention here was to use a series of standard questions which 
would facilitate comparison with previous evaluations and indeed other forms 
of business support. The emphasis in the discussion will be on the following 
components of that assessment:




In addition, the narrative from the 10 face-to-face interviews with SFIE Scheme 
beneficiaries is presented to understand in more detail these issues. Finally, a 
summary of the key findings of the non-take-up survey is presented to provide 
some insights into the decision to abandon seemingly viable projects that had 
been offered assistance by either BERR or the RDAs.
6.2  Motivation for Seeking Assistance
Both groups of beneficiaries were asked what their motivation was in seeking 
assistance from the RSA and SFIE Scheme (Table 6.1). The table presents only 
the three most important responses for each beneficiary group. A desire to 
grow the business faster was the most common response from the two groups. 
However, SFIE Scheme beneficiaries were more likely than those assisted under 
the old RSA Scheme to indicate that this was their main motivation in seeking 
assistance. RSA Scheme beneficiaries were also more likely to report that they 
sought assistance because they were in difficulty. This was particularly the case 
for foreign-owned firms as almost one in five (18.8%; n=80) indicated that their 
main reason for seeking assistance under the RSA Scheme was because they 
were in difficulty. Businesses in receipt of larger amounts of financial assistance 
(>£1 million) were, as one might expect, more likely to be foreign-owned firms 
and/or plants (27.5% of foreign-owned firms received financial assistance in 
excess of £1 million compared to 6% of UK-owned firms). As a result, therefore, 
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these larger beneficiaries of financial assistance reported that their main 
motivation for seeking assistance was because they were in difficulty.
As we have noted earlier comparing the two sample groups of beneficiaries 
is problematic due to the fact that the old EGS Scheme is encompassed with 
the current SFIE Scheme. If we restrict the analysis of the SFIE respondents to 
only those that were offered financial assistance of £100,000 or more (n=47) 
then this will be more useful in identifying if there were different motivations 
for businesses in seeking assistance between the two Schemes. Table 6.1 
shows that after controlling for size of grant the general point still holds in that 
SFIE beneficiaries were more likely than RSA beneficiaries in the sample to be 
approaching the Scheme in order to secure financial assistance to help them 
grow faster.












We were seeking to grow faster 68.3 68.9 80.9 78.7 72.6
We weren’t growing at all 6.0 5.5 5.6 6.4 5.8
We were in difficulty 12.5 13.2 4.9 4.3 10.0
N=319 N=273 N=162 N=47 N=481
Another dimension to this is the extent to which there are variations across the 
Assisted Areas (as measured by the intensity of assistance available: i.e., Tier 
1 and Tier 2). This information is only available for the RSA beneficiary sample 
and, although not significant, RSA respondents in Tier 1 were slightly more likely 
to report that their motivation in seeking financial assistance was that they were 
in difficulty: 14.9 per cent compared to 11 per cent in Tier 2 Assisted Areas.
6.3  Effects of RSA and SFIE on Business Behaviour
As part of the survey firms were asked to identify ways in which the financial 
support received from RSA or SFIE had impacted on their business and the 
responses are tabulated below (Table 6.2)44. This question was the initial one 
which sought to capture if the respondent thought there was any benefit or 
effect in this area. Generally, the majority of respondents (more than two-
thirds in most areas of impact) from the two samples reported benefits for their 
businesses. The most common effects were on productivity and sales growth 
with developments in management practice and innovation management 
some of the least often cited impacts. Two statistically significant differences 
were evident between the effects cited by RSA and SFIE respondents relating 
to improved staff knowledge or skills and improved technical understanding 
44 Comparisons with other BERR Business Support Programmes could be undertaken by using Wave 5 of the Cross-
Product Survey.
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and capability. In both cases a positive effect was more often cited from SFIE 
beneficiaries than from RSA beneficiaries. 













% % % % % %
Introduction of new or significantly 
improved products or processes
73.2 76.9 67.4 71.8 77.3 58.7
N=310 N=77 N=46 N=156 N=110 N=46
Introduction of new or significantly 
improved management practices 
46.9 32.5 43.2 49.4 53.2 42.6
N=309 N=78 N=44 N=158 N=111 N=47
Improved staff knowledge or skills 65.0 66.2 65.2 73.6 75.9 68.1
N=314 N=77 N=46 N=159 N=112 N=47
Improved management of innovation 
processes
50.8 47.4 54.5 52.9 55.0 47.8
N=307 N=78 N=44 N=157 N=111 N=46
Improved technical understanding or 
capability
60.3 67.9 68.9 70.9 70.5 71.7
N=310 N=77 N=45 N=158 N=112 N=46
Improved product quality 66.3 55.7 69.6 73.4 73.2 73.9
N=312 N=79 N=46 N=158 N=112 N=46
Improved efficiency of machinery 75.2 75.9 71.1 79.2 78.2 81.8
N=310 N=79 N=45 N=154 N=110 N=44
Improved efficiency of other inputs 49.5 48.0 48.9 47.1 50.5 39.1
N=301 N=75 N=45 N=153 N=107 N=46
Reduced costs 62.5 70.5 52.3 58.1 61.5 50.0
N=309 N=78 N=44 N=155 N=109 N=46
Improvements in sales 78.1 75.9 80.0 83.8 87.4 74.4
N=311 N=79 N=45 N=154 N=111 N=43
Increased productivity
(and by that I mean value added per 
employee)
81.6 84.6 79.5 84.4 85.3 82.2
N=309 N=78 N=44 N=154 N=109 N=45
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Table 6.2 also disaggregates the responses by ownership (Non-UK owned for 
the RSA Scheme) and by the size of financial assistance received. The only 
significant differences in terms of grant size (reported in the table as less than 
or greater than £100k) between the two schemes relates to the ‘introduction of 
new or significantly improved products or processes’ and ‘reduced costs’. In 
other words, smaller amounts of financial assistance under the SFIE Scheme 
(broadly equated to levels of financial assistance available under the old EGS 
Scheme45) are more likely to produce these effects than similar amounts of 
financial support received under the old RSA Scheme. Perhaps what is more 
useful to understand than the effects of the actual amounts of money received 
is to investigate the effects of the particular project for which financial assistance 
was sought and received. 
With respect to ownership, there were too few cases in the SFIE sample to 
make meaningful comparisons with the previous RSA Scheme. However, from 
the RSA sample some statistically significant differences emerge. Foreign-
owned firms and/or plants are less likely to report the ‘introduction of new or 
significantly improved management practices’ and ‘improved product quality’ 
as a result of the financial assistance received, whereas they are more likely to 
report increased productivity.
Again we examine the extent to which the reported effects of assistance of 
business behaviour vary by the type of Assisted Area (Figure 6.1). The sample is 
restricted to RSA beneficiaries only and for only those that can be allocated to 
either Tier 1 or Tier 2 levels of assistance. Two statistical significant differences 
emerge with a greater number of RSA beneficiaries in Tier 1 areas reporting 
the improved efficiency of other inputs and increased productivity as a result 
of the financial assistance received. Probing further it is clear that this finding is 
independent of ownership with both UK-owned and foreign-owned firms just as 
likely to report these effects in the Tier 1 Assisted Areas.
45 Although it is clear from the data that there a significant number of RSA beneficiaries who were in receipt of 
financial assistance of less then £100,000 in the period when the EGS was operating.
99
Motivations for Seeking Assistance, Effects and Additionality
Figure 6.1: Effects of Assistance on Business Behaviour by Assisted 




























































































































































































































Tier 1 Tier 2
The follow-up question on each of the areas of business behaviour sought to 
ascertain the extent to which, if a respondent replied that they thought there 
was a benefit of the Scheme (RSA or SFIE), this benefit had actually happened or 
would definitely happen (on a scale of 1 not very likely to 5 to a critical extent). 
The results are presented for both sample groups in Figure 6.2. It is clear that 
when a respondent reported that they thought the assistance would have an 
impact on their business it was in effect seen as a critical or very important 
impact for on average half the firms/plants in the two samples. Of particular note 
was the high percentage of respondents reporting that the assistance produced a 
critical or very important impact in improved efficiency of machinery, innovation 
and increased productivity.
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Figure 6.2: Extent to Which Business Behaviour Changed (critical or 





























































































































































































































6.4 Additionality – Self-Assessment 
Despite the obvious problems inherent in asking beneficiary firms/plants the 
rather hypothetical ‘counter-factual’ question what would have happened in 
the absence of assistance this approach has become a consistent feature of the 
evaluations of business support programmes. There are intrinsic difficulties 
associated with this technique when used in this regard which is commonly 
referred to as ‘respondents effect’, that is, the fact that respondents (firms) 
may purposely exaggerate (in either an upwards or downwards direction) the 
impact of financial assistance from an external influence, such as a development 
agency. More precisely, respondents may exaggerate the impact of assistance 
for fear that they may reduce their chances of receiving repeat assistance (if they 
were not deemed by the development agency as really meriting assistance the 
first time round). On the other hand, other beneficiaries may be likely to play 
down the impact of assistance attributing success to themselves and their own 
personal characteristics (such as own motivation; education; business idea etc).
Levels of deadweight from both RSA and SFIE appear low with the majority 
of firms citing some form of partial additionality in terms of either achieving 
business outcomes more quickly or to a greater extent (Table 6.3). Complete 
additionality occurred in around 21 per cent of cases. Interestingly, there was 
no statistical difference between the pattern of responses between the RSA and 
SFIE beneficiaries. 
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% % % % %
We would have achieved similar business outcomes 
anyway
3.4 5.0 4.9 3.5 8.5
We would have achieved similar business outcomes, 
but not as quickly
23.2 26.3 22.8 27.0 12.8
We would have achieved some but not all of the 
business outcomes
25.7 22.5 24.1 22.6 27.7
We probably would not have achieved similar 
business outcomes
25.1 25.0 24.7 21.7 31.9
We definitely would not have achieved similar 
business outcomes
21.3 17.5 21.0 21.7 19.1
(None of these) 1.3 3.8 2.5 3.5 0.0
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
N=319 N=80 N=162 N=115 N=47
Disaggregating the RSA beneficiaries by ownership reveals no statistically 
significant differences between UK-owned and foreign-owned beneficiaries of 
the scheme. Again there are too few foreign-owned cases in the SFIE sample, and 
indeed the overall population of SFIE assisted businesses, to make comparisons 
between the schemes feasible. 
Follow-up questions were included in the survey whenever a respondent 
indicated that the financial assistance enabled the project to proceed more 
quickly or at the anticipated scale. Of those RSA beneficiaries who indicated 
that they would have achieved the same outcomes but not as quickly, two-fifths 
(39.2%) indicated that it would have taken them an additional 1-2 years and in a 
further third of cases (33.8%) the delay would have been more than 2 years. The 
pattern of responses for SFIE beneficiaries is broadly similar with the comparable 
proportions being 37.8 per cent and 24.3 per cent respectively.
With respect to the reduced scale of project in the absence of financial assistance 
almost three-fifths (58.6%) of RSA beneficiaries reported that they would have 
had to scale back the project by 50 per cent or more. The comparable proportion 
for SFIE beneficiaries was just under half (48.8%). Both these follow-up questions 
on partial additionality provide important supporting evidence for the very low 
levels of ‘non-additionality’ associated with both the RSA and SFIE Schemes. In 
other words, respondents were able to evidence their initial assessment of the 
degree of additionality.
However, as we have discussed earlier these comparisons between the RSA and 
SFIE Schemes are not completely accurate as the latter included businesses that 
would have normally been supported under the old EGS Scheme. Accordingly, 
we report the responses for SFIE beneficiaries disaggregated by the amount of 
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financial assistance received: less than £100,000 and £100,000 and over. The 
direct like-for-like comparison between the old RSA Scheme and SFIE cases 
receiving £100,000 or more reveals that although the degree of wholly non-
additionality is slightly higher the overall levels of partial and full additionality 
are much higher. For example, 51 per cent of SFIE respondents report 
Scheme additionality (definitively and probably not achieved business outcomes 
categories of response) compared to 46.4 per cent of RSA beneficiaries.
At this point it is useful to introduce evidence from previous evaluations of the 
EGS Scheme in order to compare with the SFIE results for those firms/plants 
receiving less than £100,000 of assistance. The most recent evidence comes 
from Wave 2 of the Business Support Monitoring Survey carried out in the first 
quarter of 2004. Figure 6.3 presents the results for the more robust comparison 
of the EGS and SFIE Schemes. The most important point to note is that 
percentage of reported wholly non-additionality was over three times as high for 
businesses supported under the old EGS Scheme46 compared to those receiving 
similar amounts of financial assistance under the new SFIE Scheme: 11 per cent 
compared to 3.5 per cent. At the other end of the spectrum the proportion of 
respondents reporting that the assistance was wholly additional (definitely or 
probably) was broadly similar (44 per cent of SFIE respondents compared to 42 
per cent of EGS respondents).


































SFIE (<£100k) – N=115 EGS (N=45)
46 These 45 EGS cases include 34 completed cases and 11 in progress cases.
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The only other point of difference is that SFIE beneficiaries were much more 
likely to report that they would not have achieved all of the envisaged business 
outcomes (i.e. reduced scale) in the absence of support: 22.6 per cent compared 
to 16 per cent.
Another way of doing this is to combine the results for the EGS Scheme from 
Wave 2 of the Business Support Monitoring Survey carried out in the first 
quarter of 2004 with the results for the RSA Scheme obtained from this survey. 
The results are presented in Figure 6.3b and show that there is no difference 
between the degree of additionality reported under the new SFIE Scheme and 
the previous RSA Scheme once the EGS assisted firms (n=45) are included.
































RSA & EGS (N=364) SFIE (N=162)
Does the degree of additionality vary across the type of Assisted Area? Figure 
6.4 present the responses for the RSA Scheme and although the level of wholly 
non-additionality is almost identical (and less than 2%) for the two types 
of Assisted Area there are significant differences in the other categories of 
additionality. Levels of full additionality in Tier 1 are almost twice that reported 
by RSA beneficiaries in Tier 2: 29.7 per cent compared to 16.4 per cent. Further, 
respondents in Tier 2 assisted areas are more likely to report partial levels of 
additionality.
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Tier 1 and DA Tier 2 and IA
An important dimension of additionality in the context of the RSA and SFIE 
Schemes is the extent to which, without assistance, firms/plants would have 
located elsewhere, whether in other regions of the UK or in other countries. 
Overall, 117 (36.7%) of RSA beneficiaries and 42 (25.9%) of SFIE beneficiaries 
reported that prior to the approval of the financial assistance under the Schemes 
they were considering another location47. What is of interest is the extent to which 
these projects would have been ‘lost’ to the UK in the absence of assistance. For 
RSA beneficiaries, just under half indicated that they were considering a location 
outside the UK, while for SFIE beneficiaries it was exactly one-third.
The follow-up question to these respondents asked them if, without assistance, 
they would have gone ahead with the current project at the same location. Figure 
6.5 shows that both the RSA and SFIE Schemes would appear to have been active 
in ensuring the assisted project went ahead at the current site. Overall, 45 per 
cent of SFIE beneficiaries and 57 per cent of RSA beneficiaries report that they 
would have abandoned the project altogether or located it outside the UK. Just 
under a fifth (19%) of SFIE beneficiaries and one-quarter of RSA beneficiaries 
report that they would have located outside the UK in the absence of financial 
assistance.
47 A further 11 and 7 respectively were ‘Don’t knows’.
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Yes - in the
UK, but at a
different location
Yes - at the
same location
%
RSA (N=117) SFIE (N=42)
Respondents were also asked to indicate if there were any other viable alternative 
sources of finance available for the project if no assistance had been provided 
under the RSA or SFIE Scheme. A fifth of RSA beneficiaries (21.0%) and 17.9 per 
cent of SFIE beneficiaries report that other viable alternatives were available as 
the time they applied to the Schemes. Overall, two-thirds of these businesses 
(n=96) report partial additionality in the second and third categories of partial 
additionality (equally split between both) in Table 6.3 with only 4.2 per cent 
reporting ‘zero’ additionality. The inference here is that while alternative sources 
of finance were available for some business the effect of the assistance from 
the RSA or SFIE Scheme was to accelerate the project or to allow it to proceed 
at the scale envisaged by the business. Finally, comparing the two groups 
those businesses who report that no alternatives were available were more 
likely to report higher levels of additionality and this difference was statistically 
significant.
An interesting follow-up to the standard additionality question asked respondents 
to indicate if the financial support they received from either RSA or SFIE to divert 
resources, such as finance, labour or management time, into business activities 
other than the funded project. For both the RSA and SFIE Scheme only 9.4 per 
cent and 10.5 per cent of businesses respectively indicated that had been an 
outcome of receiving assistance. This serves as a way of illustrating the further 
effects of assistance under both schemes on other potential business outcomes 
and not those solely associated with the funded project. 
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Table 6.4 presents the results for the three previous evaluations of RSA together 
with the findings of the current evaluation48. The results are not directly 
comparable due to the differing ways in which the various degrees of partial 
additionality, including alternative locations, were addressed and also the way 
in which the assessment was undertaken. Previous BERR studies have based 
the assessment on both the interviewers’ assessments and the response from 
the respondent, whereas in our evaluation the respondent’s reply was recorded 
without further review.
The most important point to emerge from the comparison is that the extent of 
wholly non-additionality associated with RSA financial assistance has fallen 
dramatically in the current evaluation covering the 2000-2004 period. The 
previous estimate of around a fifth (based on an agreed interviewer/respondent 
assessment) in 1991-95 has fallen to only 2.8 per cent, although it is only 
approximately half that found in the 1985-88 evaluation. Full additionality has 
shown some fluctuation over the four evaluation periods but an average figure 
of around 23 per cent would appear to be useful generalisation. One obvious 
inference to make from these figures would be that the selection process for 
assisted cases has become much more refined in the last 10 years which has led 
to lower levels of wholly non-additional cases being supported.
Businesses supported under both the RSA (2000-04) and SFIE Schemes were 
significantly less likely than in previous periods to report that in the absence 
of assistance they would have gone ahead with the project outside the UK, or 
indeed in other regions of the UK. 
48 Appendix 2 contains a summary of recent evidence from the evaluation of industrial policy in Ireland which was 
taken from Lenihan, Hart and Roper (2005).
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Table 6.4: Comparative Additionality Estimates for RSA Assistance
1980-843 1985-883 1991-952 2000-043 2004-06
SFIE8
Wholly non-additional5 16.1 8.5 19.3 2.8 6.4
1. Gone ahead but at a later date/
more slowly5
17.4 26.9 24.0 20.1 8.5
2. Gone ahead but on a smaller 
scale1
15.4 11.3 12.9 23.2 25.5
3. Gone ahead but elsewhere in 
the UK4
6.0 1.4 8.2 0.3 0.0
4. Gone ahead but outside the 
UK4
15.4 12.7 18.1 0.3 2.1
Some combination of 1-4 5.4 3.8 4.1 6.97 6.47
Full Additionality (probably)6 n.a. n.a. n.a. 25.1 31.9
Full Additionality (definitely)5 24.2 35.4 13.5 21.3 19.1
100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
N=149 N=212 N=165 N=319 N=47
Source: King (1990); PACEC (1993) and AEP (2000)
Notes:
1  Defined as ‘with fewer jobs’ in the 1980-84; 1985-88 and 1991-95 evaluations, whereas the 2000-04 evaluation did 
not specify jobs in the question, although given the nature of the Scheme the inference is that a reduction in the 
scale of the project would lead to fewer jobs. 
2  Based on an agreed Interviewer/Respondents’ assessment. 
3  Based on respondents’ assessment.
4  The additionality question did not include these location options but rather they were probed in a series of separate 
questions which have been cross-tabulated with the standard additionality question. In brief, they are a sub-set of 
respondents to the wholly non-additional category who had given serious consideration to alternative locations 
prior to accepting the offer of financial assistance under the RSA and SFIE Schemes.
5  Figures in bold are directly comparable across the four evaluations.
6  This option was not included in the additionality question in the three previous evaluations of RSA. 
7  In the 2000-04 evaluation this was captured by the combination of the response category ‘none of these’ and other 
combinations of the of the partial additionality questions, including alternative locations.
8  For comparative purposes the results from the survey of SFIE beneficiaries are included (i.e. only those in receipt of 
financial assistance of £100,000 or more).
6.5 Timing of Effects
Around half of RSA beneficiaries reported already having derived all of the 
expected benefits from their financial support compared to around 22 per cent 
of SFIE beneficiaries. This inevitably reflects the time difference in the receipt of 
support49. A significant proportion of firms, however, anticipate future benefits 
from RSA support and particularly from SFIE stretching over the next five or 
more years. This has clear implications for the interpretation of the results of the 
modelling of the economic impact of the schemes – i.e., there will be a tendency 
49  The analysis of the question has not yet been undertaken which controls for the timing of assistance.
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towards an underestimation of the overall effects of assistance on the business 
(see Chapter 5).













% % % % % %
You have already realised all the 
benefits
53.3 42.5 73.9 21.6 24.3 14.9
You expect to realise all the benefits in 
the next year
15.4 17.5 4.3 29.0 26.1 36.2
You expect to realise them in the next 
2 years
14.7 17.5 6.5 30.9 33.9 23.4
In the next 3 years 6.6 12.5 2.2 6.2 3.5 12.8
In the next 4 years 1.9 1.3 4.3 3.7 1.7 8.5
In the next 5 years 2.2 1.3 0.0 3.1 3.5 2.1
Or will it take more than 5 years to 
fully realise all the benefits
2.5 2.5 6.5 0.6 0.9 0.0
(No benefits experienced) 1.6 2.5 2.2 1.2 1.7 0.0
(Don’t know) 1.9 2.5 0.0 3.7 4.3 2.1
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
N=319 N=80 N=46 N=162 N=115 N=47
One might expect the profile of the timing of benefits to be different depending 
upon the amount of financial assistance received with smaller amounts of 
assistance having ‘worked their way through the business’. This is in fact the 
case for the RSA Scheme where almost three-quarters (73.9%) of businesses in 
receipt of financial assistance of less than £100,000 reporting that all the benefits 
have been realised at the time of the survey. This not the case for the SFIE 
Scheme but given that most of the assistance received by these firms has been 
of recent vintage this is not surprising – we are not comparing like with like.
Foreign-owned firms and/or plants assisted under the RSA Scheme are less likely 
to report that they have realised all the benefits which given the fact that they 
are more likely to have received larger tranches of financial support is consistent 
with the findings on the amount of support.
Once again a further dimension of the analysis is to investigate the differences 
between the two categories of Assisted Areas – Tier 1 and Tier 2. RSA beneficiaries 
located in Tier 1 areas are more likely to report that the benefits of financial 
assistance have not been fully realised compared to Tier 2 areas50. This is further 
emphasised by the fact that just over one-fifth of Tier 1 RSA beneficiaries expect 
50 Again it is important to note that the current analysis is only based on 174 RSA beneficiaries for which we are able 
to allocate to these areas.
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to realise all the benefits of assistance in the next two years compared to 8 per 
cent located in Tier 2 areas.
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6.6 SFIE Beneficiaries: Jobs, Sales and Exports
In recognition of this issue about timing for the beneficiaries under the new SFIE 
Scheme and the inability to undertake econometric modelling of the effects of 
assistance additional questions were included in the survey to probe further on 
the effects of the scheme. These relate to job creations, jobs safeguarded as well 
as the effects on sales and export sales (Tables 6.5 and 6.6).
Businesses were asked to indicate how many jobs they had expected to create 
and/or safeguard a as a result of assistance under the SFIE Scheme and at the 
time for the survey had they actually done so. From Table 6.5 it is clear that 
just under half of the respondents (44.4%) indicated that all the expected jobs 
had been created while almost double that number report that all the jobs 
they had expected to safeguard with the assistance had in fact been secured. 
Approximately, a further quarter of respondents (28.9%) report that some of the 
expected job had been created which, as we have seen above, may be related to 
the anticipated future benefits still to be realised.
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Table 6.6: Jobs Created and Safeguarded (SFIE Beneficiaries)
Jobs Created Jobs Safeguarded
% %
Yes – all of them 44.4 87.7
Yes – some of them 28.9 3.6
No 25.2 6.5
Don’t Know 1.5 2.2
N=135 N=138
Using the information on new and safeguarded jobs from all the in-scope 
SFIE beneficiaries it is possible to gross up this result to produce an overall 
employment effect for the programme in mid-2006. With respect to safeguarded 
jobs the assisted businesses had received financial assistance to protect 10,130 
jobs and we can now estimate that 8,884 of these jobs had actually been secured 
at the time of the survey. Of the 9,660 ‘promised’ new jobs we can estimate that 
4,289 jobs have been created at the time of the survey51. 
How many of these ‘actual’ number of assisted jobs can be considered as 
‘additional’? We can use the self-reported estimates of additionality (see Table 
6.3) from the survey respondents to arrive at an estimate of the number of net 
additional jobs associated with the SFIE Scheme in the period 2004-06. The 
results are presented in Table 6.6. In summary, we can conclude that 1,875 
safeguarded jobs were secured and that 905 net new jobs were created as a 
result of the financial assistance received. 
Table 6.7: SFIE: Net Additional Jobs
New Jobs Safeguarded Jobs
Estimated number of jobs at time of offer 9,660 10,130
Actual number of jobs created or safeguarded1 4,289 8,884
Degree of Additionality (full only – i.e., definitely would not have 
gone ahead)
21.1% 21.1%
Number of net additional jobs 905 1,875
Notes:
See Table 6.6
With respect to sales, Table 6.7 shows that for the sample of SFIE assisted 
businesses just under a third (30.2%) report that all the anticipated increases 
in turnover had been realised with a further third reporting that some of them 
had been. Of those firms who answered the question regarding the anticipated 
effects of financial assistance on export sales around a fifth (22.0%) report that 
they had fully achieved these sales, while a further third (34.1%) report that 
51 We use the ‘worst case’ estimate here of 44.4% and 87.7% (see Table 6.5) as we have no way of calculating the 
proportion of actual jobs created by respondents who indicated that they had only created some of the promised 
jobs by the time of the survey.
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they have done so only partially. Again, as with jobs, this is not surprising for 
a new Scheme with many of the assisted business in the survey only receiving 
assistance in the calendar year 2005, but not after September 2005.
Table 6.8: Sales and Export Sales (SFIE Beneficiaries)
Sales Export Sales
% %
Yes- fully 30.2 22.0
Yes- partially 33.1 34.1
No 29.5 39.0
Don’t Know 7.2 4.9
N=139 N=41
6.7 SFIE Case Studies
As part of the evaluation it was agreed that 10 follow-up interviews with SFIE 
beneficiaries would be undertaken after the telephone survey to probe further on 
a number of the issues raised by the respondent. The Topic Guide used in these 
face-to face interviews is included in Appendix 4.
The selection of the case studies was deigned to reflect a range of responses to 
a number of the questions in Section B of the telephone questionnaire – dealing 
with the impact of the financial assistance from the SFIE Scheme. In other words 
we were seeking to identify those firms, who had been offered in excess of 
£100,000, and who had indicated either ‘low’ or ‘high’ additionality together with 
a spectrum of other impacts on the business. These were all businesses who had 
given permission at the time of the telephone survey for the research team to 
contact them at a subsequent time. Overall, there were 30 ‘in-scope’ businesses 
from which to seek a further face-to-face interview. 
The 10 SFIE beneficiaries interviewed were located in a number of English 
regions: the North East (3 firms), the North West (2 firms), London (1 firm), 
Yorkshire and Humberside (1 firm), the West Midlands (2 firms) and the East of 
England (1 firm). They were, with one exception, UK-owned businesses and 8 
of the businesses were operating in a range of manufacturing sub-sectors (e.g., 
food, chemicals, automotive products, printing, engineering, wood products). 
The remaining two businesses were in the service sector (engineering services 
and a racing facility). Seven of the businesses would be classified as small 
businesses (i.e., less than 100 employees).
In terms of the financial assistance received under the SFIE Scheme the three 
larger businesses had received in excess of £500,000, while the others had 
received between £120,000 and £250,000. Given the reliance upon the survey-
generated GVA data in the VfM calculations it was decided to attempt to verify 
the information on purchased inputs reported in the telephone survey through 
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the case studies. In all cases the respondent was able to talk through the relevant 
figures to arrive at a broadly similar estimate of purchased inputs as recorded in 
the survey dataset.
ThE APPLICATION PROCESS
One of the most important issues that emerged from the interviews with the 
owner-managers and/or financial director of the business was that the process 
of applying for SFIE assistance was complicated and has resulted in many of the 
interviewed firms employing consultants to submit the application at an average 
cost of around £20,000. In one case the respondent revealed that the consultant 
operated on a percentage of the total grant received – that is 10 per cent. In one 
case it was actually a cold call by a consultant which resulted in the business 
applying for assistance under the scheme to assist them to purchase land next to 
the existing factory premises. Without this support they would have gone ahead 
anyway with the purchase. Interestingly, the respondent had clearly indicated 
this in the telephone survey when answering the standard additionality question 
– they would have ‘gone ahead anyway’ – which provides some confidence in the 
estimates derived from this type of survey using the self-assessment method.
It should also be noted that many of these firms did have experience of the old 
RSA Scheme and were able to make very direct comparisons with the application 
process – that is, it has become much more complex. However, whilst there was 
a general view expressed about the complexity of the application process the 
majority of interviewees understood the need to collect the data requested – 
the problem was the opportunity cost involved and hence the use of outside 
consultants.
For one respondent the length of the application process was considered to be 
a very long one…
“There were only 2 of us working on it [the application process] and it took 
a lot of time…they needed a huge amount of information…it just seemed 
to go on for months’’.
It was not only the length of time and volume of paper work involved in the 
process that was considered a problem but also the people who the company 
had to interact with to complete the application process. In particular the external 
accountant the company was told to use by BERR to aid with the financial aspects 
of the application.
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“…he was the financial person we were referred to…there was one 
accountant who yes-ed and no-ed things and he was only part-time…and 
we had to get advice from him. For example at one stage he was basically 
saying ‘No, you don’t meet the criteria’. So we said ‘Well what do we need 
to do to make the criteria?’ He said ‘You change this and this and you’re 
okay’. But without asking him…He didn’t tell you…it was a question of you 
had to treat him the right way and ask him the right questions…”. 
There were further issues over the lack of clarity in the criteria with different 
people in the process asking and/ or emphasising different things leading 
to some confusion. For example, it was only at the end of the application 
process questions about workforce ethnicity were raised for one business when 
previously this had not been mentioned as an issue in terms of the criteria that 
had to be fulfilled.
“…we’d get to one stage and then meet somebody else and he would 
ask us totally different questions to the people we’d met before then, just 
before finalising it, the chap who offered it us in the end came down to se 
us and he was asking about claiming and the ethnicity of our workforce…
nobody had ever asked us and we were practically at the final stage and 
you think ‘Well, why did nobody mention this before? Why could it not be 
in the report that you asked me to fill in?”. 
SChEME CONdITIONS
There was a great deal of negative commentary on the particular conditions 
associated with assistance provided under the SFIE Scheme as the following 
case illustrates:
“I think the main thing was that neither they nor we understood the 
retention. They call it a floatility (?) retention, but in fact effectively it’s 
holding back money just in case you, you know, pack up and leave. 
Which I can understand that, but they didn’t understand that actually if 
you completed a project earlier than the 3 year time frame that the 20% 
actually stayed there till the end of the third year which is crazy”.
“But you need the grant and you put in the application for the grant and 
there’s a ceiling on the grant, right, about a combination of jobs or capital 
and then they hold this 20%. So you’re actually applying for an 80% grant 
and you get penalised effectively for doing the job early, so the whole 
structure of this 20% is bizarre”.
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One respondent, who received the assistance to help his company to move to 
new premises described how…
“…it was touch and go to get the approval before we actually moved in…
it’s a bit difficult because the criterion is you mustn’t sign for any of your 
requirements [i.e., for the building]. We had to get special permission to 
sign the lease because everything hadn’t been finished…It was a very 
long…process and generally when you’re looking for property you look 
for a long time and if suddenly the right one comes up you can’t hang a 
round…If we’d waited for the DTI we’d have lost the building…we got this 
special permission but even then…but we mustn’t use all of it in any of 
those products before we got the approval. So you’ve got this building…
yet in theory you’re not allowed to sign an order form for any of this 
product which is going to be paid for or contributed towards by the grant 
until you’ve got the grant, which of course is not possible…once the final 
thing goes in…you have to wait 3 or 4 weeks…if we had relied on this 
money to go ahead with the project and here we are 15 months…since we 
actually got possession of the building…then we’d have been in serious 
problems”.
AddITIONALITy OF ASSISTANCE
From the telephone survey we know that in all but one of the cases interviewed, 
in the absence of the grant the business would not have been able to be trading 
at the same level as they are currently. We used the face-to-face interviews to 
investigate these responses in more detail. 
For the business reporting ‘zero’ additionality the following comment was 
made:
“Well yes, because – again confidentially – £120,000 less all expenses 
compared with an outlay of 3 million is very, very small. I mean we’d have 
done it anyway”.
For those cases reporting some additionality we report the following findings. 
In one case the grant added to the total investment and without the grant they 
would have reduced the investment and the impact of this was that the future 
stream of revenues would have been curtailed. In another case the owner would 
have decided to scale back but the grant had raised their growth objectives. In 
other cases the grant enabled the business to remain in operation, while for 
another without it the business would have been unable to start trading. 
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Another owner expressed it like this:
“I think that we would have ended up borrowing more money, but I’m not 
sure … In terms that we financed the assets with the local bank, I mean 
they obviously have their limits in terms of what they will lend against 
assets and I think we were close to the maximum anyway, so I don’t think 
it would have been easy to find the extra £100,000 to £150,000 required to 
invest in the new technology”.
In the case of one of the respondents the additionality from the RSA Scheme 
came in the form of the company concerned reaching a point of ‘modernisation’ 
earlier than it otherwise would have done. This ‘modernisation’ all stemmed 
from the grant enabling the company’s move to new premises and then having 
enough funds for further equipment purchases that the new premises allowed 
them to exploit. 
“It’s taken us ahead in time. It’s probably taken us two years ahead in the 
equipment and the efficiency that we’ve achieved…when you move when 
you’re limited as to what you can afford to do you stagger things in and 
we did do so, but knowing that we had to spend this amount of money to 
get the grant it made us do things we wouldn’t have done for a couple of 
years…we did advance technically further than we would have otherwise 
done I think – this quickly”. 
If the grant was provided in a different way how would the assisted businesses 
react? For a number of cases the grant supported the balance sheet to add to 
shareholders funds and to reduce the gearing which had constrained the banks 
from lending in the past. The fact that the grant adds to ‘free cash flow’ is highly 
significant in its role to unlock finance from traditional sources. Making the grant 
into an interest-free loan would reduce its value to the firm because it would add 
to both assets and liabilities. 
“Well, it would be very difficult for a private company to accommodate that 
sort of thing. A loan is obviously not as good as a grant and we can get 
loans from anywhere. You can get loans so that’s not much of a help”.
In all the cases the use of venture capital was ruled out by the private owners. 
This is consistent with the traditional ranking of sources of finance that takes 
place in private companies. This suggests that the key to this ranking of finance 
is the degree to which it leaves the existing management in control. 
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IMPACT OF ASSISTANCE ON ThE BuSINESS
It was quite clear that the capacity of all the cases was increased by the 
investment supported by the SFIE scheme. In addition, for the majority of 
the project investments there was some technical change associated with the 
purchase of the capital equipment. In two of the cases the new capital equipment 
was combined with a brand new facility which enabled the production process 
to be completely redesigned. 
The new capital equipment in many of the cases will significantly add to the 
services that they could provide, especially for cases operating in sectors of 
manufacturing where the old ways were no longer tenable and would have 
led to an inevitable decline of the business over time. The new elements were, 
therefore, critical to their future. But there was a conditionality associated with 
this in a number of the businesses – in other words would the management be 
able to fully exploit the opportunities presented in part because of the sheer 
scale of internal change that had been instigated. 
The conclusion is that the large scale investment that these grants support is 
something that makes an appreciable difference to the individual businesses 
concerned. In many cases, whilst the grant did not on its own tempt the firms 
into making these decisions it acted to increase the size of the investment and 
to emphasize the growth element of the business decision. 
In the case of one respondent the SFIE money funded a move to newer, bigger 
premises, these allowed several things to happen within the company. 
“…we were growing…and we’d just come to a stop because once you 
overload a warehouse you block things up…we were getting to that 
stage…you write these grand things down and you think ‘By golly, I’m 
not going to get the money unless I spend it’, so you just spend it, but…
not wastefully…we did advance technically…Particularly going to the 
computer controlled stock control. And this can be developed into all sorts 
of things and later on we’ll do order picking as well…It’s only just come in, 
but we can see it doing it [improving efficiency] and accuracy particularly 
to see the accountability of stock around the building… We would have 
done the move anyway, but we would not have equipped ourselves as 
quickly to become…efficient…It’s not just the equipment, but we also built 
a mezzanine floor to cater for a new show room…that is good for showing 
off to customers because the customers are impressed by the building….
These are things without the grant or without the potential of the money 
coming from the grant in the future we wouldn’t have outlaid that amount 
of money at that stage…we’ve never had so many customers visiting us 
as there are now and I’m sure because it’s a nicer place to visit”. 
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The point being raised at the end of this quote supports a point that we have 
made on many occasions about the evaluation. It is the totality of the financial 
assistance that is important to the recipient and not the actual amount of money 
that they end up receiving. Receiving only 80 per cent of the latest amount 
offered would not have reduced the effects highlighted by this respondent.
WIdER BENEFITS
The case studies brought out some wider benefits from the SFIE scheme. 
Obviously the support is for firm’s capital expenditure; which adds to the sum 
of investment. Many of the firms introduced embodied technical change in the 
capital expenditure and were in the process of realizing the productivity benefits. 
Most of the capital expenditure enabled the firms to increase capacity. 
For two of the cases there were strong links to local universities (in the North 
East and the North West) as a result of the assisted project and KTP schemes 
were also being used to facilitate this link. The businesses were operating in the 
chemical and food sectors and were heavily reliant on R&D activity to ensure 
ongoing product development in very competitive markets.
Other ways the assisted business can help develop a professional business base 
in the assisted areas is revealed through the following comment from a recent 
start-up:
“…but we are very keen on the training and we’re actively talking at the 
moment to get involved in a scheme whereby our managers are able 
to perform in groups with non-competing other managers and that is 
effectively my way of association and linkage and this, that and the other 
whereby they go and do a theme but it allows them to be able to transfer 
that knowledge and experience….”
In a number of the cases the relationship between the business and local 
regeneration projects was strong and the individuals running the businesses 
had been active in playing a strategic role in the local area. Their businesses 
were highly ‘tuned’ to the needs of the local area in terms of providing both 
skilled jobs, and more generally, a quality profitable business at the core of the 
regeneration project.
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The SFIE assisted firms were located in less advantaged areas. Consequently, 
the firms were recruiting and training people in areas of disadvantage: as one 
chief executive said: 
“I mean the best illustration of that is our apprentice training scheme. 
We started the apprentices year one and we’ve now had 2 qualified. It’s 
a 4 year apprenticeship. 2 have come all the way through the time and 
they’re now a year into their professional career now. We’ve got 4 who 
finished at college this year, so they’ve done their 4 years and we’ve still 
got 8 still at college and we’ve recruited 4 more apprentices this year. So 
our commitment to training and developing apprentice engineers through 
to fully skilled engineers is really very evident. We have got certainly 
more than our fair share of fully skilled machinists. With the sort of level 
of complexity that we’ve got, really we don’t want people just to operate 
and push runs. We need a skill. We would like ideally a skilled engineer on 
every machine. That would be our aim. We can’t do that cost effectively. 
We can use some semi-skilled labour, but even that we’re taking people 
from the [dying] trades in the city and re-training into engineering”. 
Another example was of re-location where the firms now recruited to an area 
with Objective 1 status from an area of relative prosperity in the region. 
“Without the grant I think we would have moved nearer to the motorway…
again you’ve got to get the employees out there…but here we don’t 
have any problems recruiting here because we’ve got ……a large town 
with relatively high unemployment. If the SFIE hadn’t been available we 
wouldn’t have moved to …we would have gone nearer to junction XX”.
The grant scheme therefore has helped firms to locate in areas that have a need 
for employment, and to train the local employees. 
There were other benefits that were not captured by the econometrics. One 
example of the grant helped a company face future environmental issues. The 
CEO described the existing facility thus: 
“It was put in in the nineties, it’s still a good facility but with all the 
environmental issues surrounding it.. you need certification to be able 
to run the process. ….it’s a heavily controlled process.. you get waste 
which is getting ever more expensive to remove, you know the polluter 
pays concept. Gas with the recent energy spikes is a growing cost and it’s 
becoming a process that you can see over time will actually become very 
cost ineffective”. 
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And the impact of investment in this firm would be to probably reduce the costs 
of their customers because there would be a process that would no longer be 
required:
“They will get a product that should reduce their costs. A lot of plants have 
a de-greasing facility before they start well you won’t need to de-grease 
this”. 
There were wider benefits from the grants. First, there were examples of the 
grant influencing location decisions to the benefit of disadvantaged local areas. 
Moreover, the benefits were in both employment and workforce training because 
inevitably both were required. Second, there were examples where other 
benefits that were less easily quantified: environmental, and with potential cost 
savings for customers, again something that is not picked up in the econometric 
modelling. 
The perceived wider benefits of the SFIE grant were listed by one respondent as 
a direct result of the move to a new single premises from three separate sites. 
This has meant that the company has moved into…
“…recycling. We recycle as much as we can which wasn’t worth it when 
you were working from three places, but now we’re in one unit we can 
do so…we’ve now got a compactor so with cartons and stuff like that we 
compact them and sell them for recycling rather than just putting them in 
a skip…”. 
Clearly the move to new premises has facilitated a more environmentally 
sensitive approach by the company concerned. 
6.8 RSA/SFIE Non Take-up Survey
It was decided to approach those businesses on the database52 that had ‘declined 
the offer’ in order to ascertain the reason for this and to develop another 
perspective on the issue of ‘additionality’. Overall, 15 interviews were undertaken 
with businesses that had declined an offer of financial assistance under either 
the RSA or SFIE Scheme in England: 8 RSA cases and 7 SFIE cases.
The following areas were explored with these non-take-up cases (see 
Appendix 5):
reasons that led to an application to the RSA/SFIE Scheme for financial ●●
assistance in the first place
proportion of total project costs sought from the RSA/SFIE Scheme●●
other sources of finance used to fund the project●●
52 There were 106 RSA/SFIE cases in both England and Scotland but only 47 had useable contact details. Of these, 
interviews were undertaken with 22 businesses: 15 in England and 7 in Scotland.
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circumstances that eventually led the firm/plant to decline the offer of financial ●●
assistance under the RSA/SFIE Scheme
what happened to the project (proceeded/abandoned):●●
If abandoned – reasons for abandoning the project and who took ●■
this decision (e.g., management at this site/parent company in UK/
overseas)
If proceeded – did it proceed as initially envisaged – and if Yes, how was ●■
the project then funded in the absence of financial assistance under the 
RSA/SFIE Scheme. If No – how was the project changed and what were 
the reasons for changing the nature of the project – an who took this 
decision (management at this site/parent company in UK/overseas)
The reasons for approaching the RSA/SFIE Schemes reflected a range of 
business development activities all designed to expand the business through 
new product/service ideas, relocation or through the physical expansion of the 
existing premises. For the RSA cases there had been previous involvement with 
the scheme and they were returning for further assistance.
When asked why they had turned down the offer of assistance the responses fell 
into two broad categories, with the majority of responses falling into the second 
category:
Scheme issues●●  – The length of time to reach a decision – offer came too late; 
too many tie-ins and conditions; grant to project costs ratio – “had to spend 
too much to get the level of grant we were looking for”; clause that states that 
you are not allowed to purchase anything until you have actually received the 
funding was an issue.
Business issues●●  – the project was abandoned as contracts fell through; lack 
of other funding; premises became available in current location therefore no 
need to move into a Tier 1 location, or too expensive in the assisted area; 
owners/shareholders decided not to proceed; change of ownership
Following on from this was the question of what happened the project once 
the offer had been declined. In all but one of the SFIE cases, and in 5 of the 8 
RSA cases, the project was abandoned altogether. The main reason for this was 
that the required funding could not be found elsewhere. Of the 4 projects that 
proceeded 2 of them did so as initially envisaged with no ‘scaling down’ of the 
investment. 
Both of these firms had complained at length about the conditions associated 
with the financial assistance. The funding for these projects was raised internally 
which might suggest very little additionality would have been associated with 
these two cases, although what was not probed was the degree to which these 
internal funds could have been utilised elsewhere in the business to achieve 
other outcomes which might have benefited the local/regional economy. 
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6.9 Summary
Generally, the majority of respondents in the sample of RSA and SFIE 
beneficiaries reported benefits for their businesses. The most common effects 
were on productivity and sales growth with development in management 
practices and innovation management some of the least often cited impacts. 
Two statistically significant differences were evident between the effects cited 
by RSA and SFIE respondents relating to improved staff knowledge or skills and 
improved technical understanding and capability. In both cases a positive effect 
was more often cited from SFIE beneficiaries than from RSA beneficiaries. 
Overall, however, the percentage of respondents reporting these ‘softer’ effects 
are high and support the interpretation that the new SFIE Scheme has the 
potential to continue to enhance the competitiveness of the recipient firms in 
future years.
Levels of deadweight (i.e., wholly non-additional) for both RSA and SFIE-assisted 
business and/or plants appear low (3-5%) with the majority of firms citing some 
form of partial additionality in terms of either achieving business outcomes 
more quickly or to a greater extent. Complete additionality occurred in around 
20 per cent of cases. 
An overall employment effect for the programme in mid-2006 was estimated. 
With respect to safeguarded jobs the assisted businesses had received financial 
assistance to protect 10,130 jobs and we can now estimate that 8,884 of these 
jobs had actually been secured at the time of the survey. Of the 9,660 ‘promised’ 
new jobs we can estimate that 4,289 jobs have been created at the time of the 
survey. We the self-reported estimates of additionality to arrive at an estimate of 
the number of net additional jobs associated with the SFIE Scheme in the period 
2004-06: 1,875 safeguarded jobs were secured and that 905 net new jobs were 
created as a result of the financial assistance received. 
The general conclusion to be drawn from the 10 case studies is that the SFIE 
Scheme has achieved outcomes that are clearly additional to the regional 
economy and that it can be positively connected to business performance in 
recent years. There were some direct criticisms of the operation of the SFIE 
Scheme and they mainly concerned the bureaucracy and the need to employ 
outside consultants on occasions to complete the application process. There 
is some evidence from the non take-up survey that the length of time to reach 
a decision led to the abandonment of the project. Nevertheless, the comments 
from the senior managers or owners of these businesses demonstrate that 
the SFIE Scheme has made important contributions to changing the capacity 
and competitiveness of manufacturing businesses as well as enabling mobile 
foreign-owned businesses to view the UK as a viable business location in an 
increasingly competitive global economy. 
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Chapter 7: RDA 
Case Officer Survey: 
Operational Issues
7.1 Introduction
The RDA Case Officers’ survey was intended to discover how case officers dealt 
with applications for the SFIE. In particular we were interested in the ease of the 
process for making the decisions and the way in which the case officers were 
making those decisions. The relevant theory suggests that the implementers of 
policy tend to choose more routine and administratively comfortable cases53. 
The extent to which case officers believe applications to be straightforward 
would tend to mitigate any ‘policy adjustment’ at the case officer level. Allied 
to this is a debate over the appropriateness of rules versus discretion in the 
implementation of policy. 
The survey had a total of 25 responses of which most were from individuals who 
were both appraising and monitoring applications. For fifteen of the case officers 
SFIE occupied all their working week, of the rest it occupied over 70 per cent for 
six, half the working week for 2 and for two others it occupied a lower proportion 
although for one this was only a recent reduction from much higher levels. Many 
of the case officers had previously held similar positions and their expertise 
was mainly developed through experience, supplemented with accountancy 
and business qualifications (32% had formal accountancy qualifications). Their 
number of appraisals varied from single figures (3 respondents) to over 200 
with most having assessed between 10 and 99 applications. The case officers 
between them reported that they had assessed a total of 930 applications. There 
is a wealth of experience to draw upon for the operation of the SFIE Scheme in 
the RDAs. 
The first question concerning the scheme concerned the way in which firms 
found out about the scheme. This confirmed the key role that intermediaries play 
in the scheme. Overwhelmingly case officers believed that the main route to the 
scheme is through business support organizations, such as Business Links or 
Chambers of Commerce. The only other group that came close was the presence 
of professional advisers. This is similar to the experience of other specialist 
financiers and indeed there was a scheme of ‘investment readiness’ to prepare 
firms for investment. 
53 Lipsky, M (1971) “Street level bureaucracy and the analysis of urban reform, Urban Affairs Quarterly 6, 391-409. 
For an example in UK business support see Mole K (2002) Street level technocracy in UK small business support, 
Environment and Planning C, 20, 179-194
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Table 7.1: What is the MAIN route by which businesses find out about 
the SFIE Scheme?
Route Number of 
Responses
%
Direct approach from RDA personnel 0 0
Leaflets from the RDA 1 4.2
Recommendation from other businesses in the region 0 0
Previous beneficiary of RSA Scheme 1 4.2
Referral from BERR 0 0
Referral from Business Support Organisations (e.g. Business 
Links, Chambers of Commerce
16 66.7
Information/Direction from Parent Company 0 0
Other (included professional advisers, local authorities, PDA press 
and publicity) 
6 25
7.2 Comparing the RSA and SFIE Schemes
The second issue that we explored was whether case officers believed that the 
SFIE scheme was an improvement on the older RSA scheme. The vast majority 
of case officers understood the rationale for the scheme, with just 3 suggesting 
that they only partly understood the rationale. 
The reasons given by the respondents for the introduction of the SFIE Scheme 
were to increase the emphasis on productivity and skills (11 out of 15) and to 
increase quality (2 out of 15) in an open ended question that was coded by the 
research team. Case officers mentioned the GVA tests which they believed had 
‘raised the bar’ but made it more difficult and less transparent a process as far 
as the firms were concerned. A case officer put it like this: 
“More rigorous appraisal process but this may be due to change in 
administration of the scheme rather than the scheme itself. Projects have 
been far more successful than those approved by the Government Office 
under RSA scheme. Volume of applications has probably reduced however 
due to the hurdles of GVA test etc. Also companies are put off applying as 
it is perceived as an arduous, difficult process” 54.
When asked about whether the SFIE Scheme has produced higher quality 
applications there was some disagreement (Table 7.2). Those who suggested 
that the scheme needed other changes included some discussion concerning the 
quality bar. Whilst one suggested skills were less of a problem. 
54 This point also emerged in the discussion with the owner-managers/Financial Directors of the 10 SFIE beneficiaries 
that were included as Case Studies (see Chapter 6).
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“I think the scheme needs to be aware that some projects are of good 
quality but the skill levels are low. This shouldn’t hinder the company’s 
chances of gaining financial support”. 
Table 7.2: Higher Quality Project Applications under SFIE Scheme 
Answer ONLY if you have direct case work experience of the RSA Scheme: 
Do you think that the changes made with the introduction of the SFIE Scheme have produced higher quality (e.g. 
labour skills and/or degree of R&D and innovation) project applications?





Others were more concerned to increase the ‘quality bar’. 
“A slight increase in quality but perhaps the quality bar should be higher 
still – which then gives a better return for the taxpayer’s investment”.
“Higher cost-per-job limits for higher quality jobs. Limit assistance for 
NVQ2 jobs”.
One suggested that in their area the bar had been deliberately set higher. 
Although 17 out of 22 (77%) believed that the SFIE Scheme guidelines were 
straightforward to operate there were a number of issues that were commented 
upon including: 
“Guidelines need to be regularly reviewed and kept up to date, in particular 
the annexes on EC market assessments and likely displacement in the 
manufacturing sectors”. 
“Although very long (and thus in theory comprehensive) the guidelines 
are open to interpretation and at times very hard to understand to the 
uninitiated, e.g. section on restrictions, Annex and Non Annex 1 foods”.
We asked case officers to compare the RSA and SFIE schemes directly. It was clear 
that the case officers believed that the SFIE scheme had increased in complexity 
for applicants (Table 7.3). This was borne out from the SFIE case studies which 
revealed that many assisted businesses are using consultants to prepare the 
application for them as they found the process very time consuming.
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Table 7.3: SFIE Scheme Guidelines
If you experienced the pre-2004 RSA Scheme, overall, how do the guidelines for the SFIE Scheme compare with 










operation as a 
Case Officer









0% (0) 6% (1) 53% (9) 12% (2) 0% (0) 29% (5) 3.08
Complexity of 
scheme criteria
0% (0) 19% (3) 50% (8) 0% (0) 0% (0) 31% (5) 2.73
Total Respondents 17
7.3 SFIE Scheme Criteria
If it is difficult for the clients to be aware of the complex procedures we were 
also interested in those elements of the SFIE Scheme criteria that the case 
officers believed were more difficult or easy for them to assess (Table 7.4). Not 
surprisingly location was the easiest criteria to assess followed by eligibility and 
skills. The most difficult to assess was the need by the business for the financial 
assistance. 
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Table 7.4: Assessment of SFIE Scheme Criteria
To what extent do you find the criteria for the SFIE Scheme to be easy or hard to assess?
hard to 
assess (1)




Location 0% (0) 0% (0) 5% (1) 9% (2) 73% (16) 14% (3) 4.79
Need 5% (1) 33% (7) 29% (6) 14% (3) 5% (1) 14% (3) 2.78
Eligible 
Investment
0% (0) 0% (0) 9% (2) 23% (5) 55% (12) 14% (3) 4.53
Skills 0% (0) 0% (0) 9% (2) 45% (10) 32% (7) 14% (3) 4.26
Viability 0% (0) 14% (3) 36% (8) 32% (7) 5% (1) 14% (3) 3.32
Quality of the 
Project




5% (1) 5% (1) 27% (6) 45% (10) 5% (1) 14% (3) 3.47
Total Respondents 22
The flavour of the comments below shows that the vague and subjective nature 
of the concepts of need and viability are more difficult for the case officers to 
assess, and it does require some judgement. Officers commented: 
“Need and Viability can be difficult to assess due to the experience of the 
applicant in seeking grant support. Validity of forecasts can be difficult to 
prove whereas the areas such as the skills test provide a simple pass or 
fail”. 
“Additionality is a subjective judgement”
“Need and viability are generally hard to assess as they depend on 
forecasts, peoples’ attitudes to risk, peoples’ attitude to borrowing, 
peoples’ investment criteria, etc”.
We followed this up by asking the extent to which each of the assessment criteria 
made a contribution to the decision that was reached about individual projects 
(Table 7.5). Despite the difficulty in assessing these criteria the assessment of 
project viability and the need for assistance were perceived by the case officers 
as two of the most important criteria for decisions about the individual projects. 
What is perhaps surprising from the responses is that project quality, skills 
and national and regional benefits are slightly less likely to be rated as critical 
element of the overall decision about individual projects.
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Table 7.5: Relative Importance of the SFIE Scheme Criteria









Location 0% (0) 0% (0) 14% (3) 5% (1) 68% (15) 14% (3) 4.63
Need 0% (0) 0% (0) 14% (3) 23% (5) 50% (11) 14% (3) 4.42
Eligible 
Investment
0% (0) 0% (0) 9% (2) 27% (6) 50% (11) 14% (3) 4.47
Skills 0% (0) 0% (0) 18% (4) 45% (10) 23% (5) 14% (3) 4.05
Viability 0% (0) 0% (0) 5% (1) 36% (8) 45% (10) 14% (3) 4.47
Quality of the 
Project




0% (0) 0% (0) 27% (6) 45% (10) 14% (3) 14% (3) 3.84
Total Respondents 22
There were other parties involved in the overall decision to provide financial 
assistance under the SFIE Scheme that were rated highly by case officers 
(Table 7.6): for example, members of the Regional Industrial Advisory Board 
or sub-regional partners including sector forums. One might suspect that these 
represented both the personal and professional network of the individual case 
officer. 
Table 7.6: Role of Other Parties in the Decision-Making Process
Please indicate the value of the contribution of other parties in the decision-making about individual projects?
Response Average
Regional Industrial Advisory Board 3.81
BERR SFIE Team 3.56
BERR Market Analysts 3.38
Industrial Development Advisory Board 2.50
IDU 2.46
The case officers suggested by a 2-1 majority that manufacturing firms were 
preferred under the scheme. This quote is typical: 
“Manufacturing businesses, those industries reliant on capital investment. 
The scheme is not suited as well to technology businesses”.
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Another case officer was more expansive concerning the sectors they felt were 
excluded from the SFIE Scheme: 
“SMEs, BMEs and some service sectors were excluded”.
7.4 SFIE Scheme Impact
In the overall assessment of the SFIE scheme the respondents were asked 
about the overall contribution that the SFIE Scheme had made to the region. 
The average responses are shown in Table 7.7. Case officers saw the greatest 
contribution of the scheme in their region to jobs (creating and safeguarding 
jobs) and rather less on increasing innovation. This is consistent with their 
earlier responses on the relative importance of the SFIE Scheme criteria in their 
decision to award financial assistance. There is perhaps a slight concern that this 
emphasis on jobs might result from the relatively smaller role assigned to skills 
and project quality by the case officers in the final decision about an individual 
project (see Table 7.5). 
Table 7.7: Regional Impact of the SFIE Scheme
Thinking about the SFIE scheme overall, can you indicate what you consider to be the most important effects of 
the Scheme to date in your region?
Response Average
Increasing or safeguarding jobs 4.45
Create or safeguard skilled jobs 4.10
Generate positive spillover effects on local economic development 4.00
Improve GVA by increasing productivity 3.68
Generate positive spillover effects on enterprise 3.35
Generate positive spillover effects on skills 3.32
Generate positive spillover effects on innovation 3.00
7.5 Summary
Overall, the survey suggests that case officers are reasonably happy about the 
SFIE Scheme. On the whole the guidelines were well received. Some believe that 
‘the bar’ is slightly too low; others believe it is too high. In any event respondents 
suggest that the region has the discretion to increase the ‘quality bar’. The way 
applicants find out about the Scheme is often through their contacts with other 
organizations involved in business support, which might suggest some joined-
up element in the operation of industrial development policy. 
The case officers’ survey highlighted the increased complexity of the SFIE 
Scheme for applicants and the difficulty of assessing both need and viability, 
critical components of the overall decision to grant support under the scheme. 
The complexity for the clients relates back to the connection between other 
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organizations involved in business support. It is clear that some knowledge 
of the way the businesses are to be assessed is required for a successful 
application. This again highlights the role of intermediaries/consultants in the 
SFIE grant process. In the case of venture capital, intermediaries are often seen 
as important to provide ‘investment ready’ projects that increase the quality of 
the deal flow. 
There are a number of case officers who see that judgement of need and viability 
of the business as more difficult. Typically case officers were using financial 
data to assess need and there maybe some differences in their comfort with 
these judgments; yet those with previous accountancy training also found these 
assessments more difficult.. Overall, however, one might argue that these are 
realistic statements: it is difficult to assess the need for grant assistance! 
Guidelines always need to be interpreted and experience from other government 
services suggests that this interpretation can differ from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. 
In terms of local discretion there does seem to be some impact of a link between 
the Regional Economic Strategy and the SFIE Scheme. Some regions are using 
SFIE to target particular issues and clusters; others have decided to increase 
the quality bar to support high skilled workers. Again this may indicate some 




The RSA Scheme has been the subject of a number of evaluations since the early 
1980s (see King, 1990, PACEC, 1993 and AEP, 2000) covering the periods 1980-84, 
1985-88 and 1991-95. These studies have used different methodologies to isolate 
the effects of RSA financial assistance on the performance of recipient firms 
and plants. All have been reliant upon the analysis of BERR’s client information 
together with a survey of recipient firms/plants. None have involved a survey of 
non-assisted firms.
OuR APPROACh 
In order to address each of these components of the evaluation study the 
research team adopted a broad methodology which encompassed a variety of 
methodological approaches ranging from econometric modelling to face-to-face 
interviews with both RSA and SFIE Scheme beneficiaries, as well as surveys 
of the RDA Case Officers and those businesses who were offered financial 
assistance under both the RSA and SFIE Schemes but who subsequently 
declined it. However, the core of the evaluation methodology is the application of 
econometric modelling techniques which seek to ascertain the net effects of RSA 
assistance after controlling for the effects of ‘selection bias’ by incorporating a 
non-assisted group of firms and plants to embed a counterfactual in the analysis. 
The econometric analysis is based on a bespoke survey of around 700 assisted 
and non-assisted businesses. It is this econometric approach which allows us to 
generate estimates of the contribution of the RSA Scheme to value-added in the 
UK and arrive at some estimate of value for money.
These econometric evaluation techniques are applied to the evaluation of the 
RSA Scheme for the first time and represent considerable methodological 
improvement upon previous evaluations of the RSA Scheme which have relied 
upon a self-assessment method of ascertaining project additionality.
Nevertheless, in order to be able to make some sort of assessment of the net 
effect of the SFIE Scheme on beneficiary firms and plants we are obliged to 
follow previous evaluation methods and obtain data from assisted firms on the 
scale of additionality associated with the assistance that they received. While 
this was primarily designed for the interim evaluation of the SFIE Scheme we 
do also collect it from RSA beneficiaries for general comparative purposes. This 
is the only mechanism available to us which allows us to make comparative 
net benefit and value for money assessments between the two schemes. It is 




We set out below the key findings of our ‘separate’ evaluations of the two schemes 
and where possible discuss the direct comparisons in terms of characteristics of 
assisted businesses, scheme effects and operational issues. 
8.2 Regional Selective Assistance (RSA)
The survey that was designed for this evaluation enabled us to compare the 
characteristics and performance of RSA beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries and 
the key points are:
RSA beneficiaries grew faster than non-beneficiaries both before and after ●●
receiving assistance.
Over the period 2004 and 2006 growth in GVA of the RSA beneficiaries is ●●
more rapid than that of non-beneficiaries. However, with respect to GVA per 
head growth the difference in mean growth rate is not statistically significant 
due to the larger size of RSA beneficiaries in terms of employment.
RSA beneficiaries tended to be younger (average 24.4 years) than non-RSA ●●
beneficiaries (34.4 years).
RSA beneficiaries also tended to be larger than non-beneficiaries both in ●●
terms of employment in the assisted site but also in terms of employment in 
the whole company.
RSA beneficiaries are more export oriented and less focussed on local ●●
markets than the general population of firms and operate in more price 
elastic markets. They are also less likely to be selling to the public sector and 
individual consumers than firms in the general population.
Finally, RSA beneficiaries are more likely to be undertaking R&D and product ●●
and process innovation than non-beneficiaries.
In general terms these observations are consistent with the targeting of RSA 
assistance on larger firms which might be expected to have many of the 
characteristics highlighted above. Further, it would appear that RSA assistance 
has been targeted at firms what are more likely to benefit from that assistance. 
This descriptive comparative evidence means that the issue of selection is of 
crucial importance to the evaluation and as a result reinforces the choice of 
methodology for this study.
ECONOMETRIC RESuLTS (ChAPTER 5)
The findings of the econometric investigation are broadly supportive of a 
positive RSA intervention. There are clearly two separate groups of firms within 
these data. While there is little evidence that the recipients of RSA are those that 
will generate the highest employment growth, it does stimulate employment in 
domestic firms, and is largely associated with firms with an international and 
national, rather than local focus. R&D however seems largely unrelated to RSA. 
RSA paid to MNEs, however, seems largely associated with encouraging firms 
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to stay in the Assisted Areas, rather than grow, and grant size is more important 
than the existence of RSA in generating employment.
However, this may under-estimate the effects of RSA financial support due to the 
benefits not being fully realised and a small proportion of the safeguarded jobs 
not being fully captured in the employment growth model. Sensitivity analysis 
would suggest that this is not a significant issue in the analysis.
8.3 Selective Finance for Investment in England (SFIE)
The rationale for the introduction of the new SFIE Scheme in April 2004 to replace 
the old RSA Scheme is discussed in Chapter 2. Although it is impossible to 
conduct a like-for-like evaluation of the two schemes the evaluation methodology 
did contain various components which allow us to comment on the operation of 
the new SFIE Scheme compared to its predecessor.
ChARACTERISTICS OF SFIE ANd RSA (ChAPTER 4)
Comparing RSA and SFIE beneficiaries in the survey is complicated by the fact 
that the replacement scheme was designed to include assistance to firms which 
would normally have been supported under the Enterprise Grant Scheme. For 
that reason the comparison of the two Schemes is limited. However, we do 
endeavour to control for this by presenting data on those SFIE assisted business 
who had received £100,000 or more in grant support (n=47). The results of this 
comparison reveal that SFIE beneficiaries are more likely to:
be smaller firms (i.e., less than 50 employees)●●
have younger owner-managers (i.e., less than 45 years)●●
have a business plan although this is clearly connected to the application ●●
process and the use of consultants (see Chapter 6)
be less likely to report ‘maintaining sales for current products and services’ ●●
as a business objective
be less export oriented and more locally focused in terms of sales●●
be operating in markets which were less price sensitive●●
have local suppliers and had higher levels of local purchasing●●
EFFECTS ON BuSINESS BEhAvIOuR (ChAPTER 6)
Generally, the majority of respondents (more than two-thirds in most areas of 
impact) from the two samples of SFIE and RSA beneficiaries reported benefits 
for their businesses. The most common effects were on productivity and sales 
growth with developments in management practice and innovation management 
some of the least often cited impacts. Two statistically significant differences 
were evident between the effects cited by RSA and SFIE respondents relating 
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to improved staff knowledge or skills and improved technical understanding 
and capability. In both cases a positive effect was more often cited from SFIE 
beneficiaries than from RSA beneficiaries. 
The conclusion from the 10 SFIE case studies is that the large scale investment 
that these grants support is something that makes an appreciable difference to 
the individual businesses concerned. In many cases, whilst the grant did not 
on its own tempt the firms into making these decisions, it acted to increase the 
size of the investment and to emphasize the growth element of the business 
decision. 
SELF-REPORTEd AddITIONALITy (ChAPTER 6)
Levels of deadweight from both RSA and SFIE appear low with the majority of 
firms citing some form of partial additionality in terms of either achieving business 
outcomes more quickly or to a greater extent. Complete additionality occurred 
in around 21 per cent of cases. Interestingly, there was no statistical difference 
between the pattern of responses between the RSA and SFIE beneficiaries. The 
important point to emerge from the survey of SFIE beneficiaries is that a large 
proportion of the benefits associated with the assisted investment project have 
yet to accrue which underlines yet again the difficulty in undertaking evaluations 
too soon after the introduction of a Scheme. Essentially the results for the SFIE 
Scheme should be interpreted as illustrative at this stage of its life-cycle.
COMPARINg SELF-REPORTEd AddITIONALITy ESTIMATES (ChAPTER 6)
The results on self-reported additionality for the three previous evaluations of 
RSA are not completely comparable due to the differing ways in which the various 
degrees of partial additionality, including alternative locations, were addressed 
and also the way in which the assessment was undertaken. Previous BERR 
studies have based the assessment on both the interviewers’ assessments and 
the response from the respondent, whereas in our evaluation the respondent’s 
reply was recorded without further review.
The most important point to emerge from the comparison is that the extent of 
wholly non-additionality associated with RSA financial assistance has fallen 
dramatically in the current evaluation covering the 2000-2004 period. The 
previous estimate of around a fifth (based on an agreed interviewer/respondent 
assessment) in 1991-95 has fallen to only 2.8 per cent, although it is only 
approximately half that found in the 1985-88 evaluation. Full additionality has 
shown some fluctuation over the four evaluation periods but an average figure 
of around 23 per cent would appear to be useful generalisation. One obvious 
inference to make from these figures would be that the selection process for 
assisted cases has become much more refined in the last 10 years which has led 
to lower levels of wholly non-additional cases being supported.
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Businesses supported under both the RSA (2000-04) and SFIE Schemes were 
significantly less likely than in previous periods to report that in the absence 
of assistance they would have gone ahead with the project outside the UK, or 
indeed in other regions of the UK. 
SFIE SChEME IMPACT – INITIAL ASSESSMENT (ChAPTERS 6 ANd 7)
Employment
Using the information on new and safeguarded jobs from all the in-scope 
SFIE beneficiaries it is possible to gross up this result to produce an overall 
employment effect for the programme in mid-2006. With respect to safeguarded 
jobs the assisted businesses had received financial assistance to protect 10,130 
jobs and we can now estimate that 8,884 of these jobs had actually been secured 
at the time of the survey. Of the 9,660 ‘promised’ new jobs we can estimate that 
4,289 jobs have been created at the time of the survey. 
How many of these ‘actual’ number of assisted jobs can be considered as 
‘additional’? We can use the self-reported estimates of additionality from the 
survey respondents to arrive at an estimate of the number of net additional jobs 
associated with the SFIE Scheme in the period 2004-06. In summary, we can 
conclude that 1,875 safeguarded jobs were secured and that 905 net new jobs 
were created as a result of the financial assistance received. 
Operational Issues
One of the most important issues that emerged from the interviews with the 
owner-managers and/or financial director of the business was that the process 
of applying for SFIE assistance was complicated and has resulted in many of the 
interviewed firms employing consultants to submit the application at an average 
cost of around £20,000. 
The RDA case officers’ survey highlighted the increased complexity of the SFIE 
Scheme for applicants and the difficulty of assessing both need and viability, 
critical components of the overall decision to grant support under the scheme. 
The complexity for the clients relates back to the connection between other 
organizations involved in business support. It is clear that some knowledge 
of the way the businesses are to be assessed is required for a successful 
application. This again highlights the role of intermediaries/consultants in the 
SFIE grant process. In the case of venture capital, intermediaries are often seen 
as important to provide ‘investment ready’ projects that increase the quality of 
the deal flow. 
A small number of businesses who had received an offer of assistance 
under both RSA and SFIE, but who had subsequently declined the offer were 
contacted. When asked why they had turned down the offer of assistance the 
responses fell into two broad categories – Scheme Issues and Business Issues, 
with the majority of responses falling into the second category. The sorts of 
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reasons advanced by business citing the second category were as follows: the 
project was abandoned as contracts fell through; lack of other funding; premises 
became available in current location therefore no need to move into a Tier 1 
location, or too expensive in the assisted area; owners/shareholders decided not 
to proceed; change of ownership
8.4 Summary
The evaluation of the RSA Scheme (2000-04) and its successor SFIE Scheme 
(2004-06) has produced a range of quantitative and qualitative evidence that 
allows us to conclude that:
RSA SChEME (2000-04)
The findings of the econometric investigation are broadly supportive of a ●●
positive RSA intervention (2000-04) on employment growth in the 2004-06 
period. This was particularly the case for UK-owned single plant businesses.
However, as we have argued in Chapter 5 this may under-estimate the effects ●●
of RSA financial support due to the benefits not being fully realised and a 
small proportion of the safeguarded jobs not being fully captured in the 
employment growth model. 
SFIE SChEME (2004-06)
Evidence would suggest that the beneficiaries under this Scheme are ●●
achieving real business benefits in terms of productivity and that this was 
also associated with increasing skills and technical capability.
There is a high level of full additionality associated with the Scheme (21.1%) ●●
and this has led us to make an interim assessment of net additional job 
creation of 4,289 jobs with a further 87.7 per cent of safeguarded jobs realised 
– that is, 8,884.
There are some concerns about the application and appraisal process which ●●
have been expressed by owner-managers/senior management of assisted 
businesses as well as RDA Case Officers.
By evaluating the effects of RSA financial assistance using this approach has 
resulted in a set of results which, when examined in detail and with different 
econometric approaches, all point in the same direction. Indeed, no previous 
evaluation of the RSA Scheme has opened this ‘black box’ of control variables 
which we know have an influence on firm/plant performance. Put simply, the 
RSA Scheme is positively and significantly associated with the creation of 
employment in the recipient plants after controlling for a large number of these 
control variables as well as controlling for selection bias and endogeneity.
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There is a clear opportunity with this econometric approach, and particularly 
with the use of the actual amount of grant awarded in the estimations, to develop 
cost-per-job estimates and an overall value for money assessment for the RSA 
Scheme in the period 2000-04. Coefficients for the RSA dummy and the value 
of the grant variable in these estimations could be used to this end. This would 
have the advantage of moving away from the reliance upon a self-assessment 
additionality question to arrive at the number of net additional jobs and then 
cost-per-job estimates. However, although this was discussed at length with the 
project Steering Group there was no consensus on the most appropriate method 
to be used. As a result it was decided to re-visit this at a future date.
Our overall conclusion is that both the RSA and SFIE Schemes are delivering 
benefits to the UK economy through net additional employment, higher value-
added and a set of wider benefits that demonstrate linkage into other regional 
priorities such as regeneration, skill enhancement, supplier networks and broader 
environmental agenda. We are much more certain of our conclusion with respect 
to the RSA Scheme which has been evaluated using innovative econometric 
techniques and were the majority of the effects of the financial assistance have 
had time to materialise to be captured in our post-assistance impact period 
of 2004-06. Nevertheless, our analysis of the beneficiaries of financial support 
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